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This thesis presents an examination of three interrelated themes concerning household
investments in the education of children, and how the number of children in a household
a¤ects a households poverty situation in Malawi. These themes cover three chapters.
Chapter 2, investigates two issues regarding household expenditure on primary educa-
tion of own children using the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data.
Firstly, we look at factors which inuence a households decision to spend or not (the par-
ticipation decision), and by how much (the expenditure decision). This is done for urban
and rural households. We nd that there are di¤erences in the factors which inuence
both decision levels for the two groups of households. Secondly, to get a deeper under-
standing of these rural-urban spending di¤erences, the study develops the Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition technique for the independent Double Hurdle model. The proposed decom-
position is done at the aggregate and disaggregated levels. The aggregated decomposition
allows us to isolate the expenditure di¤erences into a part attributable to di¤erences in
characteristics and a part which is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. The detailed (dis-
aggregated) decomposition enables us to pinpoint the major factors behind the spending
gap. At the aggregate decomposition level, our results show that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential is explained by di¤erences in characteristics between rural and ur-
ban households, implying that an equalization of household characteristics would lead to
about 66% of the spending gap disappearing. At the disaggregated decomposition level,
the rural-urban di¤erence in household income is found to be the largest contributor to
the spending gap, followed by quality of access of primary schools. Besides, rural-urban
di¤erences in mothers education and employment are found to contribute more to the
spending di¤erential relative to the same for fathers.
Recognizing that in many African countries parents are not just responsible for the educa-
tion of their own children, Chapter 3 examines the relationship between household income
and schooling costs in the presence of intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological
children. To this end, we construct a two-period model of intrahousehold schooling bias.
The model predicts that there is an asymmetry in the impact of changes in costs and
income on schooling in the sense that the impact is larger for the non-biological child.












biological child and the parents gets wider. It also shows that an increase in cost of
schooling leads to a bigger reduction in schooling for poor households, and that the dif-
ference in the impact of cost changes between the biological and the non-biological child
declines as household income increases i.e. there is convergence. The convergence is faster
the more distantly related to the parents the non-biological child is. An empirical investi-
gation of these predictions using IHS2 data, shows that when current enrolment and grade
attainment are used to measure schooling, the price and income elasticities of schooling
are larger for non-biological children. The results also indicate that households in the low-
est income quintile (the poorest) have the largest price elasticities, and households in the
highest income quintile (the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. We also nd
that the price elasticities for biological and non-biological children converge as we move
from the lowest income quintile to the highest income quintile, and that the convergence
is faster for non-biological children who are non-relatives.
Having looked at among other things the role of household economic status on the edu-
cation investments of children in Malawi in Chapters 2 and 3, in Chapter 4 we turn the
question on its head and investigate the impact of fertility (number of children) on poverty
in rural Malawi. We use two measures of poverty; the objective and the subjective. After
accounting for endogeneity of fertility by using son preference as an instrumental variable,
we nd that fertility increases the probability of being objectively poor. This e¤ect is
robust for all poverty lines used. It is also robust to accounting for economies of scale and
household composition as well as assuming that poverty is continuous. We also nd that
when fertility is treated as an exogenous variable its impact is underestimated. When
poverty is measured subjectively, the results are opposite to those of objective poverty.
We nd that fertility lowers the likelihood of feeling poor, and that fertility is exogenous
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1.1 Background and motivation
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2005, 52.4 % of Malawians were
living below the national poverty line of 44.30 Malawi Kwacha (US$0.50) per day. 22.4%
of the population was classed as ultra poor, living on less than 27.50 Malawi Kwacha
(US$0.31) per day. About 25 percent of the population in urban areas was living in
poverty, compared to 56 percent of the rural population. That is, a person in a rural
area was more than twice as likely to be poor (NSO 2005). For human development,
Malawi was ranked by the United Nations at 164 out of 177 countries in 2007 (UNDP
2007)1. Malawis poverty situation like in many Sub-Saharan African countries is further
compounded by the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In 2005, the estimated adult (age 15-49) HIV
prevalence rate for Malawi was 14.1%. With this high prevalence rate, Malawi was ranked
number eight in the world (UNAIDS 2006). Thus, the twin challenges of high poverty and
high HIV prevalence continue to occupy the attention of donors, government development
planners as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Over the years, economists
and other researchers have proposed policy prescriptions to eradicate or alleviate poverty.
One of the channels out of the dire poverty situation is investment in human capital
formation through the provision of health and education. Low levels of education are
widely considered to be a major impediment to economic growth and the eradication of
poverty in sub-Saharan Africa (Glick and Sahn 2000). It has been argued (e.g. Appleton
et al. 1996), that countries with low literacy and numeracy levels would nd it di¢ cult
to attain high and sustainable levels of economic growth necessary to have a signicant
impact on poverty. Low levels of education in a country can make it more di¢ cult for it to
take advantage of the opportunities o¤ered by a globalized economy where liberalization
1Malawis GDP per capita (PPP US$) was 667 in 2007. This gives the country a rank of 174th out of











2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
and educational expansion can either, in a virtuous cycle, reinforce each other or lead
to a low level equilibrium (Kim and Kim 2000). An educated workforce makes it easier
for a country to adopt the requisite new technologies which would enable it compete
e¤ectively in an increasingly globalized world. Investments in education have other more
subtle and indirect benets. For example, societies with high illiteracy levels have been
shown to be more susceptible to political manipulation, corruption and bad governance,
as well as civil strife and violence, phenomena that undermine human as well as economic
development (Gupta et al. 1998; Ranis et al. 2000).
The accumulation of human capital through investments in education is mostly done
by families and governments. Parents play a crucial role in the education investment
process through their decisions to enrol their children in school, making sure that once
enrolled they stay in school, as well as spending on their education. Economists have long
been concerned with modelling decisions that parents make regarding investments in the
education of their children (see Haveman and Wolfe 1995 for a review). They have looked
at the factors which inuence the direct education expenditures that parents make on their
children. Here there are two strands of literature; those that use aggregated expenditure
where expenditure on education is combined with other items (e.g. Lazear and Michael
1988), and another strand which uses education expenditure as a stand alone item (e.g.
Mauldin et al. 2001; Yueh 2006; Beneito et al. 2001; Song et al. 2006; Kingdon 2005).
While focussing on household expenditure on primary education as a stand alone item, we
advance the understanding of the direct expenditures that parents make on their children
on two fronts;
 we make a distinction between households by whether they reside in rural or urban
areas. Most studies looking at spending on education of children either pool the
rural and urban samples or just look at one sample (e.g. Mauldin et al. (2001)
focus on a pooled sample while Yueh (2006), Song et al. (2006), and Kingdon
(2005) look at rural households only). The rural-urban distinction is important as
the perceived expected rate of return to education may not be the same between
rural and urban areas, due to di¤erences in returns between the formal sector (mostly
urban) and the agricultural sector (mostly rural) (Al-Samarrai and Reilly 2000). The
implication of this is that a households expected return to investing in education
may be di¤erent between the two areas, and hence the spending would also be
di¤erent. The characteristics between the two areas may be dissimilar in the sense
that for example access to schools in terms of distance would be poorer in rural areas,
reecting an urban bias in terms of developmental projects.The rural-urban divide
is also interesting aside from the education spending argument in that most poor
people live in rural areas. One can therefore loosely look at the spatial demarcation










1.1. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION 3
a familys decision to spend on own childrens primary education in rural and urban
Malawi.
 in the light of the rural-urban di¤erences in expenditure, we go a step further to
explain these di¤erences. We propose an extension of the decomposition technique
developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) to the independent double hurdle
model. We then use the proposed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent
double hurdle model to conduct a decomposition of the gap in household expendi-
ture on education between the two areas. The decomposition isolates how much
of the di¤erential in expenditure can be attributed to characteristics (characteristic
e¤ect) and how much is due to di¤erences in returns to those characteristics (coef-
cient e¤ect). The two e¤ects give us an aggregated picture of the reasons for the
expenditure gap, and to move on from this black box explanation of the expendi-
ture gap, we further propose a disaggregated decomposition of the characteristic
e¤ect of the independent double hurdle model. This detailed decomposition allows
us to pinpoint the major factors behind the spending gap. For example, a detailed
decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect provides an understanding of the role of
household income in the rural-urban spending di¤erential.
In many African countries, Malawi inclusive, parents are not only responsible for the edu-
cation of their own children, but they are also responsible for the investments in education
of non-biological children who are put in their care. With the high prevalence rate of HIV
as alluded to earlier, the number of HIV/Aids orphans in Malawi is bound to grow. Thus,
the role that parents play in educating non-biological children in addition to their own
takes on an added signicance. This blending of biological and non-biological children in
families may give rise to schooling discrimination, in the sense that non-biological chil-
dren may receive less schooling relative to biological ones. Given the benets of education,
schooling discrimination may have negative implications on future economic growth and
the ght against poverty. The literature is few and far between on the possible sources of
this discrimination. For example, Case et al. (2004) show that the probability of school
enrollment is inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the house-
hold head, regardless of whether the child is an orphan or not. In addition to the dearth of
economic studies on sources of schooling bias against non-biological children, to the best
of our knowledge there is no study which addresses the issue of what happens to schooling
bias following household income and school cost changes. We therefore make the following
contributions;











4 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
 we demonstrate in the presence of discrimination, how households respond to changes
in household income and school costs, and how the households response to cost
changes varies with income.
 then, we empirically investigate the theoretical predictions. Specically, the em-
pirical analysis seeks to examine using Malawian data, how households respond to
changes in household income and school costs, and how the households response to
cost changes varies with income.
Parents do not just make decisions on the education investments of children, biological
or otherwise, they also decide on how many children to have. The choices that parents
make regarding their family size may have consequences on their households poverty
situation. Studies looking at the impact of fertility (number of children) in Africa are few,
despite the fact that Africa has some of the highest levels of both fertility and poverty in
the world. The few studies (e.g. Chernichovsky 1984; Langani 1997; Cohen and House
1994; Noumbissi and Sanderson 1998) have treated fertility as exogenous, thus ignoring
the potential simultaneity that exists between the two variables as well as the fact that
there are unobserved factors which inuence both variables i.e. unobserved heterogeneity.
Besides, they only focussed on poverty dened in the objective monetary sense which is
a narrower denition of household welfare. Subjective measures of welfare better capture
the multidimensional nature of poverty. In the light of these shortfalls, we make the
following contributions;
 while accounting for the simultaneity and unobserved e¤ects, we investigate how
fertility impacts on objective poverty in Malawi
 we examine how fertility impacts on subjective poverty in Malawi2
The aforementioned contributions are presented in three chapters of the thesis, structured
as follows. In Chapter 2 we look at the rural-urban di¤erences in parental spending on
childrens primary education. Schooling bias against non-biological children is the focus
of Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we ip the question on its head and look at how fertility
impacts on objective and subjective poverty. We nally present the major conclusions of
the thesis in Chapter 5.











Rural-urban di¤erences in parental
spending on childrens primary
education in Malawi
2.1 Introduction
One of the costs of raising children that must be incurred by parents is investing in
their education. There are two major players in investments in human capital of children
namely; the household and the government. Household and government expenditure on
education is both an end in itself and a means for achieving other goals of development,
such as economic growth, poverty reduction, improved health status, greater equity and
reduced fertility (Glewwe and Ilias 1996). The low level of human capital development
in most African countries is considered an obstacle for economic growth as well as the
alleviation of poverty (Glick and Sahn 2000).
The Malawi government in recognition of the crucial role that human capital accumulation
and development plays in fostering economic growth among other benets introduced free
primary education (FPE) in 1994. Under FPE, parents no longer pay tuition fees, however
they still have to pay for other educational expenses including books, uniforms, transport,
contribution for school building and maintenance among other expenses. This means that
households still have to play a role in investing in the primary education of their children.
Besides, they also have to pay for the education of their children when they go to secondary
school.
In this study, we focus on investment in education by families and not government. Econo-
mists have long been concerned with modelling decisions that parents make regarding in-
vestments in the education of their children (see Haveman and Wolfe 1995 for a review).











6 CHAPTER 2. RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES IN PARENTAL SPENDING
1988; Leibowitz 1974, 1977; van der Gaag 1982). They have focused on the factors which
inuence enrolment in primary and secondary schools (e.g. Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu
2007; Glewwe and Ilias 1996). Others have looked at household willingness to pay for the
education of children (e.g. Gertler and Glewwe 1989). Other studies have looked at the
factors which inuence direct education expenditures that parents make on their children.
Here, there are two strands of literature; those that use aggregated expenditure where
expenditure on education is combined with other items (e.g. Lazear and Michael 1988),
and another strand which uses education expenditure as a stand alone item (e.g. Mauldin
et al. 2001; Yueh 2006; Beneito et al. 2001; Song et al. 2006; Kingdon 2005). In this
study, we look at education expenditure as a stand alone item.
While focussing on household expenditure on primary education as a separate item, the
study advances the understanding of the direct expenditures that parents make on their
children in two ways. First, we make a distinction between households by whether they
reside in rural or urban areas1. Most studies looking at spending on education of children
either pool the rural and urban samples or just look at one sample (e.g. Mauldin et al.
(2001) focus on a pooled sample while Yueh (2006), Song et al. (2006), and Kingdon (2005)
look at rural households only). The rural-urban distinction is important as it is shown
in Section 2.4 that there are di¤erences in average expenditure between households in
rural and urban areas. The rural-urban divide is also interesting aside from the education
spending argument in that most poor people live in rural areas. One can therefore loosely
look at the spatial demarcation as poor-rich one. Further to that, Al-Samarrai and Reilly
(2000) contend that the perceived expected rate of return to education may not be the
same between rural and urban areas, due to di¤erences in returns between the formal sector
(mostly urban) and the agricultural sector (mostly rural). The implication of this is that
a households expected return to investing in education may be di¤erent between the two
areas, and hence the spending would also reect this. The characteristics between the two
areas can be dissimilar in the sense that for example access to schools in terms of distance
would be poorer in rural areas, reecting an urban bias in terms of developmental projects.
A more detailed discussion of the reasons why we would expect rural-urban di¤erences in
investment in education are given in the theoretical section. With this distinction in mind,
the study looks at factors which inuence a familys decision to spend on own childrens
primary education in rural and urban Malawi. Specically, here we seek to answer two
interrelated questions; a) what factors inuence the probability that a household spends
or does not spend on own childrens education? This is the participation decision. and b)
what factors a¤ect educational expenditure if a household decides to spend? This is the
expenditure decision.
Second, in the light of these rural-urban di¤erences in expenditure, we go a step further











to explain these di¤erences. To this end, we propose an extension of the decomposition
technique developed by Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973) to the independent double hur-
dle model2. We then use the proposed Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent
double hurdle model to conduct a decomposition of the gap in household expenditure on
education between the two areas. The decomposition isolates how much of the di¤er-
ential in expenditure can be attributed to characteristics (characteristic e¤ect) and how
much is due to di¤erences in returns to those characteristics (coe¢ cient e¤ect), which
we interpret as the di¤erence due to behavioural di¤erences. The two e¤ects give us an
aggregated picture of the reasons for the expenditure gap, and to move on from this black
box explanation of the expenditure gap, we further propose a disaggregated decomposi-
tion of the characteristic e¤ect of the independent double hurdle model3. This detailed
decomposition enables us to pinpoint the major factors behind the spending gap. For
example, a detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect provides an understanding
of the role of household income in the rural-urban spending di¤erential. From a policy
standpoint, while it is important to know whether these expenditure di¤erences arise due
to di¤erences in characteristics of the households or whether they are attributable to be-
havioural di¤erences, it is even more critical that we have knowledge of which individual
characteristics are vital in driving the spending gap.
Our empirical results for the two areas of residence show that di¤erent factors inuence
household expenditure on primary education di¤erently. The level of household income
in rural and urban areas positively and signicantly impacts both the participation and
expenditure decisions. Computed elasticities indicate that spending on education by rural
households is more sensitive to changes in income compared to urban households, suggest-
ing that spending on education in rural areas is a luxury good. We nd that a fathers
and mothers employment status has a bigger impact on spending (at both decision lev-
els) in rural areas compared to urban areas. For both areas, a mothers employment and
education has a larger impact on spending compared to a fathers. Urban households
compared to their rural counterparts are more sensitive to the quality of access of primary
schools as measured by the distance to nearest primary school. We nd no evidence of
gender bias in school spending in urban areas, but rural households exhibit bias in favour
of boys.
Results from the proposed aggregated decomposition indicate that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential is as a result of di¤erences in characteristics and about 34% arises
from behavioural di¤erences (coe¢ cient e¤ect) between rural and urban households. This
suggests that an equalization of household characteristics (behavior) would lead to about
2Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) conduct a decomposition of school enrolment gaps between rural and
urban areas in Tanzania.
3Owing to interpretational problems of the coe¢ cient e¤ect, we do not undertake a disaggregated
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66% (34%) of the spending gap disappearing. Results from the disaggregated decom-
position of the characteristic e¤ect indicate that household income, parental education
and employment, and quality of access of primary schools are the key factors driving the
spending gap. The rural-urban di¤erence in household income is found to be the largest
contributor to the spending gap, followed by quality of access of primary schools. Besides,
rural-urban di¤erences in mothers education and employment are found to contribute
more to the spending di¤erential relative to the same for fathers.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 looks at the education sector in
Malawi. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical underpinnings on which the study is based
as well possible explanations regarding the gaps in spending between rural and urban
households. In Section 2.4 we discuss the model specication, variables used, estimation
issues, and data and descriptives. Econometric results are the focus of Section 2.5. The
extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition technique and results are discussed in
Section 2.6. We nally conclude in Section 2.7.
2.2 Education in Malawi
The formal education system in Malawi is composed of three levels namely; primary,
secondary, and post secondary. Education at all three levels is not compulsory. The
o¢ cial entry age at the primary school level is about six years. Primary school is made of
standards one to eight; which is divided into infant (standards 1-2), junior (standards 3-5),
and senior (standards 6-8). Since 1994, the government introduced free primary education
(FPE), which entailed that parents no longer had to pay fees for the primary education
of children who attend government schools. Private primary schools however continue
to charge fees. At the end of the eight years of primary education, pupils sit for the
primary school leaving certicate examination (PSLCE). This is a national exam which
determines eligibility of entry into secondary school. Secondary school education takes
four years; the Junior Certicate level (Forms 1 and 2), and the Malawi School Certicate
level (Forms 3 and 4). Parents pay for the secondary education of their children. So
the primary-secondary education cycle takes twelve years4. The length of post secondary
education depends on the type of education programme. University education takes about
three years for a diploma, four to ve years for a degree. In the recent past, Malawi
has experienced a mushrooming of private providers of education at all three levels of
education.
In 2005, four out of ve pupils attending primary education were in government schools.
The next highest providers of primary education were religious institutions. Almost sev-
enteen percent of pupils attending primary school were in religious institutions (National
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Statistical O¢ ce 2005). Although government is the dominant provider of secondary
education, the rate is slightly lower compared to that of primary education. In 2005,
government was providing secondary education to 65 percent of all the pupils attending
secondary education relative to 80 percent in primary education. The situation is di¤er-
ent for private schools. More secondary school pupils attended private schools relative to
those in primary education. Nearly one in every three pupils attending secondary educa-
tion were at private institutions. In terms of area of residence in 2005, 81% of primary
school pupils in urban and rural areas attended government schools. This suggests that
the majority of primary school pupils in the two areas are in government schools. There is
however a marked di¤erence in attendance at secondary level, with 42% and 76% of pupils
attending government secondary schools in urban and rural areas respectively. It has also
been noted that the substitution by households for private providers is highest for those
in the upper expenditure quantiles (National Statistical O¢ ce 2005). At the university
level, government remains a major provider, until 1998 the University of Malawi was the
only university.
2.3 Theoretical framework
2.3.1 Human capital theory
The theoretical framework on which this study is based is the human capital theory (Becker
1981; Becker and Tomes 1976). Under human capital theory, consideration is made of
the fact that these investments are generally not made by the primary beneciaries but by
their care givers. Thus, there are issues not only of the e¢ ciency of the investment, but
also of the intrahousehold allocation of the expected benets (Alderman and King 1998).
Parentsdecision to educate children is done both for its own sake as a consumption good,
and as an investment good. The theory suggests that parents will invest time which is a
direct input, money which is an indirect input, and other resources in their childrens edu-
cation because they get utility from doing that, and it is also an investment which will give
them returns in future. Parents will invest in the education of their children up to a point
where the marginal benet and the marginal cost of investing are equal (Becker 1981;
Becker and Tomes 1976). The theory also postulates that the human capital of a child
also depends on the genetic endowments which are passed on to children from parents.
Becker and Tomes (1986) argue that these endowments from parents to children regress
to the mean. They thus argue; "children with well endowed parents tend also to have
above average endowments but smaller relative to the mean than their parents, whereas
children with poorly endowed parents tend also to have below average endowments but
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human capital theory suggests that investments in childrens human capital are related to
parental characteristics, characteristics of the children, and parental preferences (Becker
and Tomes 1986; Hanushek 1992). Expenditures on childrens education, skills, health,
and abilities are an indirect input into their childrens human capital (Becker and Tomes
1986). It is also worth noting that if schooling is a pure investment good i.e. without
current consumption aspects, and there are no credit constraints, then income would not
a¤ect schooling decisions. However, in many developing countries credit constraints are
prevalent (Behrman and Knowles 1999).
Within the human capital theory framework, others explain gender discrimination regard-
ing parental investment in the education of their children (Behrman et al. 1986; Alderman
and Gertler 1997; Alderman and King 1998; Pasqua 2005; Yeuh 2006). This part of human
capital theory deals with why parents may invest more in the education of their boys than
girls or vice versa. This strand of literature identies four possible sources from which
gender di¤erences in education may originate. Firstly, a girl will receive less schooling
if the cost (direct and indirect) of educating her is higher than that of a boy. This is
possible when one considers that the opportunity cost of a girl going to school might be
higher as she is more likely to help in caring for younger siblings or fetching rewood and
water (Pasqua 2005; Gertler and Glewwe 1992). Secondly, there will be less schooling
investment in a girl relative to a boy if the returns to education for a girl are lower. The
returns to schooling for a girl can be lower as a result of gender bias in the labour market.
Kingdon (1998) for example, nds signicant gender di¤erences in returns to education
in India. Thirdly, there will be schooling bias against a girl if the expectation/belief of
how much the boy child will transfer in old age is higher than that of the girl child. This
is quite possible under a patrilineal system where a woman has to leave her family when
she gets married and become a member of her husbands family. Finally, the girl child
will have less schooling if parents have preference bias against the education of a girl in
favour of a boy. That is, there will be gender schooling bias against girls, if parents get
more utility from a boys education even when the education level is the same as that for
a boy. We utilize this theoretical framework while focussing on the rural-urban di¤erences
in household school investment on primary school children. In the next subsection, we
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2.3.2 Explaining di¤erences in school investment between urban
and rural households
Broadly, the reasons for why there may be di¤erences in investment in schooling between
rural and urban households can be put into two categories5. The rst category relates
to explanations which attribute the di¤erence to di¤erences in characteristics between
rural and urban households. The second category comprises explanations which ascribe
the di¤erence to di¤erences in returns to the characteristics. That is, the characteristics
between rural and urban households may be the same, but the returns to (or e¤ectiveness
of ) those characteristics may be di¤erent.
We start with the rst broad category. Di¤erences in characteristics of urban and rural
households may explain the gaps in school investment between the two areas. There
may be di¤erences in characteristics with respect to school quality such as distance to
schools, pupil teacher ratio where these statistics are generally bad for rural areas. In most
developing countries there is an urban bias in terms of general infrastructure including
school facilities. This is well expressed by Lipton (1977) when he observes;
"The most important class conict in the poor countries of the world to-
day is not between labor and capital. Nor is it between foreign and national
interests. It is between rural classes and urban classes....Scarce investment,
instead of going into water-pumps to grow rice is wasted on urban motorways.
Scarce human skills administer, not clean village wells and agricultural exten-
sion services, but world boxing championships in showpiece stadia"( Lipton
1977, p1)
There are several reasons for why rural areas may not be favoured in terms of facilities6. It
could be due to the fact that the provision of urban public goods is cheaper (Arnott and
Gersovitz 1986). It could also arise from the inuence and lobbying power of the urban
elite (Lipton 1977). The disparity could also be due to the fact that urban households
have an information advantage. Majumdar et al.(2004) contends;
"Urban residents have an information advantage that may arise due to
several factors: greater average wealth, higher education, better access to the
media as well as a stronger urban focus in media coverage. Even if both rural
and urban residents observe public good outcomes equally well, this information
advantage implies that urban residents are better positioned to evaluate the role
5See Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) for a similar categorization.
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of the governments ability in achieving a given outcome" (Majumdar et al.
2004, p 139).
To the extent that access, availability, and quality of school facilities inuence parental
investment in education of children7, this urban bias may explain the di¤erences in
schooling between the two areas. The urban bias in terms of access and availability of
other facilities such clinics, water facilities may also explain the rural-urban di¤erences
in householdsinvestment in schooling. For example, children are generally involved in
fetching water, and if water facilities are very far (as is the case in rural areas) this may
a¤ect childrens schooling as they dedicate more time to fetching water. Kabubo-Mariara
and Mwabu (2007) nd a negative relationship between time taken to fetch water and
the likelihood of primary school enrolment in Kenya. In addition to the community/area
level disparities in favour of urban areas, we can also have characteristic di¤erences at
the household level between rural and urban areas. Rural households tend to have larger
families than urban households, and assuming a quantity-quality trade-o¤, this should
entail lower schooling in rural areas. Parental education is di¤erent between the two
areas, rural parents are generally less educated than their urban counterparts. This may
have implications on schooling, for instance the cost of helping with homework may be less
for more-schooled parents than for less-schooled parents (Behrman and Knowles 1999).We
now turn to the di¤erences in returns to characteristics story. Al-Samarrai and Reilly
(2000) argue that the perceived expected rate of return to education may be di¤erent
between rural and urban areas due to di¤erences in return between the formal sector
(mostly urban) and the agricultural sector (mostly rural). The implication of this is that
a households expected return to investing in education may be di¤erent between the two
areas, and this would be reected in di¤erentials in school investment between urban and
rural households. To the extent that there may be cultural di¤erences between rural areas
(which tend to be traditional) and urban areas (which tend to be modern) this would be
reected in parental preferences for education. The opportunity cost of schooling between
the two areas may also be di¤erent, in rural areas children are more likely to work in the
eld or indeed be sent o¤ to work as child labourers to supplement family income. Thus,
in rural areas the opportunity cost of sending a child to school is higher relative to the
urban areas. We later propose a decomposition technique which enables us to calculate
which of these broad categories is the predominant explanation for the rural-urban school
spending di¤erential in Malawi. In addition, we develop a disaggregated decomposition
technique which helps us to look at each individual characteristics contribution to the
rural-urban education spending disparity. Before talking about the decomposition, we
rst present in the next section, the econometric model on which the decomposition is
7Studies by Case and Deaton (1999), Lavy (1996), and Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000), nd school














As discussed earlier, the study is based on direct expenditures that households make on
the primary education of their children. One underlying feature of expenditure data is
that it contains excess zeros, and the choice of a statistical technique used to deal with
the zeros is important, as an inappropriate treatment of zeros can lead to biased and
inconsistent estimates (Greene 1981). The Tobit model (Tobin 1958) has been widely
used to model outcomes which have excess zeros. The Tobit model is derived from an
individual optimization problem and views zeros as corner solution outcomes. The major
drawback of the Tobit model is that it assumes that the same stochastic process determines
both the extensive and intensive margins, that is the decision whether or not to spend
(participation decision) and how much (expenditure decision), are treated as the same.
This assumption is restrictive. A model which corrects this limitation of the Tobit model
is the Double Hurdle model (DH hereafter)8. The DH model, originally formulated by
Cragg (1971), assumes that households make two decisions with regard to spending, each
of which is determined by a di¤erent underlying stochastic process (Blundell and Meghir
1987). Following Jones (1989), the DH is formally specied as follows;






1 if Di > 0
0 otherwise
The expenditure equation (the second hurdle) is given as follows;
Y i = X
0
i + i (2.2)
Y i = max(0; Y

i )
8The DH has been used in various areas in the literature and without purporting to be exhaustive it has
been used to model; expenditure on alcohol (Yen and Jensen 1996), expenditure on cigarettes (Yen 2005;
Jones 1989 ), time use (Daunfeldt and Hellström 2007), expenditure on food away from home (Jensen
and Yen 1996; Newman et al 2003), expenditure on cheese (Yen and Jones 1997), and expenditure on















where; Di is a latent variable describing the households decision to participate ( spend
or not) on childrens education, Y i is a latent variable describing household expenditure
on childrens education, Z 0i is a vector of variables explaining the participation decision,
X 0i is a vector of variables explaining the expenditure decision. "i; i are independent
random errors with the following properties; "i  N(0; 1) and i  N(0; 2), and i
denotes household. The assumption of independence is quite common when using the
DH (Mauldin et al. 2001; Jensen and Yen 1996; Su and Yen 1996). In words, it means
that all the unmeasurable and unobserved factors inuencing whether or not to spend are
unrelated to the unmeasurable and unobserved factors a¤ecting how much is spent. The
alternative would be to assume that the errors are dependent. However, Smith (2003)
shows that there is little statistical information to support the estimation of a DH with
dependent errors even when dependence exists.The parameter vectors are ;  assumed
to be linear.
For a positive level of expenditure on education to be observed, two hurdles (hence the
name double hurdle) have to be overcome; rstly, the household must be a potential
spender (i.e. Di = 1) and secondly, it must actually spend on education (i.e. Y i =
Y i ). In the DH model, observed zeros in expenditure on education may arise either from
participation or consumption decisions and potential spenders may have zero expenditure
on education9.
Using 0 to represent zero expenditure and + to denote positive expenditure, the sample






















Where (:)and (:)denote the standard normal cumulative density function (CDF), and
the standard normal probability density function (PDF) respectively. The likelihood func-
tion above (equation 2.4), reduces to that of a Tobit when  (Z 0i) = 1. A closer look at
the likelihood function (equation 2.4) reveals that it is simply a product of the likelihood
functions of a probit model and a truncated regression model where truncation is at zero.
In other words, the log likelihood of the independent DH is the sum of log likelihood
functions of a probit model and a truncated regression model where truncation is at zero.
This is quite useful as it implies that the independent DH can be estimated by estimating
the probit and truncated regressions separately 10. Accordingly, a likelihood ratio test can
9This is unlike the Heckman model (Heckman 1979), where zeros in expenditure would arise only
through participation.











be used to test the Tobit model versus the independent DH11.
2.4.2 Variables used
As said earlier, the DH model is estimated separately by area of residence (rural and
urban). The dependent variable is the share of total annual household expenditure on the
education of primary school children in total annual consumption expenditure12. In order
to account for price variability across areas and time, both expenditure items are deated
by using the Malawi National Statistical O¢ ces spatial and temporal deator with base
national, and February/March 2004. The expenditure items include; fees (tuition and
boarding), books and other materials, school uniform, contributions to school building
and maintenance, parental association fees, and other school related expenses. In coming
up with the factors which inuence household investment in the education of children, we
are guided by human capital theory as discussed in the theoretical framework as well as
other empirical studies which have looked at parental investment in education.
We include the age of the youngest primary school going child in the household; this is
motivated by the fact that as children get older education expenditures increase. Age of
the child may also reect the opportunity cost of home production which increases with
age. We include the square of age of the youngest child to measure possible nonlinear-
ities. Household permanent income as proxied by the log of total household per capita
expenditure13 has been found to a¤ect spending on education (e.g. Song et al.2006; Yueh
2006; Kingdon 2005). The expectation as intimated in the theoretical literature is that if
schooling is a pure investment good and capital markets are perfect then income should
not inuence spending on education, however income will inuence spending on education
if it is a consumption good and/or it is an investment good but there are credit constraints.
We also include a variable which captures proportion of children who are day scholars in a
not needed to identify the parameters.
11The log likelihood ratio test statistic (LR) is computed as follows: LR =
 2 [LLT   (LLP + LLTR)]  2k ; where LLT = log likelihood for the Tobit model; LLP = log
likelihood for the Probit model; LLTR= log likelihood for the truncated regression model. LR follows a
Chi-square distribution with degress of freedom k equal to the number of independent variables in the
equations.
12One could alternatively use absolute expenditure on education as the dependent variable. We use the
Engel curve approach in keeping with similar studies looking at household expenditure on education e.g.
Kingdon (2005), Yeuh (2006), and Song et al.(2006).
13We use consumption expenditure other than income for two reasons. First, particularly in an agricul-
tural economy such as Malawi, income is often very lumpy. Farming households receive a large amount
of cash income in May and June after the harvest, and receive very little the rest of the year. In con-
trast, households are constantly expending their income and consuming. Consumption expenditure is a
smoother measure of welfare through time than is income. In other words, consumption can be viewed as
realized welfare, whereas income is more a measure of potential welfare (Murkhejee and Benson 2003). Sec-
ond, in Malawi much of household income is derived from self-employed business or subsistence-oriented
agricultural production. Assigning income values to the proceeds of these enterprises is often problematic
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household. This variable is dened as the number of day scholars divided by the number
of children in the household.
The number of children in a household may also a¤ect whether or not a household spends
on their education, and if so how much. In the literature there are basically two opposite
ndings regarding the impact of number of children on investment in human capital. The
rst nding which conrms the quantity-quality trade o¤ is that having more children
negatively impacts on investment in human capital (Gertler and Glewwe 1990). The
other nding is that having more children actually increases human capital formation as
it ensures that each child requires less time for home production (Al-Samarrai and Reilly
2000). Additionally, we include the square of number children in the household to measure
the possibility that expenditures diminish with more children.
Employment status of parents may be positively related to expenditures on a childs pri-
mary education as it may inuence their perception of the relationship between human
capital investments and returns on those investments. Studies by Haveman et al. (1991)
and Ribar (1993) in the US, nd a signicant and positive relationship between mothers
employment during a childs teenage years, and high school completion but nd no sig-
nicant e¤ect on the same of the fathers employment. In this study, we measure the
employment status of both parents by whether they work for a wage or not. The educa-
tional level of parents is expected to have a positive e¤ect on investment in education. The
theoretical explanation of this expectation is that parents with higher levels of education
are more likely to perceive greater future benets or returns on investing in their chil-
drens education and, thus may be willing to sacrice more for these future returns. More
educated parents expect that their children will exhibit greater promise and thus will be
more willing to invest in their childs education (Becker 1981; Becker and Tomes 1976).
At the empirical level, several studies which look at the relationship between attainment
and parental education support this human capital perspective (e.g. Ray 2000; Gertler
and Glewwe 1990; Song et al. 2006; Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu 2007).
Parental age may inuence expenditures on childrens primary education. Age reects
experience, and the expectation is that with age comes the ability to appreciate the benets
and returns on investments in education. As argued by Mauldin et al. (2001), if parents
are older at the time their children are in primary and secondary schools, they will be more
nancially secure as well and be more willing to sacrice a larger proportion of income
for their childrens education. We thus include the age of the mother and father as well
as the square of ages for both parents to measure the possibility of nonlinearities. Studies
by Case and Deaton (1999), Lavy (1996), and Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000) have found
signicant negative e¤ects of distance to the nearest primary school. Distance to the
nearest primary school can be a measure of the quality of access of primary schools, it can











the education of their children if for example schools are very far. In this study, distance
to nearest primary school measured in kilometres is set equal to zero if there is a primary
school in the community.
As has been discussed in the theoretical literature, there may be bias in spending against
a particular sex. Besides, some empirical studies have found evidence of son preference in
spending for example, Song et al.(2006) and Yueh (2006) for China and Kingdon (2005)






, where Hg is the number of household members in age-gender
group g and H is the household size14. We distinguish ten age and gender categories;
ages 0-6, 7-15, 16-19, 20-55, and over 55 for each gender. Since we are using aggregate
household education expenditure data, this variable can give an indirect test of gender
bias in spending. In particular, to check for evidence of di¤erences in spending between
primary school going boys and girls we are concerned with the coe¢ cients of the age-
gender variable for the ages 7-15 for both sexes. If the coe¢ cients are signicant and
di¤erent that is evidence of preference for a particular sex in spending15. We control for
regional xed e¤ects by including a three class regional dummy for the north, centre, and
south.
2.4.3 Estimation issues
The log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, and this may lead to biased
and inconsistent results. One possible channel of endogeneity is that the log of per capita
expenditure and spending on education can be jointly determined through labour supply
decisions in the sense that a decision to send children to school may be jointly determined
with a decision to send the children to work to supplement household income. Another
route for endogeneity would be that parents with a good taste for the education of their
children may work harder so they are able to pay for their schooling (Kingdon 2005).
We address this problem in both the participation and expenditure decision equations.
In the participation equation we use the Rivers and Vuong (1989) procedure for discrete
choice models, and in the expenditure equation we use the Smith and Blundell (1986)
procedure for limited dependent variable models. The two procedures are analogous and
they are done in two stages. In the rst stage, a reduced form regression of an endogenous
variable is regressed using ordinary least squares (OLS) on exogenous variables including
instruments, and residuals are predicted. In the second stage, the predicted residuals are
14In the estimation the age-gender category over 55 for males is omitted to avoid multicollinearity since
the categories sum up to one in each household.
15Testing for equality of coe¢ cients in both participation and expenditure equations for all groups of
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included in the participation equation (Rivers and Vuong procedure) and the expenditure
equation (Smith and Blundell procedure) including the endogenous variable. A simple
t-test of the coe¢ cient on the residual tests the null hypothesis of exogeneity. We use
household assets namely hectares of land, and its square as instrumental variables for log
of per capita expenditure16.Similar instruments are used by Glewwe and Jacoby (1994),
Glewwe and Ilias (1996), and Kingdon (2005). An instrumental variable (IV) must be
correlated with the endogenous variable (log of per capita expenditure in our case), but
uncorrelated with the error term for the participation equation or the expenditure equation
i.e. the IV must be redundant in the participation equation or the expenditure equation
once log of per capita expenditure is included. Thus, the e¤ect of the IV on school spending
must work through log of per capita expenditure only. As is shown later, land and its
square are correlated with log of per capita expenditure. Land is an illiquid asset, and
therefore is unlikely to be sold in the short term to cover schooling expenses (Kingdon
2005). One can argue that land cannot work as IV for urban areas. It has to said that as
of 1998, nearly eight out of 10 households in Malawi owned land where agricultural crops
were grown, and 15.1% of urban households owned land for agricultural crops (NSO 1998)
2.4.4 Data and descriptives
The data used in the study come from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey
(IHS2). This is a nationally representative sample survey designed to provide information
on the various aspects of household welfare in Malawi. The survey was conducted by the
National Statistical O¢ ce from March 2004 -April 2005. The survey collects information
from a nationally representative sample of 11,280 households. In addition, the survey
collects information from a nationally representative sample of 564 communities. During
the survey a communitywas dened as the village or urban location surrounding the
selected enumeration area, which most residents recognize as being their community. The
households were sampled from these communities. This data contains detailed information
on socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the households. The survey also
collects annualized household education information which includes household expenditure
on primary, secondary, and tertiary education, for household members aged 5 and above.
The expenditure items are; school fees (tuition and boarding), books and other materials,
school uniform, contributions to school building and maintenance, parental association
fees, and other school related expenses. In this study, we use husband-wife and single-
parent families with at least one child in primary school. We do this for two reasons.
Firstly, the survey does not record the parental characteristics of children who do not
live with their parents, thus this restriction allows us to examine the impact of parental
characteristics as discussed in section 2.4.2. Secondly, schooling decisions are cumulative











in nature such that the circumstances in which a person was raised in as a child are more
relevant than current ones (Glick and Sahn 2000). This restriction may potentially lead
to a non random sample (i.e. a selected sample), which may bias our results. Specically,
if children are fostered out or older children leave the house to marry or work, this may
lead to a selected sample of children who are di¤erent from those that have left. Since
fostering increases with age and the likelihood of children leaving to marry or work also
increases with age, by focussing on primary education, we somewhat mitigate the fears of
selection bias.
Descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the analysis for families with nonzero
expenditures and for the full sample by area of residence are presented in Tables 2.1 and
2.2. The full sample comprises households with primary school going children, with zero
expenditures and nonzero expenditures on education. In Table 2.1, we report sample
means of annual household expenditure on primary education (absolute expenditure) and
the share of annual expenditure on primary education in total household consumption
expenditure; our dependent variable. The table also presents results of tests of statistical
signicance of the di¤erences in expenditure between rural and urban households. The
results show that there are di¤erences between rural and urban households. In terms of
absolute expenditure, rural households spend less on average compared to urban house-
holds. The share of education spending out of total household consumption expenditure
for rural households is lower than that of urban households. These di¤erences hold for
both the full and spending samples. Additionally, the di¤erentials are statistically sig-
nicant. Looking at the various components of expenditure on education, we notice that
urban spending on all items is signicantly higher than that of rural households. We also
observe that for urban households tuition takes up a big part of spending, whereas for
rural households most of the spending is done on uniforms.
Table 2.2, presents results of summary statistics of explanatory variables used in the
study by area of residence for the full sample and the sample of households which actu-
ally spend on education. The table also reports whether the di¤erences in the variables
are statistically signicant. With the rural-urban demarcation of the sample, we have
3739 rural households and 676 urban households with primary school going children. Of
these full samples, 2782 rural households (74.4% of sample) and 548 urban households
(81.1% of sample) have nonzero expenditures on primary school children. Thus suggest-
ing that compared to rural areas, there are more households in urban areas with positive
expenditures on education. In terms of the proportion of children going to day schools,
the results show that rural households have a higher number (90%) compared to 87%
for urban households. The di¤erence is statistically signicant. Urban households have
generally signicantly better parental characteristics. Specically, in urban areas a sig-
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years of schooling compared to their rural counterparts. The results show that the ur-
ban households have signicantly nearer schools compared to rural ones. Looking at the
age-gender demographics for the primary school going age (7-15), the results suggest that
there are di¤erences between the two areas with rural households having a signicantly
higher proportion of boys (16%) compared to 13% for urban households. In terms of the
proportion of girls of the schooling going age, we nd no signicant di¤erence between
the two areas. Essentially, we observe that just like expenditure on education discussed
earlier; there are di¤erences in the characteristics across area of residence. We have also
reported enrolment rates by age for rural and urban areas (see appendix Table A2.1),
again here we get a picture which is consistent with that from education spending. We
discuss the econometric results in the next section.
2.5 Econometric results
The descriptive statistics show that there are di¤erences in expenditure on primary ed-
ucation as well as characteristics between rural and urban households. In the light of
this, we formally test the hypothesis that households in rural and urban areas are not
di¤erent with respect to their investment in childrens education17. We essentially seek
to investigate whether or not coe¢ cients for the di¤erent variables are the same for rural
and urban households. This is done by conducting a pooling test; a failure of pooling
between the two groups would indicate that they are di¤erent. To conduct the pooling
test, we use the likelihood ratio (LR) test. For comparison, the hypothesis is tested using
both the DH and the Tobit models. The unrestricted regression is estimated with sep-
arate urban and rural households, and the restricted regression with the pooled sample
using an area of residence dummy variable rural. If we denote the log-likelihoods for
the urban, rural and pooled samples respectively as LLurban; LLrural; LLpooled with corre-
sponding number of parameters kurban; krural; kpooled , then the LR statistic which follows
a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom (krural + kurban)  kpooled is given by;
LR =  2 [LLpooled   (LLrural + LLurban)]  2(krural+kurban) kpooled (2.5)
Results of the pooling tests are presented in Table 2.3. The results for both the DH and
Tobit models show that rural and urban households are di¤erent, and thus pooling the
rural and urban households is inappropriate. This means that the DH model or the Tobit
17Since we do not have information on whether the expenditures are on private or government primary
schools, in our preliminary estimations we dropped tuition fees as we gured this may be a major factor
between urban and rural areas, in the sense that there is a predominance of private schools which tend
to be expensive in urban areas. However, our econometric results were by and large una¤ected by this
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model should be estimated separately for the two areas. The next issue that we address is
whether the DH or Tobit is the right model for our data. Basically, we seek to ascertain
by using the LR test whether there is another censoring mechanism as represented by
the participation equation. Results of the tests are reported in Table 2.4. The LR test
results favour the use of the independent DH as opposed to the Tobit model. This implies
that there are two decision processes underlying spending on education; households decide
whether or not to spend, and if yes, how much. We therefore discuss results of the DH
for the two groups of households.
As discussed earlier the log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, we tested
for this using the Rivers and Vuong procedure for the participation equation and the
Smith and Blundell procedure for the expenditure equation as outlined earlier. We nd
that the log of per capita expenditure is endogenous in the expenditure equation only for
rural households. To ensure comparability in terms of number of variables, we included
residuals from the reduced form regression for urban households in the urban expenditure
equation as well. The reduced form regressions of log of per capita expenditure for both
areas reported in the appendix Table A2.1, show that the instrumental variables land and
its square perform reasonably well as they are signicantly correlated with the log of per
capita expenditure.
The nal maximum likelihood results of the DH are presented in Table 2.5. Since the
Tobit model has been rejected in favour of the DH, our discussion of the results is based
on the DH but we show results of the Tobit model (Table A2.3 in the appendix) for
comparison. The results generally show that some variables are signicant for one group
but insignicant for another; an indication of the rural-urban di¤erences alluded to earlier.
The age of the youngest child is signicant and negative only in the participation equation
for rural households. This suggests that parents in rural areas are less likely to spend
on the education of children as they get older. This perhaps reects the opportunity cost
of sending children to school, that is as they get older they can be a source of labor for
agriculture, and other income generating activities to supplement parental income. This
opportunity cost may not be as high in urban areas. The level of income as proxied
by the log of per capita expenditure signicantly increases the likelihood of spending on
education and how much is spent for both rural and urban households. The results
therefore suggest that income matters at both the extensive and intensive margins for
the two groups of households. Mauldin et al. (2001) also nd that income has positive
and signicant e¤ect on household spending on education at both decision levels in the
US. We cannot compare the magnitudes of these coe¢ cients of income in the two areas,
but later in the next section we compare the magnitudes of the coe¢ cients by computing
elasticities. Su¢ ce to say that the positive and signicant e¤ect of income indicates that
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presence of credit constraints in both areas.
For rural households, having a higher proportion of children going to day schools signif-
icantly increases the probability of spending on them but lowers the share of education
expenditure. For urban households having more day scholars lowers the chance of spending
on primary education but it has no impact on the share of education expenditure in total
expenditure. We nd that the number of children inuences positively and signicantly
the share of education expenditure for rural households, but does not signicantly a¤ect
the likelihood of spending on education18. For urban households having more children
increases the likelihood that a household will spend on their education but does not a¤ect
the share of expenditure. This positive e¤ect conforms with the argument by Al-Samarrai
and Reilly (2000) that the more children a household has, the less is the time needed
for household production activities, and hence the higher will be the investment in their
education. This however, contradicts an argument by Gertler and Glewwe (1990) that
larger families may derive less utility from sending an additional child to school if some
are already enrolled. This lower enrolment resulting from having many children could be
reected in lower spending. This also runs counter to the expectation that with more
children there is more competition for resources.
In terms of parental employment, the results show that for rural and urban households
a fathers and a mothers employment signicantly increases the share of expenditure on
education as well as the chance that they will spend on children. This suggests that holding
other things constant, employed parents will invest more on their children. With respect
to education, we nd that the education of both the mother and the father positively and
signicantly a¤ects the decision whether or not to spend as well as how much to spend on
the primary education of their children in both rural and urban areas. Thus, ceteris paribus
the higher is the parental human capital, the higher will be the investment in schooling
of children. These results are in line with ndings by Song et al. (2006) for rural China
where they found that the educational level of both parents positively impacts household
spending on education. We cannot compare the magnitudes of the DH coe¢ cients of the
employment and education for parents in the two areas, however this issue is taken up
later in the next section where we compute elasticities. These comparisons allow us to
say something about the possible di¤erences in the impact of the two variables between
parents and between the two areas.
The quality of access of primary schools as proxied by distance to the nearest primary
18It is worth recognizing that the number of children is potentially endogenous, if there is a quantity-
quality trade o¤ where parents prefer fewer children with a good education. Besides, if there is son
preference which a¤ects expenditure on childrens education, this may also a¤ect family size. We control
for the possibility of son preference as discussed earlier. Since we have no valid instruments; we addressed
the simultaneity problem arising from the quantity-quality trade by re-estimating the DH models for all
groups without number of children; our results largely remained unchanged thus giving us condence that
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school has a negative impact on the participation and the expenditure decisions of both
rural and urban households19. This suggests that households will be less likely to spend
on primary education if the schools are far away and if they do actually decide to spend,
the amount spent will be lower20. In terms of the age-gender demographics, the results
suggest that having more primary school going boys (i.e.proportion of males aged 7-15)
and girls (i.e.proportion of females aged 7-15) signicantly and positively impacts on the
participation and the expenditure decision levels of rural households. The same is true
for urban households. We investigate further to check evidence of gender bias against
girls by conducting Wald tests of the equality of the coe¢ cients for proportion of males
and females aged 7-15 in the two areas. Results of the tests are shown at the bottom of
Table 2.5. The test results indicate that for rural households there is gender bias against
girls at both the participation and expenditure decision levels. For urban households, the
Wald test results indicate that there are no statistically signicant gender di¤erences at
both the intensive and extensive margins. Thus, the Wald tests show evidence of gender
bias in favour of boys in rural areas only. Interestingly, we observe that when the Tobit
model is used (see Table A2.3 in the appendix), there is no evidence of gender bias in both
areas. This is in conformity with a nding by Kingdon (2005) who shows that when a
variant21 of the DH model is used more evidence of gender bias in school spending is found
in India as compared to using a single equation model. This underlines the importance
of the participation decision when modelling a dependent variable with excess zeros. We
complement the Wald tests results by comparing the magnitude of elasticities for the
proportion of males and females aged 7-15 in the next section.
We have assessed the impact of di¤erent regressors on expenditure, and found some to be
signicant in the levels equation only while others are signicant in the participation equa-
tion only or both the levels and participation equations. Further to that, some variables
have been found to have opposite signs in the two decision levels. As noted by Yen (2005),
when examining the impact of explanatory variables, the presence of parameter estimates
with opposite signs in the participation and level equations complicate the interpretation
of the estimated e¤ects. Thus, the impact of explanatory variables can be better explored
19Distance to the nearest primary school can be endogenous, for example some communities may have
a leadership which values education and is more vocal and progressive. This may a¤ect both household
schooling decisions as well as placement of schools. Another possible source of endogeniety is that parents
with high aspirations for their children may "vote with their feet" by moving to areas where schools are
nearer. And this unobserved high aspiration by parents may a¤ect both distance to schooling and schooling
decisions. We dont have valid instruments for distance to nearest primary school, so we re-estimated the
models without distance to nearest primary school and our results were marginally di¤erent from those
with distance to nearest primary school thus giving us some level of assurance about the reliability of our
results.
20If the distance to the nearest primary school is thought of as a measure of the direct cost of primary
education, then the result suggests that households will be less likely to spend on primary education if
costs are high and if they do actually decide to spend, the amount spent will be lower.
21The model used by Kingdon (2005) assumes that once a household decides to spend there are no zero
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by computing elasticities. It is worth noting that the elasticities unlike the coe¢ cients we
have just discussed also allow us to talk about the economic signicance of the variables
used.
2.5.1 Elasticities in the independent DH
The interpretation of coe¢ cients in limited dependent variable models is complicated, and
to overcome this the e¤ect of explanatory variables on the unconditional expectation of
the dependent variable (Yi) as measured by elasticities is decomposed into an e¤ect on
the probability of a positive expenditure and an e¤ect on conditional expenditure (Yen
2005)22.
The unconditional expectation of Yi in the independent DH is given as;
E(Yi) = Pr(Yi > 0)E(YijYi > 0) (2.6)
Where the probability of expenditure is given by;
Pr(Yi > 0) = Pr(Z
0
i+ "i > 0; X
0
i + i > 0) (2.7)
= Pr ("i >  Z 0i; i >  X 0i)





The conditional expectation of Yi is expressed as23;
E(YijYi > 0) = X 0i + E (ij"i >  Z 0i; i >  X 0i) (2.8)
= X 0i +























The elasticities of the unconditional expectation of Yi with respect to the continuous
regressors are computed by di¤erentiating equations 2.7 and 2.8, and using the adding up
property, equation 2.6. Formally, the elasticity of a continuous variable j which appears
22This follows a proposed decomposition by McDonald and Mo¢ t (1980) for Tobit models on the e¤ect
of a regressor on the unconditional expectation.
23The probability of positive expenditure and conditional expectation of expenditure are based on the
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= Pj + 
C
j
Equation 2.9, shows that the elasticity of the unconditional expectation of Yi with respect
to a continuous variable j which appears in both the participation and the expenditure
equations (UCj ); is simply a sum of the elasticity of the probability of observing a positive
expenditure (Pj ) and the elasticity of conditional expenditure (
C
j ).
These elasticities of the probability, conditional level and unconditional level for contin-
uous variables are computed at the sample means of the regressors. Table 2.6 reports
the elasticities for the probability, conditional and unconditional levels of some selected
variables for the DH. For comparison, we present the elasticities for the probability, con-
ditional and unconditional levels of some selected variables for the Tobit model in the
appendix Table A2.4. The elasticity of probability for both rural and urban households
with respect to the log of per capita expenditure which proxies permanent income is pos-
itive and signicant implying that spending on education is considered a normal item.
The same holds true for the elasticity of conditional and unconditional levels for the log
of per capita expenditure. It is worth noting that rural households have greater than one
elasticities of the probability, conditional level and unconditional level compared to urban
households. We test whether the income elasticities are statistically greater than one for
rural areas and less than one for urban areas24. For rural areas with t-statistics 4.25, 2.64,
and 5.04 respectively for probability, conditional level and unconditional level, we reject
the null that the elasticities are equal to one and conclude that they are greater than one.
For urban areas with t-statistics, -10.2, -6.9, and -7 respectively for probability, conditional
level and unconditional level, we reject the null that the elasticities are equal to one and
conclude that they are less than one. This means that for rural households spending on
the schooling of children is more sensitive to income compared to urban households, and
thus schooling is a luxury good in rural areas25.
The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional level with respect to
parental employment and education are positive and signicant in both areas. However,
24The hypothesis is done using the following t-statistic; t =
̂   1
se(̂)
: Where; ̂ is an estimated elasticity
(probability, conditional level, and unconditional level), and se(̂) is the corresponding standard error.
25We do not address the possibility that the elasticity of expenditure on education with respect to
income may vary non-monotonically i.e. the income elasticities peak in the middle-income categories
(have a value of greater than one), and diminish for the lower and upper ends of the income distribution
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we note two things, rstly the elasticities for parental employment and education are
higher for rural areas, and secondly, the elasticities for mothers employment and educa-
tion are higher than those of fathers in both areas. These ndings indicate that parental
characteristics have a bigger impact on spending in rural areas, and that a mothers char-
acteristics have a larger impact on spending compared to a fathers. If one thinks of the
employment status and education of the mother as a reection of the bargaining power of
the mother in the household, this would imply that childrens education benets from an
improvement in the bargaining position of the mother. Besides, this result has intergen-
erational implications for human capital formation in that more female education entails
more educated mothers, and hence more education for children.
The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional level with respect to
the distance to the nearest primary school are negative and statistically signicant for
both areas. We observe that the elasticities are larger for urban areas as compared to
rural areas suggesting that urban households are more sensitive to the quality of access
of primary schools. The elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional
level with respect to the proportion of primary school going boys (proportion of males
aged 7-15) and girls (proportion of females aged 7-15) are positive, statistically signicant
and economically substantial for rural and urban households. In addition, we also note
that for rural households the elasticities of probability, conditional level and unconditional
level for boys are larger than those for girls suggesting a bias against girls. The computed
elasticities for urban households are not noticeably di¤erent. These elasticities therefore
reinforce evidence shown earlier using Wald tests that boys are favored when it comes to
whether or not to spend as well as how much to spend in rural households, but there is no
evidence of school spending gender bias in urban households. Just like the raw coe¢ cients
discussed earlier for the Tobit model, we nd that the elasticities (see appendix Table
A2.4) are both statistically insignicant and economically not very di¤erent from each
other. Thus, when a single equation model is used we nd no evidence of gender bias in
spending in both rural and urban households.
Both the descriptive and econometric results show that there are di¤erences in household
investment in the human capital of primary school children. Specically, the results indi-
cate rural and urban households are di¤erent both in terms of how much they spend and
the e¤ect of di¤erent characteristics on their spending behavior. We therefore know that
there are these di¤erences, but we dont know why there are these di¤erences. Are these
di¤erences largely due to di¤erences in characteristics or due to di¤erences in behavior?
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2.6 Extending the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to
the independent DH model
The observed rural-urban di¤erences in household investment in the education of primary
school children call for an understanding of what explains these di¤erences. This section
therefore provides a comprehensive analysis of the rural-urban di¤erential in household
expenditure on education. To achieve this, we propose an extension of the decomposition
technique proposed independently by Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) for linear models
to the independent DH model, which is a nonlinear model. The technique has almost
exclusively been used in the labour economics literature to study gender wage discrim-
ination (e.g. Appleton et al. 1999; Sicillian and Grossberg 2001; Neuman and Oaxaca
2004), and to the best of our knowledge our study is the rst to apply the technique to
study household expenditure. The proposed decomposition isolates the expenditure gap
into a characteristic e¤ect, which is a part of the di¤erential explained by di¤erences in
social-economic characteristics, and a coe¢ cient e¤ect which is the part of the gap which
is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. In this study, we interpret the coe¢ cient e¤ect as part
of gap which is due to household behavior26.
As will be demonstrated later, the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method cannot
be used to decompose the DH as it is strictly meant for linear models. For nonlinear
models; Fairlie (1999, 2005) has proposed the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for logit
and probit models, Bauer and Sinning (2005, 2008) have proposed an extension of the
same for Tobit models. To derive the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for the independent
DH; consider the DH as expressed in equation 2.3, which is estimated separately for two
groups of households, m = (U;R), where; U =urban and R =rural households. We want
to decompose the gap in average expenditure share between urban and rural households,
MDH= E(YU)   E(YR), by using the following sample counterpart M̂DH = YU   YR .





; where Nm is
the sample size for group m: The "hat" denotes sample estimates. The Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition of the independent DH similar to that for the Tobit by Bauer and Sinning
(2005, 2008) is expressed in terms of unconditional expectations of the dependent variable
(Yi). The unconditional expectation for the two groups estimated separately is expressed
as follows27;
E(Yim) = Pr(Yim > 0)E(YimjYim > 0) (2.10)
26The coe¢ cient e¤ect in the labor economics literature is interpreted as a measure of discrimination.
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Where the probability of expenditure is given by;








The conditional expectation of Yi is expressed as;











Three things need to be noted about equation 2.10. Firstly, the unconditional expectation
E(Yim) is not equal to E(Xim)0m as is the case in linear models on which the standard
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is based28 ;29. As discussed earlier, imposing a linear model
on a dependent variable with excess zeros leads to biased and inconsistent coe¢ cients, and
therefore using coe¢ cients from the linear model would give a misleading decomposition
as well. Secondly, the unconditional expectation is not equal to that of Tobit as it has
another censoring mechanism,  (Z 0imm) which represents participation; this means that
we cannot use the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Tobit models as developed by Bauer
and Sinning (2005, 2008). Finally, equation 2.10 shows that the unconditional expectation
has the standard error of the error term of the expenditure equation,m. This may a¤ect
the magnitude of the decomposition and therefore has to be included in the decomposi-
tion. As a result, there are several possible decompositions of the mean di¤erence MDH ,
depending on which m is used in the counterfactual part of the decomposition.
We therefore derive two possible decompositions for the independent DH30:
MDHR1 =
h





EU;U;R (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
28It is worth noting the di¤erence in terminology used here; the conditional expectation in linear models
is given by E(Y jX) while the conditional expectation in limited dependent variable models (e.g. Tobit,
Truncated, DH models) is expressed as E(Y jY > 0).
29Assuming a linear model Yim = X 0i+i for illustration; the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
is based on the property of linear models with an intercept that the mean of a dependent variable is equal
to the mean of the regressors evaluated at their respective estimated coe¢ cients i.e. Yim = Xim̂m: Hence,
the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is given as; YU  YR =











Where the "overbars" denote sample means and the "hats" denote sample estimates.



















EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
Where Em;m;m (Yim) denotes the unconditional expectation of Yim evaluated at the
parameter vectors m; m and the standard error m. The di¤erence between the two
decompositions is that equation 2.13 treats the standard error as part of the variables
while equation 2.14 treats it as part of the coe¢ cients.
The above decompositions use the urban coe¢ cients in the counterfactual; this implies
that if there was no gap in average expenditure share, the expenditure prole of the urban
would prevail. We can alternatively use the rural coe¢ cients; this implies that if there was
no gap in average expenditure, the expenditure structure of the rural areas would exist.
When the rural coe¢ cients are used the two possibilities are written as31 :
MDHU2 =
h















EU;U;U (YiR)  ER;R;R (YiR)
i
The rst term in the decompositions (equations 2.13 -2.16) captures part of the average
expenditure share gap between the urban and rural households attributable to di¤erences
in covariates. This is the characteristic e¤ect. This basically is the part of the gap
in average expenditure share between the two groups of households assuming that both
types had the same coe¢ cients (behavior) but di¤erent endowments. Thus, this is a part
of the gap explained by di¤erences in characteristics. The last term in equations 2.13
-2.16, measures the di¤erence in average expenditure share between the two groups which
is due to di¤erences in coe¢ cients. This is the coe¢ cient e¤ect. It is part of the gap
which is unexplained by the di¤erences in characteristics. Essentially, it is part of the
gap assuming that urban and rural households had the same characteristics but di¤erent
31This provides a robustness check of our results to choice of reference group. When decompositions
give di¤erent conclusions depending on the reference group used, an index number problem is said to
obtain. Various attempts have been made in the literature to resolve the index number problem for linear
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coe¢ cients (behavior). So for example, assuming that rural and urban households have
the same income levels, this income may be a more important factor (implying a bigger
coe¢ cient) to rural households as compared to urban ones in their spending decisions.
In order to conduct the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition as given in equations 2.13 to 2.16,































Where ̂m; ̂m, and ̂m denote sample estimates. With this sample counterpart of the
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If there is only one censoring mechanism, that is  (Z 0im̂m) = 1, decompositions 2.13 to
2.16 reduce to that of a Tobit with censoring from below at zero, as proposed by Bauer and
Sinning (2005, 2008) for Tobit models. If expenditure is uncensored at zero, decomposition
2.13 and 2.14 are equal and reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with
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equal and reduce to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition with rural coe¢ cients
used in the counterfactual.
2.6.1 Detailed decomposition of the independent DH
The decomposition we have just derived gives us the overall or aggregate characteristic
e¤ect and coe¢ cient e¤ect of the independent DH. This while important gives us only a
black box explanation of the di¤erences in education spending between rural and urban
households. It does not for example address the issue of how much of the characteristic
e¤ect arises from di¤erences in household income. Similarly, it does not show how
much of the unexplained gap is due to di¤erences in household income. So a detailed
decomposition which further disaggregates the two e¤ects is important in pinpointing the
major factors driving the spending gap. Knowledge of the major drivers of the spending
gap is important for policy interventions aimed at closing or reducing the gap.
Owing to the di¢ culty in interpreting the detailed decomposition of the coe¢ cient e¤ect,
this study only dwells on the detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect (see Jones
1983 for more details on the interpretational problems)32. In deriving the detailed decom-
position of the characteristic e¤ect of the independent DH33, we use the average predicted
gaps given in equations 2.18 to 2.21.
A detailed decomposition of the characteristic e¤ect denoted as CE for the jth variable
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(2.22)
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(2.23)
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(2.24)
32In addition to the interpretational problems, a detailed decomposition of the coe¢ cient e¤ect for
dummy variables may su¤er from an invariance problem in the sense that the detailed coe¢ cients e¤ect
attributed to dummy variables is not invariant to the choice of the base category (Oaxaca 1999). Solving
this problem involves the estimation of a normalized regression (see Suits 1984; Gardeazabal and Ugidos
2005; Yun 2005).
33It should be noted that the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Tobit models proposed by Bauer and
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W j4 = 1 (2.27)
The contribution of each variable to the characteristic e¤ect is computed by replacing the
value of one group of households (rural or urban) with that of the other group of households
sequentially one by one34. Assuming that there is only one censoring mechanism, the
detailed decompositions in equations 2.22 to 2.25 reduce to that of a Tobit model with
censoring at zero. Further, if expenditure is uncensored, detailed decompositions 2.22 to
2.25 reduce to that of linear models. The corresponding weights for both the Tobit and
linear models reduce to the single equation weights as proposed by Yun (2004).
2.6.2 Results of the decomposition
We present the results and discussion of the aggregated decomposition in subsection 2.6.2,
this is followed up by results and discussion of the detailed decomposition in subsection
2.6.2.
34The sequential replacement of each variable does not lead to path dependency i.e. it is insensitive to
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Results of the aggregate decomposition
Results of the proposed aggregate decomposition are presented in Table 2.7. For com-
parison we also show in Table A2.5 in the appendix results of the decomposition for the
Tobit model. In both tables, we have also presented the actual average expenditure share
gap for the full sample from Table 2.1. The results indicate that the DH model compared
to the Tobit model has a lower approximation error, implying that it predicts spending
more accurately. The gap in the predicted average share of primary education expenditure
between rural and urban households is largely due to di¤erences in characteristics. For
example, looking at the expenditure di¤erential when urban coe¢ cients are used in the
counterfactual, and we also use the urban variance in the counterfactual, 66% of the gap is
due to di¤erences in characteristics of the households, and 34% of the gap is explained by
di¤erences in estimated coe¢ cients, hence due to behavioural di¤erences. The two aggre-
gate e¤ects are statistically signicant at 1%. This result means that if rural and urban
household characteristics were to be equalized, 66% of the spending gap would vanish.
On the other hand, if the behavior of rural and urban households was equalized, 34% of
the spending gap would disappear. Similarly, when the urban coe¢ cients and the rural
variance are used in the counterfactual, the results indicate that the characteristic e¤ect is
67.6% and that 32.4% of the expenditure gap is attributable to di¤erences in coe¢ cients.
Both e¤ects are statistically signicant. In this case 67.6% (32.4%) of the spending gap
would vanish if household characteristics (behavior) were equalized.
The picture that is emerging from the DH decomposition results is that the gap in spend-
ing between rural and urban households largely arises from di¤erences in their characteris-
tics. The same conclusion is arrived at when we ignore the participation equation and use
Tobit model (see appendix Table A2.5). It is however worth noting that decomposition
results for the Tobit consistently give a higher (lower) measure of the characteristic e¤ect
(coe¢ cient e¤ect); which suggests that when we when do not account for the fact that
spending is made in two stages, we overestimate (underestimate) the characteristic e¤ect
(coe¢ cient e¤ect). In a nutshell, the DH and Tobit results suggest that the rural-urban
gap in expenditure is mainly due to di¤erences in characteristics; and this nding is robust
to choice of both variance and coe¢ cients35 used in the counterfactual as well as ignoring
the participation equation as a censoring mechanism.
Results of the detailed decomposition
The aggregated decomposition results presented in the preceding show that the rural-
urban spending gap is predominantly due to di¤erences in characteristics, however this
35The robustness of the decomposition results to choice of counterfactual implies that we do not have
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does not tell us which characteristics are key. In Tables 2.8 and 2.9, we present results of
the disaggregated decomposition of the DH. For comparison, we also report results of the
same for the Tobit model in Tables A2.6 and A2.7 in the appendix. We have reproduced
the characteristic e¤ect in the top panel of the tables for ease of exposition. The detailed
decomposition results of the DH show that a big part of the characteristic e¤ect is taken
up by six variables namely; household income, fathers and mothers education, fathers
and mothers employment status, and the distance to the nearest primary school. This
conclusion is robust to choice of variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual. For
example, when we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients (rural coe¢ cients)
in the counterfactual, we nd that these six variables constitute 83.59% (90.45%) of the
characteristic e¤ect, and the remainder,16.41% (9.55%) is taken by the other variables.
This implies that these six variables are the major factors behind the rural-urban spending
di¤erence, and that an equalization of these six variables jointly between rural and urban
households would wipe out 83.59% (90.45%) of the characteristic e¤ect.
In terms of the specics, and when we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients
(rural coe¢ cients) in the counterfactual, the results show that di¤erences in household
income as proxied by the log of per capita annual consumption take up 34.38% (36.36%) of
the characteristic e¤ect, and that this e¤ect of income is statistically signicantly di¤erent
from zero. Thus, if household income alone was to be the same between the two areas,
this would take o¤ 34.38% (36.36%) of the characteristic e¤ect. When we change the
variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual, we get a similar story. This suggests
that di¤erences in household income are the largest factor in driving the rural-urban
spending di¤erential. This result conforms to a nding by Al-Samarrai and Reilly (2000)
in Tanzania where they found di¤erences in income to be the largest and statistically
signicant driver of rural-urban enrolment di¤erences. In terms of policy interventions,
this result suggests that e¤orts aimed at reducing the rural-urban poverty gap would have
a signicant contractionary e¤ect on the spending di¤erential.
When we use the urban variance and the urban coe¢ cients (rural coe¢ cients), the results
also show that di¤erences in the quality of access of primary schools as proxied by the
distance to the nearest primary school have the second largest impact of 17.19% (25.76%)
on the spending gap. So 17.19% (25.76%) of the characteristic e¤ect would be knocked
o¤ as a result of closing the quality of access gap between the two areas. We get a similar
picture when the rural variance and urban or rural coe¢ cients are used the counterfac-
tual. Thus, reducing the di¤erences in the quality of access of primary schools between
the two areas would go a long way in reducing the spending gap36. Interestingly, the
results which are robust to choice of variance and coe¢ cients used in the counterfactual,
36If the distance to the nearest primary school is thought of as a measure of the direct cost of primary
education, then the result means that reducing the di¤erences in cost of primary education between the











show that di¤erences in mothers characteristics in terms of education and employment
contribute more to the characteristic e¤ect compared to the same for fathers. Hence,
targeting mothers education and employment would have a bigger impact as compared
to the same for fathers in narrowing or closing the spending gap between the two areas.
It is also noteworthy that mothers education has a larger contribution to the gap than
mothers employment. Similar to the econometric results (subsection 2.5.1), this nding
has intergenerational implications for reducing or closing the rural-urban gap in spending.
Educating more girls entails more educated mothers in future, who would then have a
larger e¤ect on the rural-urban spending gap.
When we ignore the fact that the spending decisions are done in two stages and use the
Tobit model (see Tables A2.6 and A2.7 in the appendix), we get conclusions similar to
the DH, albeit with generally higher e¤ects for the six variables, again implying that we
overestimate the impact of the variables when the participation decision is not accounted
for. Again, these conclusions are robust to choice of variance or coe¢ cients used in the
counterfactual. In summary, both results from the DH and the Tobit models show the six
variables to be the major drivers of the spending gap. Thus, policy interventions to narrow
or close the rural-urban household spending gap should focus on reducing the poverty gap,
school quality gaps, mens and womens education and employment gaps, especially the
womens education gap.
2.7 Conclusions
Using the SecondMalawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data, the chapter has looked
at household expenditure on the education of own primary school children. We make a
distinction between rural and urban households. With this distinction in mind, we have
looked at two issues. Firstly, we have investigated the factors which inuence a house-
holds expenditure decision. Specically, here we have looked at two interrelated questions;
what factors inuence a households decision to spend or not (the participation decision),
and then what factors inuence how much is spent (the expenditure decision). We have
found that there are di¤erences in the impact of factors by area of residence. It has been
established that the level of household income in rural and urban areas positively and
signicantly impacts both the participation and expenditure decisions. Computed elas-
ticities have shown that spending on education by rural households is more sensitive to
changes in income compared to urban households, suggesting that spending on education
in rural areas is a luxury good. We have found that a fathers and mothers employment
has a bigger impact on spending (at both decision levels) in rural areas compared to urban
areas. For both areas, a mothers employment and education has been found to exert a










36 CHAPTER 2. RURAL-URBAN DIFFERENCES IN PARENTAL SPENDING
holds compared to their rural counterparts are more sensitive to the quality of access of
primary schools as measured by the distance to the nearest primary school. The study
has found evidence of gender bias in school spending in rural areas only.
The second issue addressed in the study relates to why there are these di¤erences between
rural and urban households, and we have dealt with this issue by conducting a decom-
position analysis. We have proposed an extension of the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
technique to the independent DH. The extension has been done at two levels namely;
the aggregated decomposition which shows just how much of the spending gap is due to
di¤erences in characteristics (characteristic e¤ect) and how much is due to di¤erences
in the estimated coe¢ cients (coe¢ cient e¤ect), and the disaggregated decomposition of
the characteristic e¤ect which shows the contribution of each variable to the character-
istic e¤ect. Results from the aggregated decomposition show that at least 66% of the
expenditure di¤erential arises from di¤erences in characteristics and about 34% is due to
behavioural di¤erences (estimated coe¢ cients) between rural and urban households. This
conclusion is robust to choice of coe¢ cients and variance used in the counterfactual. It
is also robust to assuming that the zeros in expenditure are entirely a result of a corner
solution. The results from the disaggregated decomposition show that household income,
parental education and employment, and quality of access of primary schools are the ma-
jor factors behind the spending gap. It has been shown that the di¤erence in household
income between the two areas is the largest contributing factor, followed by quality of
access of primary schools. Further, it has been demonstrated that di¤erences in mothers
employment and education have a larger e¤ect relative to the fathers on the spending
di¤erential.
Our empirical analysis has a a number of caveats which are worth pointing out. Firstly,
we have not taken into account the possibility that sending children to school and sending
them to work (i.e. child labour) are joint decisions. Secondly, the study makes the implicit
assumption that more spending on education entails more schooling either in levels or in
quality. However, more spending on education can translate in more schooling or more
quality of schooling rather imperfectly. Finally, there may be a possibility of spatial
sorting which may hold if most hard working parents or those with the strongest taste for
education are more likely to move to urban areas which may result in urban households
spending more on education. We unable to address this selection on unobservables. Our
conclusions should therefore be taken with these caveats in mind.
In this chapter, we have focussed on the parental role in the human capital formation of
own primary school children in Malawi. In many African countries however, parents are
not only responsible for the education of their own children, but they are also responsible
for the investments in education of non-biological children who are put in their care.











that parents play in educating non-biological children in addition to their own takes on an
added signicance. This blending of biological and non-biological children in families may
give rise to schooling discrimination, in the sense that non-biological children may receive
less schooling relative to biological ones. The next chapter, examines this schooling bias
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Table 2.1: Annual primary education expenditure
Rural Urban
Full sample Spending sample Full sample Spending sample Gap 1 Gap 2
Expenditure (1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Absolute 379.97 510.68     4696.00 6863.38 6352.70*** 4316.03***
Share 0.004 0.005 0.014 0.022 0.01*** 0.017***
Disaggregated absolute expenditure of full sample
Tuition 35.48 2945.85 2910.27***
Books 74.81 250.63 175.82***
Uniform 160.64 343.62 182.98***
Boarding 13.05 124.06 111.01***
Building 53.78 82.78 28.89*
PTA 10.55 233.23 222.68***
Other 31.46 715.83 684.37***
Notes: The full sample is made up of all households with school going children, and the spending sample is
made of households with nonzero expenditure on education. Absolute is the absolute expenditure while share
is absolute expenditure divided by household annual consumption expenditure. We use two-tailed tests to test
the significance of the differences (gaps) in expenditure between rural and urban. The significance asterisks











Table 2.2: Sample descriptives of explanatory variables
Rural Urban
full sample spending sample full sample spending sample gap 1 gap 2
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (3)-(1) (4)-(2)
Household characteristics
last child’s age 7.97 7.65 9.30 8.57 1.3*** 0.92**
consumption expenditure 9.64 9.65 10.07 10.19 0.43*** 0.53***
government scholars 0.79 0.80 0.69 0.70 -0.10*** -0.10**
children 3.52 3.68 3.59 3.71 0.04 0.07
Parental characteristics
father works 0.71 0.72 0.82 0.81 0.10** 0.11***
mother works 0.23 0.24 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.07*
father’s education 2.02 2.01 5.40 5.75 3.74*** 3.38***
mother’s education 0.79 0.76 2.90 3.31 2.55*** 2.11***
father’s age 47.77 47.78 47.88 47.87 0.09 0.11
mother’s age 43.62 43.23 43.11 42.13 -1.1 -0.51
School characteristics
distance primary 2.75 2.95 1.99 1.30 -1.65 -0.76
Age-gender composition of household
males aged 0-6 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.02* -0.02
males aged 7-15 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.13 -0.03** -0.03**
males aged 16-19 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 -0.003 0.0006
males aged 20-55 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.03*** 0.02**
males above 55 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.007 0.01
females aged 0-6 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 -0.005 -0.03
females aged 7-15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 -0.008 0.002
females aged 16-19 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.01
females aged 20-55 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.03*** 0.02**
females above 55 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Region
north 0.18 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.02 0.12
centre 0.40 0.46 0.44 0.51 0.05 0.04
south 0.42 0.38 0.27 0.31 -0.07 -0.15***
Sample size 3739 2782 676 548
Notes: The full sample is made up of all households with school going children, and the spending sample is made
of households with nonzero expenditure on education. We use two-tailed tests to test the significance of the
differences (gaps) in regressors between rural and urban. For continuous regressors we use mean differences, and
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Table 2.3: LR test of differences in expenditure on education
Log likelihood value (number of parameters)
Model Pooled Rural Urban      LR statistic df p-value
DH -8306.19(66) -6167.27(64) -2075.03(64)   127.78 62          0.00
Tobit -8398.78(33) -6211.47(32) -2107.53(32)   159.56 31 0.00
Table 2.4: LR test of Tobit against the independent DH
Model
Group       Independent DH Tobit LR statistic df           p-value
Rural -6167.27 -6211.47 88.4             32 0.00











Table 2.5: Results of the independent DH by area of residence
Rural Urban
Variable participation   level participation level
Household characteristics
last child’s age -0.05488*** -0.01060 0.30450               0.00072
(0.01614)       (0.00883) (0.23719)             (0.00365)
last child’s age2 0.00104***      0.00022 -0.00767 -0.00009
(0.00038)      (0.00021) (0.00710) (0.00009)
consumption expenditure 0.23207*** 0.05227*** 0.56821*** 0.03576***
(0.05461)       (0.00355)          (0.01981)             (0.01283)
government scholars 0.76890*** -0.11241** -2.86960**             0.02045
(0.10820)       (0.04691)          (1.34249)             (0.01268)
children 0.03128         0.04425*** 1.63650** -0.00016
(0.04129)       (0.01411)          (0.64050)             (0.00804)
children2 -0.00132 -0.00132** -0.14069**             0.00046
(0.00398)       (0.00056) (0.07013)             (0.00084)
Parental characteristics
father works 0.00650*** 0.00756*** 0.04989*** 0.02324***
(0.00138)       (0.00155)          (0.00224)             (0.00296)
mother works 0.20134*** 0.02023*** 0.64032*** 0.02352***
(0.05835)       (0.00219)          (0.07506)             (0.00132)
father’s education 0.00677*** 0.01142*** 0.02940*** 0.00121***
(0.0017)       (0.00259)          (0.00354)             (0.00019)
mother’s education 0.00683*** 0.00865*** 0.03234*** 0.00231***
(0.00101) (0.00148)          (0.00609)             (0.00026)
father’s age 0.03908         0.01789 0.90438** -0.01001
(0.03091)       (0.01648)          (0.37120)             (0.00628)
father’s age2 -0.00019 -0.00018 -0.00825**             0.00010
(0.00027)       (0.00015)          (0.00341)             (0.00006)
mother’s age 0.04274 0.05428*** -0.51033** -0.01090
(0.03055)       (0.01915) (0.21431) (0.01311)
mother’s age2 -0.00045 -0.00048*** 0.00328* 0.00015
(0.00028)       (0.00018) (0.00181) (0.00014)
School characteristics
distance primary -0.00699*** -0.00908*** -0.56579*** -0.02440***
(0.00024)       (0.00084) (0.00536)       (0.00158)
Age-gender composition of household
males aged 0-6 1.11652** -0.27137 -8.03960              0.20918*
(0.55346)       (0.21291) (5.46235)            (0.11936)
males aged 7-15 1.94601***      0.23238*** 6.16139*** 0.18465***
(0.54091)       (0.0095)          (0.09781) (0.00321)
males aged 16-19 1.05852* 0.30828 -11.41691*             0.26668*
(0.57515)       (0.22514)          (6.57410)            (0.14466)
males aged 20-55 0.43034 0.14724 -12.28649**            0.17875*
(0.50640)       (0.18605)          (5.65072)            (0.10662)
females aged 0-6 0.87586 -0.58748** -7.37600 0.26562**
(0.54953)       (0.25236)          (5.68817)            (0.12612)
females aged 7-15 1.82512***      0.25020*** 7.70956*** 0.29012**
(0.2362) (0.0093)          (0.40535) (0.12162)
females aged 16-19 0.33254         0.36888* -8.92036              0.31863***
(0.59034)       (0.22344)          (5.63699)            (0.12218)
females aged 20-55 0.63089         0.30406 -3.77753              0.12265
(0.59596)       (0.23380)          (4.96818)            (0.10029)
females above 55 1.47903**       0.51368* -4.29883              0.41458**
(0.71350)       (0.28441)          (6.11054)            (0.18104)
Region
north 0.17206*** 0.13929* -1.56052*             0.04564
(0.06414)       (0.07396) (0.87341)           (0.03108)
centre 0.70344***      0.01791 -0.73286 -0.02001*
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Table 2.5: continued
Rural Urban




constant -5.71966*** -1.95478* -9.54081 -0.12453
(1.40696)       (1.16150)          (12.48037) (0.33370)
sigma 0.01358***                               0.01182***
(0.00258)                                (0.00160)
Log-likelihood -6167.27 -2075.03
P-values of equality of coefficients of males aged 7-15 and females aged 7-15:
0.007 0.002 0.52 0.36
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses











Table 2.6: Elasticities with respect to selected regressors for the DH
DH
Rural Urban
Variable Prob Cond      Uncond          Prob Cond Uncond
consumption expenditure 1.889*** 1.145*** 2.33*** 0.154***    0.177*** 0.331***
(0.209) (0.055)      (0.264) (0.083) (0.12) (0.095)
father works 0.164*** 0.143***    0.307*** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.256***
(0.006) (0.007)     (0.013) (0.003) (0.025) (0.028)
mother works 0.272*** 0.312*** 0.584*** 0.205*** 0.206*** 0.411***
(0.003) (0.004)     (0.007) (0.064) (0.114) (0.178)
father’s education 0.174*** 0.137***    0.311*** 0.114*** 0.0856*** 0.1996***
(0.007) (0.032)     (0.039) (0.014)     (0.0021) (0.0161)
mother’s education 0.441 0.318*** 0.759*** 0.166***    0.224*** 0.390***
(0.030) (0.073) (0.03) (0.017) (0.023) (0.04)
distance primary -0.018*** -0.047*** -0.065*** -0.296** -0.854*** -1.15***
(0.002) (0.005)      (0.007) (0.115) (0.268) (0.383)
males aged 7-15 0.120*** 0.66***      0.780*** 0.314*** 0.320*** 0.634***
(0.033) (0.055) (0.088) (0.077) (0.036) (0.113)
females aged 7-15 0.014*** 0.070***     0.084*** 0.317*** 0.321*** 0.638***
(0.003) (0.004)      (0.007) (0.024)     (0.013) (0.037)
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors.
Table 2.7: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the independent DH
Using the urban variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.0064*** 0.0066***
(0.0011) (0.0002)
% of raw gap 66% 68.43%
Coefficient effect 0.0032*** 0.0031***
(0.00041) (0.00063)
% of raw gap 34% 31.57%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Using the rural variance
Actual expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted expenditure share gap 0.0097*** 0.0097***
(0.0012) (0.0012)
Characteristic effect 0.006*** 0.0069***
(0.00057) (0.0015)
% of raw gap 67.6% 71.13%
Coefficient effect 0.0031*** 0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.00082)
% of raw gap 32.4% 28.87%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0003 0.0003
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. The actual expenditure share gap is for the full
sample reproduced from Table 1. Approximation error is the difference between the actual expenditure share
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Table 2.8: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the DH using the urban variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0064*** 0.0066***
Of which:
consumption expenditure 0.0022*** (0.00072) [34.38%] 0.0024*** (0.00012)     [36.36%]
father works 0.0003*** (0.000033) [4.69%] 0.00011*** (0.00007)     [1.67%]
mother works 0.00071*** (0.00008) [11.09%] 0.00067*** (0.000086)    [10.15%]
father’s education 0.0002*** (0.000065) [3.13%] 0.00019*** (0.000052)    [2.88%]
mother’s education 0.00084*** (0.000029) [13.13%] 0.0009*** (0.000061)   [13.64%]
distance primary 0.0011*** (0.000076) [17.19%] 0.0017*** (0.000063) [25.76%]
other  variables 0.00105 [16.41%] 0.00063 [9.55%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other variables comprise the remaining variables. We have not computed the
standard error for these remaining variables.
Table 2.9: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the DH using the rural variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.006*** 0.0069***
Of which:
consumption expenditure 0.0019***    (0.00017) [31.67%] 0.0023*** (0.0001)      [33.33%]
father works 0.00019***   (0.00003) [3.17%] 0.00017*** (0.000031)    [2.46%]
mother works 0.00071***   (0.000064) [11.83%] 0.00069*** (0.00002)     [10.00%]
father’s education 0.00015***   (0.000047) [2.50%] 0.0001*** (0.00002)     [1.45%]
mother’s education 0.00093***   (0.000042) [15.50%] 0.001*** (0.0001)      [14.49%]
distance primary 0.0012***    (0.0001) [20.00%] 0.0016*** (0.00012)     [23.19%]
other  variables 0.00092 [15.33%] 0.00104 [15.07%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other variables comprise the remaining variables. We have not computed the
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2.8 Appendix to Chapter 2








Table A2.2: Reduced form regressions of log per capita consumption
Variable Rural Urban
last child’s age 0.090*** 0.121***
(0.005) (0.045)
last child’s age2 -0.002*** -0.002
(0.000) (0.001)
father’s age -0.143*** -0.007
(0.009) (0.081)
father’s age2 0.001*** 0.002
(0.000) (0.001)
mother’s age -0.084*** -0.071
(0.010) (0.047)












F-test of joint significance of instruments:
F-stat 111 9.64
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
F-test of overall significance:
F-stat 122 19.68
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.2988 0.4564
Notes: The instruments for per capita consumption expenditure are land, its square. The significance asterisks
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Table A2.3: Results of the Tobit by area of residence
Variable Rural Urban
Household characteristics
last child’s age -0.00044*** 0.00191
(0.00016) (0.00176)
last child’s age2 0.00001** -0.00008
(0.00000) (0.00005)
consumption expenditure 0.00171*** 0.01259**
(0.00018) (0.00611)







father works 0.00134*** 0.0164***
(0.00032) (0.00368)
mother works 0.02277** 0.01213***
(0.00034) (0.00129)
father’s education 0.00151*** 0.01206***
(0.00004) (0.00037)
mother’s education 0.00431*** 0.01074***
(0.00007) (0.00049)
father’s age 0.00059* -0.00024
(0.00030) (0.00216)
father’s age2 -0.00000* 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00002)
mother’s age 0.00077*** -0.00259*
(0.00023) (0.00144)
mother’s age2 -0.00001*** 0.00002*
(0.00000) (0.00001)
School characteristics
distance primary -0.00042* -0.01039***
(0.00022) (0.00295)
Age-gender composition of household
males aged 0-6 0.00150 -0.02059
(0.00346) (0.03275)
males aged 7-15 0.00871 0.01916
(0.337) (0.23)
males aged 16-19 0.00763** -0.02771
(0.00361) (0.03614)
males aged 20-55 0.00291 -0.04197
(0.00316) (0.02973)
females aged 0-6 -0.00124 -0.00743
(0.00345) (0.03255)
females aged 7-15 0.00867 0.07097
(0.334) (0.977)
females aged 16-19 0.00640* -0.00056
(0.00374) (0.02995)
females aged 20-55 0.00419 -0.00840
(0.00378) (0.03112)



























P-values of equality of coefficients of males aged 7-15 and females aged 7-15:
0.2315 0.5768
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
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Table A2.4: Elasticities with respect to selected regressors for the Tobit
Tobit
Rural Urban
Variable Prob    Cond Uncond Prob Cond Uncond
consumption expenditure 1.524*** 1.399***     2.923*** .450***     0.461*** 0.911***
(0.043) (0.071) (0.114) (0.098) (0.020) (0.120)
father works 0.23***   0.17***       0.40*** 0.16***    0.12*** 0.28***
(0.007) (0.005)      (0.001) (0.015) (0.001) (0.016)
mother works 0.713*** 0.64***      1.35*** 0.449** 0.412** 0.861***
(0.004)    (0.003)      (0.007) (0.070) (0.051) (0.120)
father’s education 0.431***    0.532***     0.963*** 0.252*** 0.407*** 0.659***
(0.046)     (0.034)      (0.08) (0.033) (0.064) (0.097)
mother’s education 0.869***   0.761***     1.630*** 0.785*** 0.658*** 1.443
(0.068) (0.056) (0.124) (0.025) (0.066) (0.091)
distance primary -0.089* -0.068* -0.157* -0.988*** -0.728*** -1.716***
(0.046)    (0.035)      (0.080) (0.303) (0.211) (0.504)
males aged 7-15 0.104 0.079 0.182 -0.116 -0.086 -0.202
(0.40) (0.30) (0.71) (0.186) (0.136) (0.322)
females aged 7-15 0.102 0.078 0.181 -0.082 -0.061 -0.143
(0.040) (0.030) (0.070) (0.223) (0.164) (0.388)
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
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Table A2.5: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the Tobit
Using the urban variance
Actual average expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted average expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0044*** 0.0046***
(0.0004) (0.0001)
% of raw gap 74.6% 77.97%
Coefficient effect 0.0015*** 0.0013***
(0.00021) (0.00041)
% of raw gap 25.4% 22.03%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Using the rural variance
Actual average expenditure share gap 0.01 0.01
Predicted average expenditure share gap 0.0059*** 0.0059***
(0.001) (0.001)
Characteristic effect 0.0048*** 0.0045***
(0.00021) (0.00037)
% of raw gap 81.56% 76.27%
Coefficient effect 0.0011*** 0.0014***
(0.00026) (0.00022)
% of raw gap 18.64% 23.73%
Counterfactual coefficients urban rural
Approximation error 0.0041 0.0041
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in
parentheses are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. The actual expenditure share gap is for the full
sample reproduced from Table 1. Approximation error is the difference between the actual expenditure share
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Table A2.6: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the Tobit using the urban
variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0044*** 0.0046***
Of which:
Consumption expenditure 0.0012*** (0.0001) [27.27%] 0.0016*** (0.00036) [34.78%]
father works 0.0002*** (0.000031) [4.55%] 0.0004*** (0.00004)     [8.70%]
mother works 0.00032*** (0.00032) [7.27%] 0.00048*** (0.000043)    [10.43%]
father’s education 0.0005*** (0.000052) [11.36%] 0.0002*** (0.00004) [4.35%]
mother’s education 0.00082*** (0.000047) [18.64%] 0.0004*** (0.000013) [8.70%]
distance primary 0.0009*** (0.000073) [20.45%] 0.0008*** (0.00008) [17.39%]
other  variables 0.00046 [10.45%] 0.00072 [15.65%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other variables comprise the remaining variables. We have not computed the
standard error for these remaining variables.
Table A2.7: Detailed decomposition of the characteristic effect of the Tobit using the rural
variance
Urban coefficients Rural Coefficients
CE 0.0048*** 0.0045***
Of which:
Consumption expenditure 0.002*** (0.0005) [41.67%] 0.002*** (0.0003) [44.44%]
father works 0.00023*** (0.000061) [4.79%] 0.00017*** (0.000041) [3.78%]
mother works 0.00038*** (0.000032) [7.92%] 0.00041*** (0.000037) [9.11%]
father’s education 0.00016*** (0.000037) [3.33%] 0.00013*** (0.00001) [2.89%]
mother’s education 0.00026*** (0.000042) [5.42%] 0.0002*** (0.000029) [4.44%]
distance primary 0.0009*** (.000033) [18.75%] 0.0005*** (0.00007) [11.11%]
other  variables 0.00087 [18.13%] 0.00109*** [24.22%]
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are bootstrapped (1000 replications) standard errors. In square brackets are percentage contributions of each variable
to the characteristic effect (CE). Other variables comprise the remaining variables. We have not computed the












schooling costs, and schooling bias
against non-biological children in
Malawi
3.1 Introduction
Parents as primary care givers of children play an important role in the formation of
human capital which is vital for the economic development of any country. They do this
by investing in the health and the education of their children. The role of parents in
providing for the education of both their own o¤ spring as well as non-biological children
in developing countries especially sub-Saharan African countries is more critical now given
the impact of HIV/AIDS. An estimated 1.7 million people were infected with HIV in
2007, bringing to 22.5 million the total number of people living with the virus in sub-
Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 2007). This entails more orphans in the future who have to
be educated by extended family or non-relatives. A number of studies nd evidence of
schooling bias against non-biological children within households in sub-Saharan Africa,
suggesting that parents discriminate against non-biological children who stay with them.
Case et al. (2004), using 19 Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) datasets from 10
African countries, nd that orphans are less likely to be enrolled than nonorphans with
whom they live. Gundersen et al. (2004) and Kabubo-Mariara and Mwabu (2007) nd
a similar result for Zimbabwe and Kenya respectively. Shapiro and Tambashewe (2001)
nd that children living in households headed by someone other than their father or
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of Congo. They nd this to be more evident for the ages 10141.
Thus, while there is a plethora of economic studies which show evidence of discrimina-
tion against non-biological children, the literature is scanty on the possible sources of this
discrimination. For example, Case et al. (2004) show that the probability of school enroll-
ment is inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the household
head, regardless of whether the child is an orphan or not. There has been an almost
exclusive focus on gender bias by studies which attempt to o¤er sources of intrahouse-
hold bias in schooling (e.g. Behrman et al. 1986; Davies and Zhang 1995; Alderman and
Gertler 1997; Alderman and King 1998; Echevarria and Merlo 1999; Rose 2000; Pasqua
2005). In addition to the paucity of economic studies on sources of schooling bias against
non-biological children, to the best of our knowledge there is no study which addresses
the issue of what happens to schooling bias following household income and cost changes.
The contributions of the study are threefold. Firstly, the study proposes a theoretical
model which o¤ers possible sources of schooling bias against non-biological children. The
second contribution of the study is that it theoretically demostrates in the presence of
discrimination, how households respond to changes in household income and school costs,
and how the households response to cost changes varies with household income. The -
nal contribution of the study is that it empirically investigates the theoretical predictions.
Specically, the empirical analysis seeks to examine using Malawian data, how households
respond to changes in household income and school costs, and how a households response
to cost changes varies with household income. The theoretical and empirical analyses
conducted by the study are signicant. They not only contribute specically to the un-
derstanding of schooling bias against non-biological children, but they also add to the
available literature on intrahousehold schooling bias in general. Knowledge of the factors
which cause intrahousehold schooling bias as well as how schooling changes as household
income and school cost change, and how a households response to cost changes varies with
household income would no doubt go a long way in the formulation of strategies to ght
schooling bias at the household level. More crucially, this knowledge takes on an added
signicance in the light of the increasing number of orphans due to HIV/AIDS in sub
Saharan Africa who mostly end up living with extended family and other non-relatives2.
To understand why there may be schooling bias against a non-biological child in a house-
hold, we construct a two period model of the family in which parents work in the rst
period and retire in the second period. In the rst period, they allocate their income be-
tween consumption and investment in the schooling of a biological child and non-biological
1While in a number of countries there is evidence of schooling bias, in others households exhibit no
discrimination. For example, Zimmerman (2003) nds that South African households treat foster children
as they do their own children in terms of human capital investment.
2In 2005, the estimated adult (age 15-49) HIV prevalence rate for Malawi was 14.1%. With this











child. In the second period, parents consume from the income transfers that the two chil-
dren make when they are adults. The income transfered depends on the schooling invested
in the two children in the rst period. Thus, there are both investment and consumption
motives to educating the children. The two children are assumed to be of the same sex.
The model predicts two broad sources of schooling bias against a non-biological child, one
attributable to non-preference based conditions, and the other due to a pure preference
bias by parents. In terms of discrimination coming from the non-preference based condi-
tions, the model shows that there will be schooling bias against a non-bioligical child if the
cost (direct and opportunity costs) of educating the non-biological child are higher; if the
returns to education of the non-biological child are lower; and if the subjective belief about
how much will be transferred by the own child when the parents retire is higher compared
to the non-biological childs. Further to that, the model predicts that the schooling gap
between the biological child and the non-biological child gets wider as the relationship
distance between the non-biological child and the parents gets wider. The model also
predicts schooling bias arising from preference bias, where parents get more utility from
the income of their own child.
The model shows that the impact of a change in costs and income on the amount of
schooling investment is bigger for the non-biological child. That is, an increase in the
cost (income) leads to a larger reduction (increase) in schooling of the non-biological child
relative to the biological child. This suggests that households respond asymmetrically to
changes in costs and household income. The model further predicts that the gap between
the two children following these changes gets wider the more distantly related the non-
biological child is. The model also shows that the change in schooling due to a change
in costs falls with income, and falls faster for the non-biological child who is distantly
related to the parents. This suggests that an increase in cost of schooling leads to a
bigger reduction in schooling for poor households, and that the di¤erence in the impact
of cost changes between the biological and the non-biological child declines as household
economic status improves i.e. there is convergence.
Using blended households in Malawi, that is households with both biological and non-
biological children of school going age, and measuring schooling either as current enrol-
ment or as grade attainment, the empirical results conrm the theoretical predictions.
Specically, we nd that when both measures of schooling are used the price and in-
come elasticities of schooling are larger for non-biological children. Further, we nd that
non-biological children who are non-relatives have higher price and income elasticities.
The empirical analysis also indicates that households in the lowest income quintile (the
poorest) have the largest price elasticities, and households in the highest income quintile
(the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. The study also nds that the price










54 CHAPTER 3. SCHOOLING BIAS AGAINST NON-BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN
est income quintile to the highest income quintile, and that the convergence is faster for
non-biological children who are non-relatives.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets up a model of intrahouse-
hold schooling discrimination and discusses its implications as well as conducts compara-
tive static exercises. In Section 3.3 we discuss the theoretical predictions to be checked,
the econometric model used, variables used, estimation issues, and data and descriptives.
Econometric results are presented in Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5.
3.2 A model of intrahousehold schooling bias
We adapt a model structure used by Alderman and Gertler (1997), and Alderman and
King (1998), to study gender schooling bias in households. Consider a society in which
parents live in two periods, indexed by t = 1; 2 respectively. They work in the rst period,
and retire in the second period. In the rst period, they give birth to a child (b), and in the
same period they have a non-biological (nb) child moving into the family3. Throughout,
we use subscripts j = b; nb to refer to the two children. The children (biological and non-
biological child) are of the same sex4, and approximately of the same age5. The parents
consumption in the rst period is their income less the investment on schooling of the two
children6. In the rst period parents can also use income from child labour, that is instead
of sending children to school they may decide to send them to work. For simplicity we
dont model this joint decision between sending children to school (future benet) and
sending them to work (current benet). In the second period (during retirement), their
consumption depends on the income transfered by the two children, which in turn depends
on the schooling investment that the parents made in the rst period. Thus, parents
decision to educate children is done both for its own sake as a consumption good, and
as an investment good. This entails that there are both investment and consumption
reasons for investing in the education of the two children. There is a trade o¤ between
current consumption and second period consumption, in that less consumption in period
1, means more schooling for the children, and hence more consumption during retirement.
We assume that there are no savings, and no old age pension. We also assume that
only parents are responsible for the schooling of the children in the rst period, that is
there are no private or public scholarships. We assume that there is complete and perfect
information meaning that there is no uncertainty7.
3For simplicity, we assume that the movement of a non-bilogical child into the family is exogenous.
4This allows us to focus on schooling di¤erences in the household which are not due to gender bias.
5This allows us control for the childrens future level of earnings.
6For simplicity, we dont allow for overlapping generations in which the parentsalso transfer part of
their income to their parents.
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The life time utility function of parents is given as follows;
U = G(C1) + V (W2b;W2nb; C2) (3.1)
Where; C1 is their rst period consumption, C2 is their second period consumption, W2b
is the income of their child in period 2 (retirement period), W2nb the income of the non-
biological child in period 2 (retirement period), and  is the discount rate or subjective rate
of time preference. This utility function says that parents get utility from consumption
in the two periods, and also they get utility from the income of the two children in the
second period. We assume that the utility function is twice continuously di¤erentiable
and has the following conventional properties;
G0 > 0; V 0 > 0 (3.2)
G00 < 0; V 00 < 0
Thus, the utility functions are concave meaning that utility is increasing but diminishing.
Since we have assumed that there are no pensions and savings, parentssecond period
consumption is given as;
C2 = kW2b + kW2nb (3.3)
That is, the resources available for consumption by parents in retirement come from the
transfers that the two children make when they are adults. The parents have a subjective
belief k, about how much of each childs income will be transferred to them when they
retire. Where k 2 [0; 1], and k is a measure of the degree of relatedness of the child.
For a biological child k = 1, and for a non-biological child k > 1: A higher k denotes
a more distantly related non-biological child. For ease of exposition, we assume that k
takes positive integer values. There are a number of reasons why transfers may be made
by children when they are adults to their retired parents. As argued by Cigno (1993),
there may exist in a society a social norm according to which adults give a fraction of
their income to their old parents. The workings of the social norm are aptly explained by
López-Calva and Miyamoto (2004, p 491) when they say;
"The adult has to decide on whether to transfer money to her retired par-
ents or not. An informal intergenerational contract exists, which can only be
enforced through "social punishment." The social perception of the adults de-
cision shall determine the optimal reaction of her own child and thus whether
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Even in the absence of the said social norm, the non-availability of pension schemes in poor
countries entail that old people rely on the resources received from their adult children
(Pasqua 2005)8.
The two childrens income when they are adults is;
W2b = bS1b + Ib (3.4)
and
W2nb = nbS1nb + Inb (3.5)
where bS1b (nbS1nb) is the biological (non-biological) childs labour income, and Ib (Inb) is
the own (non-biological) childs non-labour income. The labour income for the biological
child is a linear function of the level of schooling (S1b) invested by the parents in period
1. Similarly, the labour income for the non-biological child is a linear function of the
level of schooling (S1nb) invested by the parents in period 1. b and nb are the returns
to education for the biological and non-biological child respectively. Though the innate
ability of each child might also a¤ect his/her earnings, for simplicity it not included9.
In period 1, the parents face the following budget constraint;
C1 + P1bS1b + P1nbS1nb = Y (3.6)
where P1b and P1nb are indirect and direct costs of schooling of the biological and non-
biological child respectively, and Y is parental labour and non-labour income. We nor-
malize the price of consumption to one. The budget constraint, equation 3.6 says that in
period 1, parents allocate their income on current consumption and the schooling invest-
ment of their own child and the non-biological child.
3.2.1 Equilibrium
Parents choose the level of schooling of the two children, S1b and S1nb to maximize their
life time utility as given by equation 3.1, subject to transfers that the two children will
make in retirement represented by equation 3.3, and subject to the budget constraint 3.6.
Substituting equations 3.3 to 3.6 into equation 3.1, the utility maximization problem of
the parents is formally expressed as;
8We assume here that the subjective belief is exogenous.
9Apart from investing in schooling, the parents may also indirectly a¤ect the earnings potential of the
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Max
S1b;S1nb
U = G(Y   P1bS1b   P1nbS1nb) (3.7)
+V (bS1b + Ib; nbS1nb + Inb; k (bS1b + Ib) + k (nbS1nb + Inb))





















We assume that  = 1 for simplicity. The two rst order conditions suggest that parents
will invest in the education of each child until the marginal cost of sacricing consumption
in period 1 (left hand side) is equal to the marginal benet in period 2. The marginal
benet in period 2 is equal to the utility the parents derive from a marginal increase in each
childs human capital plus the marginal utility of second-period consumption multiplied
by the subjective belief about future transfers per unit of school investment.
3.2.2 Implications
We now turn to the implications of the model for intrahousehold schooling bias against
a non-biological child. The model predicts two broad sources of intrahousehold schooling
bias against a non-biological child. Bias could be due to non-preference based factors
favouring the biological child, and secondly, it could arise from preference bias against
the non-biological child. These two predictions are formally expressed in the next two
propositions.
Proposition 1 If parents exhibit no preference bias against the non-biological child, the
non-biological child will receive less schooling i.e. S1b > S1nb when at least one of the
following holds:
i) Direct and indirect costs of educating the non-biological child are higher than those
of the biological child i.e. P1b < P1nb:
ii) Returns to education of the non-biological child are lower than those of the biological
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iii) The subjective belief about how much the non-biological child will transfer in old age
is lower than that of the biological child i.e. 1 > k for k > 1. Further to this, the
schooling bias worsens, if the subjective belief decreases as the relationship with the
non-biological child becomes distant i.e. 1 > 2 > 3; :::
Proof. Assuming that the marginal benet (right hand side of 3.8 and 3.9) is the same,









; when S1b = S1nb: Now assuming that the marginal cost (left hand side of 3.8 and











nbk. With b > nb; this
equality holds only if S1b > S1nb; due to the concavity of schooling in the parents utility
function. Similarly, with 1 > k for k > 1; and concavity of schooling, this equality
prevails only if S1b > S1nb: Thus, S1b > S1nb (bias) occurs if i) P1b < P1nb or ii) b > nb
or iii) 1 > k: Further to this, when we have 1 > 2 > 3; ::: the schooling gap must be
widening.
The cost especially the indirect opportunity cost of educating a non-biological child may
be higher than that for the biological child owing to the possibility that a non-biological
child is more likely to be sent out to work (child labour) to supplement household income.
The forgone income from the non-biological child makes it more costly to send him/her
to school. The returns to schooling for the non-biological child may be lower in Africa
where most of the non-biological children are orphans due to parental death caused by
HIV/ AIDS. For example, Case et al. (2004, p 484 ) argue that;
"orphans may also be more likely than nonorphans to have HIV/AIDS be-
cause of maternal-child transmission, which could depress schooling. In addi-
tion, the returns to schooling could be reduced by the experiences surrounding
the death of a parent, including time lost from school during the parents illness
and death and emotional scarring that may compromise the childs ability to
learn."
The stigma that often follows those children whose parents died of HIV/AIDS may leave
emotional scars which could quite possibly a¤ect their future returns to education. As
Gachuhi (1999) contends, the psychological e¤ects of having to cope with pervasive illness
and death, and the debilitating impact of the stigmatization associated with HIV/AIDS
can be a detriment to learning. Since parents cannot observe a priori a childs future
transfers to them in old age, they form a subjective belief that due to the biological
ties, their own o¤spring will transfer a higher fraction of his/her income, than the non-
biological child with whom they have weaker ties, and the ties with the non-biological
child get weaker and weaker the more distant is the relationship. The idea that biological
relatedness matters is aptly expressed by evolutionary biologist Hamilton (1964a,b) in
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"The social behavior of a species evolves in such a way that in each dis-
tinct behavior evoking situation the individual will seem to value his neighbors
tness against his own according to the coe¢ cients of relationship appropriate
to that situation."(1964b, p 19.)
The rule suggests that the degree of altruism is an increasing function of biological relat-
edness, that is a child would care more about his parents than a distant relative10. At
the empirical level, Case et al. (2004) show that the probability of school enrollment is
inversely proportional to the degree of relatedness of the child to the household head,
regardless of whether the child is an orphan or not11. Thus, intrahousehold discrimination
against a non-biological child can arise due to the aforementioned non-preference based
conditions. Schooling bias in households can also arise if parents have preference bias
against the non-biological child, this is formally expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If parents exhibit preference bias against the non-biological child, the non-
biological child will receive less schooling i.e. S1b > S1nb:










; when S1b = S1nb: Now












bk. Therefore, with preference bias this
equality holds only if S1b > S1nb; since utility is concave in school investment.
Thus if parents get more satisfaction from the income of their own child relative to the
biological child, the non-biological child receives less schooling. In summary, the model
predicts four possible sources of intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-biological
child. Firstly, a non-biological child will receive less schooling if the cost (direct and
indirect) of educating him/her is higher than that of the own child. Secondly, there will
be less schooling investment in a non-biological child relative to a biological one if the
returns to education for a non-biological child are lower. Thirdly, there will be schooling
bias against a non-biological child if the belief of how much the own child will transfer in
old age is higher than that of the non-biological child. Further, schooling bias against a
non-biological child is worse, the more distantly related he/she is to the parents. Finally,
the non-biological child will have less schooling if parents exhibit preference bias against
him/her, in the sense that they get more utility from the income of the own child if the
income is the same.
10It should be pointed that the standard Hamilton coe¢ cient of relatedness works the other way i.e.
low values of the coe¢ cient imply low values of biological relatedness. Our reformulation where higher k
denotes a more distantly related non-biological child does not a¤ect the spirit of the Hamiltons rule.
11Biological relatedness transcends schooling, for example, Bishai et al. (2003), nd that reduced
biological relatedness is associated with reduced child survival in Uganda. Case et al. (2000), nd that
households in which a child is raised by an adoptive, step or foster mother, less is spent on food in the
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3.2.3 Comparative statics
As discussed earlier, the study seeks to investigate di¤erences in the human capital for-
mation (schooling) of the biological child and non-biological child following changes in
the cost of schooling as well as changes in household income. In addition, the study ex-
amines the di¤erences in the relationship between household income and the change in
school investment due to cost changes for the two children. We answer these questions
by conducting comparative static exercises. The results of the comparative exercise are
summarized in the next two propositions.
Proposition 3 Assuming that P1b = P1nb = P1, and the bias sources discussed earlier
prevail, the following holds;
i) an increase in costs leads to a bigger reduction in schooling for the non-biological
child relative to the biological one.
ii) an increase in household income leads to a bigger increase in schooling for the non-
biological child relative to the biological one.
iii) and the gap between the two children following these changes gets wider the more
distantly related the non-biological child is.
Proof. Using the implicit function theorem to di¤erentiate the rst order conditions as


































< 0: Therefore, with preference bias or b > nb
or 1 > k for k > 1, the following is true j@S1b@P j < j
@S1nb
@P
j. Similarly, di¤erentiating 3.8



































> 0:Therefore, with preference bias or b > nb or





. It must be the case that the gap
following these changes widens when we have 1 > 2 > 3; ::::
Thus, when there is intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-biological child originating
from the sources discussed earlier, the schooling of a non-biological child is more sensitive
to changes in costs and income. This suggests an asymmetry in the way a family would
respond to cost and income shocks to the household. That is, if a family experiences a
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more relative to the biological children. The same implication holds with respect to cost
shocks. Further, this non-neutrality in household response to income and cost changes
for the two children gets more asymmetric the more distantly related the non-biological
child is. This suggests that a non-biological child who is not related to the parents would
have his/her schooling su¤er more following cost increases and a decline in a households
economic status. In terms of policy interventions, the theoretical predictions imply that
e¤orts aimed at ghting poverty would go a long way in improving the schooling of non-
biological children.












































and the bias sources discussed earlier prevail, the change in schooling due to a change in
costs P1;
i) falls with household income.
ii) and the fall is faster for the non-biological child relative to the biological child i.e.there
is convergence in the sense that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes between
the biological and the non-biological child declines as household income increases.
iii) the more distantly related the non-biological child is, the faster the convergence.





































































































































; if there is preference bias or b > nb
or 1 > k for k > 1. The fall gets bigger with decreasing biological relatedness i.e. when
we have 1 > 2 > 3; :::
This result implies that when there is intrahousehold schooling bias against a non-biological










62 CHAPTER 3. SCHOOLING BIAS AGAINST NON-BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN
schooling is bigger for low income households compared with high income households.
There is therefore an asymmetry between poor households and non poor households re-
garding how they respond to cost changes. That is, an increase in cost of schooling leads
to a bigger reduction in schooling for poor households. The model further suggests that
the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes between the biological and the non-biological
child declines as household income increases. That is, as households become richer, the
impact of cost changes on the schooling of the two children converges. Besides, the model
suggests that this convergence as household income increases is faster the more distantly
related the non-biological child is. This has policy signicance, in that improvements in
the economic status of households would lead to a reduction in bias against non-biological
children. The assumption that @
3G
@C31
> 0 deserves some comment. A positive third deriva-
tive of consumption implies that @G
@C1





is similar to the coe¢ cient of relative prudence by Kimball (1990). In Kimballs theory of
precautionary saving under uncertainty, a higher coe¢ cient of relative prudence implies
that economic agents become more prudent following an increase in their income by reduc-
ing consumption, and hence engange in precautionary saving. In our model, we argue by
analogy that the assumption of a positive third derivative of current consumption entails
that parents act "prudently" by reducing current consumption and investing more in the
education of children following an increase in income. It has to be pointed out though
that the analogy is hardly perfect.
3.3 Empirical analysis
3.3.1 Predictions checked
The purpose of the empirical analysis is to check the predictions of the preceding theoret-
ical model using empirical data. We specically check the following predictions:
1. An improvement in household economic status has a larger increase in the schooling
of non-biological children relative to own children, and the increase is larger the more
distantly related the non-biological children are.
2. An increase in the cost of schooling leads to a bigger decrease in the schooling of
non-biological children relative to own children, and the increase is larger the more
distantly related the non-biological children are.
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4. As household economic status improves, the fall in schooling as a result of cost
increases for non-biological children converges to that of biological children, and
converges faster the more distantly related the non-biological children are.
3.3.2 Model specication
In order to check these predictions, we use two measures of schooling outcome namely;
the highest grade attained and current school enrolment. These two measures represent
di¤erent conceptualizations of schooling. They capture di¤erent dimensions of schooling,
and therefore can be viewed as complementary. Each measure of schooling outcome is
modeled using a di¤erent econometric model.
Grade attainment
The advantage of grade attainement over current school enrolment is that it represents
the cumulative investment in a childs education, that is current school enrolment ignores
the fact that current schooling depends on previous levels of schooling. We use the cen-
sored ordered probit to model grade attainment. The censored ordered probit model was
originally developed by King and Lillard (1987) to study grade attainment. It has subse-
quently been used to study grade attainment by among others; Glewwe and Jacoby (1994),
Alderman et al. (1996), Behrman et al. (1997), Holmes (1999), and Maitra (2003). The
censored ordered probit addresses three problems which are inherent in grade attainment.
Firstly, the model allows for the fact that grade attainment represents ordered discrete
choices i.e. whether to move to the next grade or withdraw. Secondly, it accommodates
the possibility that grade attainment often exhibits a large mass point at zero years of
schooling and similar probability spikes at primary and secondary completion levels where
graduating to the next grade is impeded by fees or entrance examinations (Holmes 1999).
Finally, it addresses the problem that grade attainment is right censored. Right censor-
ing occurs because for those children who are still in school, their nal grade attained is
unknown and to treat their grade as being equal to those who have stopped at that grade
would lead to biased estimates of the e¤ects of regressors on true grade attainment (Glick
and Sahn 2000).




i + "i (3.10)
where Si is a continuous, and unobserved latent variable representing desired level of
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parameters including a constant, and "i is an error term. The observed level of completed
schooling outcomes Si; has J discrete possible outcomes, Si = 0; 1; 2::J which follow a
natural ordering i.e. grade 2 is higher than grade 1, etc. For those children who have
completed schooling (uncensored observations), the observed level of completed schooling
Si is given as12;
S = 0 if S  0
S = 1 if 0 < S  1
S = 2 if 1 < S
  2
... (3.11)
= J if J 1  S
s are threshold parameters (cut o¤ points)13 which denote a transition from one grade
to the next where the next grade is higher than the previous, and J denotes the highest
attainable schooling grade. For those with no schooling, we know only that the latent
variable falls below the lowest threshold, i.e. S < 0, and for those with the maximum
level of schooling, we know that J 1  S. Under the assumption that the error term
" follows a standard normal distribution14, the conditional probability of observing each
schooling outcome is;
Pr (S = 0) =  ( X 0)
Pr (S = 1) =  (1  X 0)   ( X 0)
Pr (S = 2) =  (2  X 0)   (1  X 0)
... (3.12)




For all probabilities to be positive, the following condition is imposed;
0 < 1 < 2 <   J 1 (3.13)
The likelihood function for the uncensored observations (LU) is expressed as;
12We have suppressed subcript i to avoid notational clutter.
13We can alternatively assume that the parameter vector  does not include a constant, and then
include it as the rst cut o¤ point i.e. the zero is replaced with a constant.
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LU =
8><>:
 ( X 0) for S = 0









for S = J
(3.14)
If there is no right censoring, the likelihood function LU , is equivalent to that of the
standard ordered probit model. For children who are still enrolled in school (censored
observations), the highest grade attained is unknown. However, we know that a currently
enrolled student will ultimately attain at least his or her current grade. Thus, the current
grade level represents a lower bound, which means that the desired level of schooling S






for S = 0; 1; 2::J (3.15)
Thus the likelihood function for censored observations (LC) is;











If there is no right censoring and J = 1, the likelihood function L reduces to that of a
probit model. So the probit model is a special case.
Since the theoretical predictions we are checking rely on the magnitude of coe¢ cients as
well as their direction, we use elasticities. The elasticity of probability for each grade in
the censored ordered probit is expressed as;
15The estimation of the censored ordered probit was done by using Stata code written by Haaga O
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In this study, the elasticities of probability are computed at the sample means of the
regressors.
Current school enrolment
The advantage of current enrolment status over grade attainment as a measure of schooling
is that it allows us to accommodate time varying e¤ects. Using current school enrolment
enables us to better capture the contemporaneous e¤ect of household structure and income
which change overtime (Glick and Sahn 2000). In terms of household structure, the arrival
of new children either through new births or fostering, may alter the allocation of time
to schooling and household work, and this may a¤ect schooling outcomes of the children.
Besides, since we are looking at the schooling of non-biological children (in relation to
biological children), their grade attainment may not reect the schooling investment of
their current care givers. In this study, we model the enrolment decision using a probit
model.
3.3.3 Variables used
For highest grade attained, in this study we have four discrete and ordered categories
dened for each child as;
S =
8>>>><>>>>:
0 if no education attained
1 if highest education attained is junior primary
2 if highest education attained is senior primary
3 if highest education attained is secondary
(3.19)
Junior primary corresponds to standards 1 to 5, and senior primary corresponds to stan-
dards 6 to 8. For secondary, we have merged junior secondary (forms 1 and 2) with senior










3.3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 67




1 if currently enrolled
0 otherwise
(3.20)
What this e¤ectively means compared to grade attainment, is that every child who is in
school is given a one, and a zero is given to those who should be in school but are not.
Both grade attainment and enrolment status are dened by age, we discuss the details
later.
The key explanatory variables for this study are annual household income and school cost.
We use the log of per capita annual consumption expenditure as our measure of household
economic status other than actual household income17. To measure the cost of schooling,
we use local child wages prevailing in the area, that is we use the average community
level child wage (measured in Malawian Kwacha)18. Local child wages represent the
opportunity cost (indirect cost) of sending children to school if the alternative is to work
in the farm, family business or other market work (Tansel 1997)19. Other explanatory
variables included in the two models are; age and sex of the child, mothers and fathers
employment status, mothers and fathers education, mothers and fathers age, household
size. We include a rural dummy to control for possible rural-urban di¤erences. We also
control for regional xed e¤ects by including regional dummies.
3.3.4 Estimation issues
The log of per capita expenditure is potentially endogenous, and this may lead to biased
and inconsistent results. One possible channel of endogeneity is that the log of per capita
expenditure and spending on education can be jointly determined through labour supply
decisions in the sense that a decision to send children to school may be jointly determined
with a decision to send the children to work to supplement household income. Another
route for endogeneity would be that parents with a good taste for the education of their
children may work harder so they are able to pay for their schooling (Kingdon 2005).
We address this problem in both the probit and censored ordered probit by using the
16The structure of the Malawian education system is discussed in the previous chapter, in section 2.2.
17For a justication of why consumption expenditure and not income is more appropriate, see footnote
14 in Chapter 2.
18This is measured as follows; for those children who work, the survey data has information on the
wages that they get, we use these wages (after annualising them to ensure comparability with the other
variables) to then compute a community level average wage.
19The two types of children face the same local child wages. Recall, that our comparative static exercise
was based on the assumption that the biological and non-biological child face the same school costs i.e










68 CHAPTER 3. SCHOOLING BIAS AGAINST NON-BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN
Rivers and Vuong (1989) procedure20. We use household assets namely hectares of land,
and its square as instrumental variables for log of per capita expenditure21.
3.3.5 Data and descriptives
The data used in the study is obtained from the Second Malawi Integrated Household
Survey (IHS2)22. The survey collects information on the education status of all children
such as the highest grade attained and current enrollment status. It records the relation-
ship of each child to the household head. This allows us to distinguish in each household,
biological children from non-biological ones. It further enables us to separate the non-
biological children into whether they are related or unrelated to their care givers. Since
we are focussing on intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological children, we re-
strict our sample to blended households, that is households which have both biological
and non-biological children. For grade attainment, we restrict the childrens ages to be-
tween 10 and 19. This restriction is necessitated by the fact that this enables us to some
extent to separate out non-enrolment from late enrolment which is common in Malawi.
Non-enrolment could either be due to late entry into school or parents not deciding to
send a child to school at all. The lower age limit 10 therefore ensures that a child who
has not enrolled in school by the age of 10 will never do so. The upper age limit of 19
is driven by the fact that this helps us to some extent to mitigate the problem of sample
selection where older children are absent from home23. For current school enrolment, we
restrict childrens ages to between 6 and 19. We have a total of 10241 children of whom
8347 (representing 82%) are biological, and 1894 (representing 18%) are non-biological.
Of the non-biological children, 1534 (representing 81%) are relatives, and the remainder
360 (representing 19%) are non-relatives.
We now look at the descriptive statistics. In Table 3.1, we report grade attainment rates
of biological and non-biological children, and the results show that biological children have
consistently higher attainments at all schooling levels. The results also indicate that non-
biological children that are not related to the people who keep them fare badly in terms
of attainment as compared to those who are related. We also notice that attainment
declines with age, and the decline is more pronounced for non-biological children who are
not relatives. For instance, the results indicate that 7.8% of biological children attained
secondary education compared to 2.17% of non-biological children who are not relatives.
The widening gap in attainment between biological and non-biological children as they get
20Details of the procedure are discussed in Chapter 2, section 2.4.3.
21Since the rationale for using the instruments is the same as that given in the previous chapter, in
section 2.4.3, we do not repeat it here to conserve space.
22More details about IHS2 data are discussed in the previous chapter, in section 2.4.4.
23Similar sample restrictions are imposed in other studies e.g. Glick and Sahn (2000), Maitra (2003),
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older may be a reection of early withdrawals from school by the non-biological children
or grade repetition. The withdrawals may increase with age due to the fact that as the
children get older they can be a source of labor for agriculture and other income gener-
ating activities to supplement household income. This need for child labour is stronger
for non-biological children especially those who are not relatives. There may be a direct
cost dimension to this as well, in the sense that at lower ages (coinciding with primary
school) education is free in Malawi, and at higher ages (coinciding with secondary school)
parents have to pay fees among other things which might discourage attainment of sec-
ondary education. Either way, this may suggest bias against non-biological children, and
that this bias gets worse when a child is not a relative. When we use current enrolment
to measure schooling (see Table 3.2), a similar picture emerges. For example, for the age
range 15-19, the results show that 78.% of biological children are still in school compared
to just 63.8% and 51.2% of non-biological children who are relatives and non-biological
children who are not relatives respectively.
Table 3.3, reports enrolment rates by income quintile. We observe that children in the
wealthiest households have higher enrolment rates regardless of whether they are biolog-
ical or not. For all quintiles, the results consistently show that biological children have
higher enrolment rates. For instance, for the lowest quintile and comparing biological
children with non-biological children, the results indicate that biological children have a
higher enrolment rate of 94% compared to 76.9% for non-biological children. Looking at
the highest quintile and comparing biological children with non-biological children, the
results show that biological children have a higher enrolment rate of 96.2% compared to
93.1% for non-biological children. The results also show that non-biological children who
are not relatives have consistently lower enrolment rates across all quintiles. The rela-
tionship between enrolment rates and the opportunity cost of schooling as measured by
local child wages is presented in Table 3.4. The results show that the enrolment rate for
all children declines as the opportunity cost of schooling increases. Comparing the lowest
cost bracket (0-100) with the highest cost bracket (801+), we nd that the enrolment rate
of non-biological children drops more sharply compared to that of biological children24.
Descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables used in the econometric analysis are
presented in the appendix Table A3.1.
3.4 Econometric results
The descriptive results show that the schooling of non-biological children however mea-
sured is worse than that of biological children. We pursue this matter further by checking
24Results for descriptive analysis of grade attainment versus income or opportunity cost of schooling
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the predictions highlighted earlier. As earlier discussed, the log of per capita expenditure
is potentially endogenous, we therefore conducted exogeneity tests in the probit as well
as the censored ordered probit models using the Rivers and Vuong procedure outlined
before. We reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the log of per capita expenditure
in all probit models estimated. For all censored probit models estimated, we nd that
the log of per capita expenditure is exogenous. The reduced form regressions of log of
per capita expenditure reported in the appendix Table A3.2, show that the instrumental
variables land and its square perform reasonably well as they are signicantly correlated
with the log of per capita expenditure.
We now empirically look at the four predictions outlined earlier. We check these pre-
dictions by computing elasticities of probability for the censored ordered probit and the
probit models estimates using children who stay in blended households. The elasticities
of probability are computed at the sample means of the regressors. While controlling for
the parental and household characteristics of the childrens care givers, we estimate sepa-
rate regressions for all biological children, and all non-biological children, who are further
demarcated into non-biological children who are relatives and non-biological children who
are non-relatives. The relationship between raw coe¢ cients (̂s) and elasticities of prob-
ability in an ordered probit model deserves some mention. The elasticity of probability
of the rst outcome (no education) with respect to any regressor has the opposite sign
to that of the regressors coe¢ cient. The elasticity of probability of the highest outcome
(secondary education) with respect to any regressor has the same sign as the regressors
coe¢ cient. For the intermediate outcomes there is no simple relationship between the
elasticities of probability with respect to any regressor and corresponding regressor coef-
cients. Thus, for the lowest and highest education outcomes, the relationship between
the elasticity of probability with respect to any regressors coe¢ cient is unambiguous25.
Table 3.5, presents computed elasticities of probability with respect to income as proxied
by the log of per capita expenditure for the censored ordered probit and probit models,
to examine whether the schooling of non-biological children increases more relative to that
of biological children following an increase in household income (rst prediction). For the
non-biological children, we further separate them into whether they are related to the care
givers they stay with or not. This separation allows us to further investigate di¤erences in
schooling responsiveness to income changes between children who are relatives and those
who are not. The raw coe¢ cients for the censored ordered probit and probit models which
are used to compute these elasticities are presented in Tables A3.3 and A3.4 respectively in
the appendix. Using grade attainment as our measure of schooling, the results show that
non-biological children have higher income elasticities (in absolute value terms) compared
to non-biological children. We observe that the grade attainment of non-biological children
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who are not relatives is more income elastic compared to non-biological children who are
relatives. For example, at the secondary school level, non-biological children who are
relatives have an income elasticity of 1.77 compared to 1.82 for non-biological children
who are not relatives. A closer look at the magnitude of the elasticities indicates that non-
biological children have greater than one elasticities and biological children have less than
one elasticities. This implies that the education of non-biological children is considered a
luxury good. Education becomes more luxurious if the non-biological children are non-
relatives. The computed elasticities for all children also show that the income elasticity
increases as we move up the education hierarchy i.e. from no education to secondary
education. This means that higher education levels are considered a luxury. Further to
that, the income elasticity as one moves up the education system are consistently largest
for the non-biological children who are non-relatives, thus suggesting that for children
who are non-relatives their further education is considered more of a luxury good relative
to non-biological children who are relatives and own children. We get a similar picture
when we use current enrolment to measure schooling. These results therefore conrm the
prediction that an improvement in household economic status has a larger increase in the
schooling of non-biological children relative to own children, and the increase is larger the
more distantly related the non-biological children are. This nding is invariant to choice
of schooling measure. This nding suggests that policies aimed at ghting poverty have
the potential to improve the schooling outcomes of non-biological children.
In Table 3.6, we report censored ordered probit and probit elasticities to examine whether
the schooling of non-biological children falls more relative to that of biological children
following an increase in costs (second prediction). Again for the non-biological children,
we further separate them into whether they are related to the care givers they stay with
or not. The raw coe¢ cients for censored ordered probit and probit models which are
used to compute these elasticities are presented in Tables A3.3 and A3.4 respectively in
the appendix. When we use grade attainment as a measure of schooling the computed
price elasticities (in absolute value terms) indicate consistently for all grade levels that
the schooling of non-biological children is more price elastic compared to that of biological
children. Further to that, the results show that unrelated biological children have higher
price elasticities relative to non-biological children who are relatives. For instance, when
we look at the secondary level, non-biological children who are relatives have a price
elasticity of -0.35 compared to -0.38 for non-biological children who are not relatives. We
also note that for all children the price elasticities increase as we move from the lowest
educational level (no education) to the highest (secondary education). This suggests
that households become more responsive to school cost changes as a child goes up the
education ladder. This responsiveness is more pronounced for non-biological children who
are not relatives. When we use current enrolment as our measure of schooling we get
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schooling leads to a bigger decrease in the schooling of non-biological children relative
to own children, and the increase is larger the more distantly related the non-biological
children are. This conclusion is robust to how schooling is measured. This nding has
policy relevance in the sense that interventions to end child labour would benet non-
biological children a lot.
Results of predictions 3 and 4, are reported in Tables 3.7 and 3.8 for the censored ordered
probit and probit models respectively. Here we estimate elasticities of probability with
respect to price for the two models at di¤erent consumption expenditure quintiles to
ascertain the relationship between price elasticities as we move up the income ladder i.e.
moving from the poorest households to the wealthiest households. Like before, for the
non-biological children we further separate them into whether they are related to the care
givers they stay with or not. The corresponding raw coe¢ cients for censored ordered probit
and probit models which are used to compute these elasticities are presented in Tables
A3.5-A3.8 and A3.9-A3.12 respectively in the appendix. Using grade attainment as our
measure of schooling, the results for all children show that the computed price elasticities
fall as we move from the poorest households (1st quintile) to the wealthiest households
(5th quintile). For example, looking at senior primary education for biological children,
the results show that the 1st quintile has a price elasticity of -0.29 compared with -0.15
for the 5th quintile. This indicates an asymmetry in schooling responsiveness following
changes in costs between poor households and rich households in the sense that poor
households are more price elastic compared to rich households. The results also show that
the price elasticities of non-biological children move towards those of biological children
as we move up from the poorest households (1st quintile) to the wealthiest households (5th
quintile), thus suggesting a convergence of price elasticities as household economic status
improves. We further note that this convergence is faster for the non-biological children
who are non-relatives. When school enrolment is used, we arrive at similar conclusions.
Essentially, these ndings conrm predictions 3 and 4. That is, the decrease in schooling
due to cost increases is negatively related to household economic status, and as household
economic status improves the fall in schooling as a result of cost increases converges, and
converges faster the more distantly related the non-biological children are. This conclusion
is independent of how the schooling of children is measured. This conclusion has policy
implications in that e¤orts to improve the economic status of households would lead to
an improvement in schooling of non-biological children.
3.5 Conclusions
The chapter has looked at the intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological children











looked at the possible sources of schooling bias against non-biological children and how
schooling responds to changes in household economic status and schooling costs. This
has been done by constructing a two period model in which parents work and invest in a
biological and non-biological child in the rst period, and retire in the second. The parents
survive on remittances from both children in old age. The model predicts discrimination
against a non-biological child can stem from either non-preference based conditions which
favour the biological child, and/or can originate from a pure preference bias against a
non-biological child. Specically, the model shows that parents will invest more in the
education of their own child if costs, especially opportunity cost of schooling are higher
for the non-biological child, or if returns to education of the own child are higher than
those for the non-biological child, or if the subjective belief that parents have about future
transfers during retirement is lower for the non-biological child relative to the biological
child. Further to that, the model predicts that the schooling gap between the biological
child and the non-biological child gets wider as the relationship distance between the non-
biological child and the parents gets wider. We have also shown that schooling against
non-biological children in a household can be a result of pure preference bias by parents
against them, in the sense that they get more satisfaction from the income of their own
child relative to the non-biological child.
The model also shows that there is an asymmetry in the impact of changes in costs and
income on schooling in the sense that the impact is larger for the non-biological child.
We have also shown that an increase in cost of schooling leads to a bigger reduction
in schooling for poor households, and that the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes
between the biological and the non-biological child declines as income increases. An
empirical investigation of these predictions using the Second Malawi Integrated Household
Survey (IHS2) data has shown that when current enrolment and grade attainment are
used to measure schooling, the price (measured as the opportunity cost of schooling)
and income elasticities of schooling are larger for non-biological children. It has been
found that non-biological children who are unrelated to their care givers have higher price
and income elasticities. The empirical analysis has also indicated that households in the
lowest income quintile (the poorest) have the largest price elasticities, and households in
the highest income quintile (the wealthiest) have the smallest price elasticities. It has been
demostrated that the price elasticities for biological and non-biological children converge
as we move from the lowest income quintile to the highest income quintile, and that the
convergence is faster for non-biological children who are non-relatives.
Our empirical analysis has not taken into account the possibility that sending children
to school and sending them to work (i.e. child labour ) are joint decisions, our results
should therefore be interpreted with this caution in mind. Further to that the integrated
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The survey did not collect information on quality of children such as IQ scores, which might
a¤ect grade attainment and school enrolment of biological and non-biological children.
Secondly, the survey data does not have information on the past schooling performance of
the children. Past schooling performance of the non-biological children before moving to
their current care givers may also a¤ect their current schooling in the sense that current
care givers may have little incentive to send a non-biological child to school if s/he was
struggling academically before coming to them. Since we do not control for these factors
in our empirical analysis, our conclusions should be taken with due cognizance of these
limitations.
In the previous two chapters, we have shown how household economic status as measured
by the log of per capita consumption a¤ects parental spending on primary school education
of own children, and how it a¤ects schooling bias against non-biological children in Malawi.
In Chapter 2, we have found that improvements in household economic status positively
a¤ect spending on education in both rural and urban areas. The gap in poverty (household
economic status) between rural and urban areas is the largest driver of the di¤erential in
spending on education between rural and urban areas. In Chapter 3, we have demonstrated
both theoretically and empirically that improvements in household economic status have
a bigger impact on the schooling of non-biological children. As households become less
poor, the di¤erence in the impact of cost changes between biological and non-biological
children declines. These ndings beg the question, how does the number of children











Table 3.1: Grade attainment of children (age 10-19)
Biological Non-biological
Grade All          Related Unrelated
No education 11.21 21.25 18.2 24.3
Junior primary 48.3 45.63 46.54 44.72
Senior primary 32.7 29.34 29.87 28.81
Secondary 7.8 3.78 5.38 2.17
Total 100 100 100 100
Table 3.2: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19)
Biological Non-biological
Age All          Related Unrelated
6-8 0.947 0.88 0.913 0.847
9-11 0.948 0.863 0.894 0.832
12-14 0.857 0.738 0.762 0.713
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Table 3.3: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19) by expenditure quintile
Biological Non-biological
Quintile All          Related Unrelated
1st 0.940 0.769 0.783 0.754
2nd 0.918 0.812 0.831 0.793
3rd 0.937 0.886 0.916 0.856
4th 0.944 0.922 0.921 0.923
5th 0.962 0.931 0.934 0.927
Table 3.4: Current school enrolment rates of children (age 6-19) and opportunity cost of
schooling
Biological Non-biological
Cost All          Related Unrelated
0-100 0.882 0.84 0.864 0.816
101-400 0.891 0.802 0.837 0.767
401-800 0.887 0.687 0.712 0.662











Table 3.5: Income elasticities from probit and censored ordered probit models
Biological Non-biological
All          Related Unrelated
Current enrolment
0.89 1.26 1.25 1.29
Grade attainment
No education -0.75 -1.34 -1.33 -1.37
Junior primary 0.79 1.42 1.41 1.43
Senior primary 0.86 1.64 1.62 1.67
Secondary 0.97 1.78 1.77 1.82
Table 3.6: Price elasticities from probit and censored ordered probit models
Biological Non-biological
All          Related Unrelated
Current enrolment
-0.24 -0.32 -0.31 -0.36
Grade attainment
No education 0.12 0.24 0.23 0.27
Junior primary -0.18 -0.26 -0.25 -0.30
Senior primary -0.22 -0.34 -0.32 -0.36
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Table 3.7: Price elasticities from censored ordered probit for different income quintiles
Biological
Quintile No education Junior primary Senior primary Secondary
1st 0.24 -0.27 -0.29 -0.32
2nd 0.20 -0.25 -0.26 -0.29
3rd 0.17 -0.21 -0.23 -0.25
4th 0.13 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21
5th 0.09 -0.12 -0.15 -0.17
Non-biological: All
1st 0.29 -0.31 -0.34 -0.38
2nd 0.24 -0.29 -0.30 -0.35
3rd 0.20 -0.22 -0.27 -0.30
4th 0.15 -0.17 -0.19 -0.24
5th 0.10 -0.13 -0.17 -0.19
Non-biological: Related
1st 0.37 -0.38 -0.45 -0.48
2nd 0.27 -0.33 -0.41 -0.43
3rd 0.22 -0.29 -0.34 -0.36
4th 0.13 -0.20 -0.22 -0.23
5th 0.11 -0.13 -0.16 -0.18
Non-biological: Unrelated
1st 0.39 -0.42 -0.46 -0.48
2nd 0.30 -0.35 -0.38 -0.39
3rd 0.19 -0.21 -0.24 -0.26
4th 0.11 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21











Table 3.8: Price elasticities from probit for different income quintiles
Biological Non-biological
Quintile All          Related Unrelated
1st -0.26 -0.33 -0.34 -0.35
2nd -0.19 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27
3rd -0.17 -0.21 -0.20 -0.17
4th -0.13 -0.15 -0.14 -0.12
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3.6 Appendix to Chapter 3
Table A3.1: Sample means (standard errors) of explanatory variables
Variable (1) (2)
child’s age 10.828      (4.058) 12.166      (4.409)
child’s sex 0.521       (0.500) 0.473       (0.499)
consumption expenditure 9.568       (0.551) 9.664       (0.597)
household size 6.794       (2.405) 6.250       (3.013)
father works 0.233       (0.423) 0.192       (0.394)
mother works 0.050       (0.218) 0.043       (0.202)
father’s education 2.015       (3.947) 1.843       (3.951)
mother’s education 0.715       (2.439) 0.888       (2.780)
father’s age 45.007      (10.069) 47.306      (16.588)
mother’s age 38.392      (9.271) 48.027      (19.247)
community wage 97.394      (136.178) 99.297     (154.182)
rural 0.908       (0.289) 0.901       (0.299)
north 0.166       (0.372) 0.195       (0.396)
centre 0.427       (0.495) 0.386       (0.487)
south 0.408       (0.491) 0.419       (0.494)
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Table A3.2: Reduced form regressions of log per capita consumption
Variable (1) (2)
child’s age 0.007*** 0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
child’s sex -0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.011)
father works 0.060*** 0.063***
(0.013) (0.013)
mother works 0.027 -0.009
(0.026) (0.029)
father’s education 0.026*** 0.026***
(0.001) (0.002)
mother’s education 0.042*** 0.043***
(0.002) (0.003)
father’s age -0.014*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.005)
father’s age2 0.012*** 0.000***
(0.001) (0.000)
mother’s age -0.015*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.006)












F-test of joint significance of instruments:
F-stat 32.71 27.43
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
F-test of overall significance:
F-stat 22.54 37.39
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00
R-squared 0.4532 0.4117
Notes: Column 1 corresponds to the current enrolment sample, and Column 2 corresponds to the grade attainment
sample. The instruments for per capita consumption expenditure are land, its square. The significance asterisks are
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Table A3.3: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment by type of child
Biological Non-biological
Grade All                 Related Unrelated
child’s age -0.246*** -0.146*** -0.246*** -0.147***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
child’s sex 0.080*** 0.077 0.081*** 0.078
(0.028) (0.052) (0.028) (0.052)
father works 0.070** 0.023 0.067* 0.019
(0.035) (0.072) (0.035) (0.072)
Mother works 0.172*** 0.066 0.015 0.055
(0.003) (0.137) (0.073) (0.137)
father’s education 0.050*** 0.040*** 0.050*** 0.040***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
mother’s education 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.027*** 0.037***
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)
father’s age -0.003 -0.014 -0.002 -0.014
(0.012) (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
father’s age2 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.002)
mother’s age 0.019 0.021 0.018 0.021
(0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
mother’s age2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.006)
consumption expenditure 0.370*** 0.142*** 0.371*** 0.142***
(0.029) (0.052) (0.029) (0.052)
community wage -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.000*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000)
household size 0.033*** 0.015 0.034*** 0.015
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
rural -0.181*** -0.253*** -0.175*** -0.264***
(0.050) (0.088) (0.050) (0.088)
north 0.359*** 0.546*** 0.351*** 0.538***
(0.041) (0.072) (0.041) (0.072)
centre -0.162*** 0.103* -0.164*** 0.099
(0.032) (0.061) (0.033) (0.062)
Log likelihood -4321 -5353 -3722 -6167
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
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Table A3.4: Probit results of current enrolment by type of child
Biological Non-biological
Grade All Related Unrelated
child’s age -0.214*** -0.267*** -0.218*** -0.220***
(0.023) (0.036) (0.039) (0.017)
child’s sex 0.129** 0.430*** 0.718*** 0.920***
(0.051) (0.092) (0.102) (0.101)
father works 0.444** 0.289 0.102 0.068
(0.203) (0.318) (0.348) (0.151)
mother works 0.652*** 0.108 0.091 0.070
(0.141) (0.259) (0.300) (0.272)
father’s education 0.138*** 0.118 0.072 0.058***
(0.006) (0.130) (0.143) (0.017)
mother’s education 0.246* 0.106 0.012 0.007
(0.136) (0.204) (0.223) (0.024)
father’s age 0.087* 0.047 0.028 0.021
(0.050) (0.072) (0.083) (0.036)
father’s age2 -0.011** 0.001 0.026 0.013
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mother’s age 0.105* 0.031 0.008 0.001
(0.056) (0.078) (0.087) (0.036)
mother’s age2 -0.01* -0.001 -0.003 -0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Consumption expenditure 0.353*** 0.192*** 0.664*** 0.961***
(0.053) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Community wage -0.217*** -0.321*** 0.334*** 0.413***
(0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.019* 0.032* -0.003 -0.002
(0.011) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
rural -0.055*** -0.039*** -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.009) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
north 0.185* 0.341** 0.311* 0.303**
(0.096) (0.149) (0.168) (0.147)
centre -2.236** 0.980 0.271 0.121
(0.988) (1.488) (1.624) (0.119)
residcons 6.663** 8.562*** 9.515*** 7.149***
(3.252) (1.911) (1.365) (1.06)
constant -66.159** 28.339 7.804 2.636**
(32.356) (48.877) (53.408) (1.042)
Log likelihood -6339 -2167 -4486 -5413
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
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Table A3.5: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment of biological children
by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age 0.227***    0.234***    0.226*** 0.280***               0.314***
(0.009)     (0.010)    (0.010)         (0.013)                (0.014)
child’s sex -0.016 -0.089 -0.010 -0.101 -0.231***
(0.057)     (0.059)    (0.060)         (0.068)                (0.075)
father works -0.029 -0.026      0.135*          0.223***               0.061
(0.077)     (0.072)    (0.075)         (0.086) (0.095)
mother works 0.087       0.355** -0.360** -0.322* -0.007
(0.174)     (0.146)    (0.176)         (0.174)                (0.182)
father’s education 0.050***    0.041*** 0.036***        0.052***               0.068***
(0.010)     (0.009)    (0.009)         (0.009)                (0.009)
mother’s education 0.032       0.014      0.019           0.028*                 0.034***
(0.023)     (0.020)    (0.016)         (0.015)                (0.013)
father’s age -0.047*      0.022      0.009 -0.021 -0.010
(0.024)     (0.026)    (0.029)         (0.030)                (0.035)
father’s age2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000           0.000 -0.000
(0.000)     (0.000)    (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
mother’s age 0.081*** -0.017 -0.015 -0.001                  0.020
(0.028)     (0.031)    (0.034)         (0.036)                (0.042)
mother’s age2 -0.001*** 0.000      0.000           0.000                  0.000
(0.000)     (0.000)    (0.000)         (0.000)                (0.000)
consumption expenditure 0.450***    0.651**    0.135           1.124***               0.286**
(0.142)     (0.328)    (0.369)         (0.355)                (0.116)
community wage 0.127*** -0.023*** -0.367*** -0.345***               0.413***
(0.001)     (0.002)    (0.001)         (0.004)                (0.003)
household size 0.023**     0.016      0.043***        0.073***               0.040**
(0.011)     (0.016)    (0.016)         (0.017)                (0.016)
rural -0.046       0.055 -0.194 -0.192* -0.230**
(0.124)     (0.127)    (0.120)         (0.111)                (0.103)
north 0.465***    0.538***    0.320***        0.214*                 0.251**
(0.078) (0.086)    (0.096)         (0.113)                (0.119)
centre -0.155** -0.229*** -0.223*** -0.153* -0.003
(0.072)     (0.069)    (0.068)         (0.079)                (0.092)
Log likelihood -6567 -5448 -4321 -3389 -5117
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
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Table A3.6: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment of all non-biological
children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age 0.158*** 0.170***           0.126***        0.158*** 0.160***
(0.017)         (0.019)            (0.015)         (0.016)            (0.016)
child’sex 0.240*          0.072              0.066           0.165 -0.081
(0.123)         (0.134)            (0.119)         (0.116)            (0.116)
father works -0.426*          0.050              0.047           0.088              0.019
(0.225)         (0.185)            (0.156)         (0.155)            (0.161)
mother works 0.154           0.406              0.766 -0.643**            0.103
(0.408)         (0.371)            (0.808)         (0.308)            (0.219)
father’s education 0.034           0.016              0.027           0.054***           0.043***
(0.024)         (0.026)            (0.018)         (0.016)            (0.015)
mother’s education -0.186***        0.105**            0.025           0.074***           0.032*
(0.071)         (0.041)            (0.029)         (0.025)            (0.018)
father’s age -0.055 -0.046 -0.031 -0.004              0.047
(0.039)         (0.045)            (0.029)         (0.034)            (0.039)
father’s age2 0.001           0.000              0.000 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000)
mother’s age 0.033           0.042 -0.043           0.040 -0.003
(0.038)         (0.048)            (0.031)         (0.037)            (0.038)
mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000              0.001* -0.000             0.001
(0.000) (0.000)            (0.000)         (0.000)            (0.000)
consumption expenditure 0.010           0.437              0.302 -0.363 -0.047
(0.284)         (0.687)            (0.752)         (0.584)            (0.161)
community wage -0.321*** -0.237*** -0.364** -0.433** -0.311***
(0.001)         (0.004)            (0.001)         (0.001) (0.001)
household size 0.012 -0.023              0.061*** -0.006              0.038
(0.019)         (0.024)            (0.023)         (0.025)            (0.026)
rural -0.616**         0.172 -0.269 -0.269 -0.208
(0.242)         (0.252)            (0.225)         (0.206)            (0.164)
north 0.671***        0.592***           0.576***        0.398**            0.634***
(0.161)         (0.193)            (0.165)         (0.161)            (0.177)
centre 0.063 -0.163 -0.072           0.184 0.249*
(0.157)         (0.161)            (0.142)         (0.126)            (0.131)
Log likelihood -2321 -5478 -6311 -4299 -2139
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
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Table A3.7: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment of non-biological (but
related) children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age 0.227***        0.234*** 0.226*** 0.281*** 0.315***
(0.009)         (0.010)          (0.010)         (0.013) (0.014)
child’s sex -0.017 -0.088 -0.010 -0.104 -0.238***
(0.057)         (0.059)          (0.060)         (0.068) (0.075)
father works -0.040 -0.026            0.135*          0.211** 0.054
(0.077)         (0.072)          (0.075)         (0.086) (0.095)
mother works 0.074           0.360** -0.364** -0.306* -0.012
(0.174)         (0.146)          (0.176)         (0.174) (0.182)
father’s education 0.049***        0.040***         0.036***        0.055*** 0.069***
(0.010)         (0.009)          (0.009)         (0.009) (0.009)
mother’s education 0.032           0.015            0.020           0.024 0.034***
(0.023)         (0.020)          (0.016)         (0.015) (0.013)
father’s age -0.045*          0.022            0.009 -0.019 -0.008
(0.024)         (0.026)          (0.029)         (0.030) (0.035)
father’s age2 0.000 -0.000 -0.000           0.000 -0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)
mother’s age 0.079*** -0.019 -0.014 -0.003 0.021
(0.028)         (0.031)          (0.034)         (0.036) (0.042)
mother’s age2 -0.001***        0.000            0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)          (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)
consumption expenditure 0.451***       0.638*           0.137           1.121*** 0.291**
(0.142)         (0.328)          (0.369)         (0.356) (0.116)
community wage -0.223*** -0.314*** -0.421*** -0.023 -0.043
(0.003)         (0.002)          (0.001)         (0.043) (0.067)
household size 0.023**         0.016            0.043***        0.074*** 0.038**
(0.011)         (0.016) (0.016)         (0.017) (0.016)
rural -0.081           0.069 -0.190 -0.166 -0.236**
(0.126)         (0.129)          (0.120)         (0.112) (0.104)
north 0.450***        0.549***         0.317***        0.175 0.252**
(0.079)         (0.087)          (0.097)         (0.115) (0.121)
centre -0.164** -0.219*** -0.224*** -0.161** -0.001
(0.072)         (0.069)          (0.068)         (0.080) (0.092)
Log likelihood -3329 -4412 -8342 -7613 -3979
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
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Table A3.8: Censored ordered probit results of grade attainment of non-biological
(unrelated) children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age 0.160*** 0.170***    0.125***        0.162*** 0.160***
(0.017)         (0.019)      (0.015)         (0.016) (0.016)
child’s sex 0.238*          0.055        0.084           0.181 -0.082
(0.123)         (0.135)      (0.120)         (0.116) (0.116)
father works -0.452**         0.051        0.085           0.125 0.016
(0.228)         (0.186)      (0.159)         (0.158) (0.162)
mother works 0.150           0.384        0.796 -0.678** 0.099
(0.409)         (0.374)      (0.810)         (0.310) (0.220)
father’s education 0.033           0.015        0.028           0.051*** 0.042***
(0.024)         (0.026)      (0.018)         (0.016) (0.015)
mother’s education -0.188***        0.109***     0.022           0.078*** 0.033*
(0.072)         (0.041)      (0.029)         (0.025) (0.018)
father’s age -0.051 -0.042 -0.034 -0.011 0.046
(0.039)         (0.045)      (0.029)         (0.035) (0.040)
father’s age2 0.000           0.000        0.000 0.000 -0.001**
(0.000)         (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)
mother’s age 0.031           0.035 -0.043           0.051 -0.003
(0.038)         (0.048)      (0.031)         (0.038) (0.038)
mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.000        0.001* -0.000 0.001
(0.000)         (0.000)      (0.000)         (0.000) (0.000)
consumption expenditure -0.011           0.486        0.227 -0.313 -0.046
(0.288)         (0.693)      (0.759)         (0.587) (0.162)
community wage -0.313*** -0.411*** -0.261*** -0.428*** -0.415***
(0.001)         (0.003)      (0.001)         (0.001) (0.001)
household size 0.013 -0.021        0.060** -0.003 0.038
(0.020)         (0.024)      (0.024)         (0.025) (0.026)
rural -0.615**         0.227 -0.285 -0.330 -0.210
(0.250)         (0.262)      (0.225) (0.213) (0.165)
north 0.673***        0.604***     0.571***        0.406** 0.611***
(0.161)         (0.194)      (0.166)         (0.164) (0.180)
centre 0.075 -0.159 -0.083           0.207 0.232*
(0.158)         (0.162)      (0.143)         (0.131) (0.133)
Log likelihood -5388 -3419 -4358 -6931 -4266
Notes: Threshold parameters not reported. The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05,
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Table A3.9: Probit results of current enrolment of biological children by expenditure
quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age -0.269*** -0.267*** -0.213*** -0.146*** -0.336**
(0.067)         (0.047)       (0.044)         (0.041) (0.134)
child’s sex 0.106           0.167         0.192*          0.132 0.266
(0.103)         (0.103)       (0.115)         (0.131) (0.180)
father works 0.962*          0.878** -0.520 0.547 -1.326
(0.568)         (0.404)       (0.373)         (0.381) (1.174)
mother works 0.842**         0.485* -1.389*** -0.155 -0.844
(0.328)         (0.281)       (0.287)         (0.399) (0.635)
father’s education 0.308          0.366** -0.100           0.141 -0.439
(0.247)         (0.171)       (0.156)         (0.149) (0.498)
mother’s education -0.581 -0.537** -0.127           0.216 -0.829
(0.398)         (0.274)       (0.246)         (0.235) (0.796)
father’s age 0.153 0.135         0.155 -0.052 0.266
(0.137)         (0.103)       (0.097)         (0.092) (0.275)
father’s age2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002*          0.001 -0.003
(0.002)         (0.001)       (0.001)         (0.001) (0.003)
mother’s age 0.229           0.265**       0.060 -0.167 0.384
(0.157)         (0.113) (0.103)         (0.115) (0.309)
mother’s age2 -0.002 -0.002** -0.000           0.002 -0.003
(0.001)         (0.001)       (0.001)         (0.001) (0.002)
consumption expenditure 0.385*          0.109***      0.218 -0.089 0.989***
(0.223)         (0.005)       (0.679)         (0.678) (0.352)
community wage -0.321*** -0.219*** -0.365***       0.413*** -0.451***
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.001)         (0.002) (0.001)
household size 0.070*** -0.011 -0.022 -0.017 0.008
(0.022)         (0.026)       (0.028)         (0.027) (0.030)
rural 0.160           0.398** -0.018 -0.131 -0.037
(0.186)         (0.188)       (0.227) (0.245) (0.228)
north 0.162           0.029 -0.146           0.502* 0.281
(0.211)         (0.192)       (0.213)         (0.282) (0.450)
centre -4.397 -4.867** -1.713           1.059 -6.088
(2.894)         (1.983)       (1.788)         (1.684) (5.807)
residcons 14.041***        14.820**     8.687***        13.671*** 19.261***
(2.503)         (6.521)       (1.866)         (2.596) (2.108)
constant -139.659 -144.169** -46.604          43.518 -199.378
(94.693)        (65.244)    (58.351)        (56.283) (190.196)
Log likelihood -3221 -4771 -7834 -6389 -7227
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
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Table A3.10: Probit results of current enrolment of all non-biological children by
expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age -0.296* -0.235*** -0.256*** -0.304*** -0.308*
(0.177)         (0.081)              (0.066)         (0.093) (0.173)
child’s sex 0.303           0.187                0.455**         0.253 1.015***
(0.251)         (0.227)              (0.222)         (0.229) (0.242)
father works -0.701           0.006 1.248*          0.252 1.632
(1.563)         (0.695)              (0.644)         (0.797) (1.531)
mother works -0.609           0.985                0.375           0.117 0.390
(0.878)         (0.776)              (0.243)         (0.322) (0.636)
father’s education -0.197           0.204                0.463           0.155 0.583
(0.662)         (0.289)              (0.368)         (0.512) (1.017)
mother’s education 0.427           0.403 -0.182 -0.025 -0.179
(1.090)         (0.462) (0.132)         (0.184) (0.341)
father’s age 0.143 -0.232                0.002           0.000 0.002
(0.355)         (0.166)              (0.002)         (0.002) (0.004)
father’s age2 -0.002           0.002 -0.126           0.039 -0.167
(0.004)         (0.002)              (0.144)         (0.193) (0.381)
mother’s age 0.230           0.030                0.001 -0.000 0.001
(0.387)         (0.186)              (0.001)         (0.001) (0.003)
mother’s age2 -0.001 -0.000 -0.777           1.100 -0.690**
(0.003)         (0.001)              (1.406)         (1.178) (0.291)
consumption expenditure 0.212 -0.222                0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.475)         (1.203)              (0.001)         (0.003) (0.002)
community wage -0.124*** -0.412***             0.335*** -0.179*** -0.472***
(0.001)         (0.002)              (0.003)         (0.060) (0.049)
household size 0.025           0.002 -0.222 -0.536 0.094
(0.033)         (0.041) (0.425)         (0.421) (0.320)
rural 0.049           0.194                0.728**         0.072 0.679
(0.378)         (0.450)              (0.335)         (0.406) (0.516)
north 0.051           0.521                4.389           0.321 4.410
(0.544)         (0.384)              (2.699)         (3.736) (7.390)
centre -2.780           2.213 -12.581 -2.212 -13.612
(7.725)         (3.318)              (8.913)        (12.283) (24.411)
residcons 10.380*** -17.633*** 24.127*** -0.220*** 0.354***
(1.333)        (2.983)                (2.212          (0.008) (0.002)
constant -103.381       82.100               136.409          13.959 147.080
(252.640)       (111.196)             (92.730)       (122.303) (242.940)
Log likelihood -9332 -8178 -1977 -2256 -4038
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
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Table A3.11: Probit results of current enrolment of non-biological (but related)
children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age -0.174*** -0.167*** -0.186*** -0.171*** -0.205***
(0.014)         (0.015)        (0.018)         (0.020) (0.027)
child’s sex 0.045           0.105          0.179           0.147 0.180
(0.093)         (0.097)        (0.114)         (0.129) (0.156)
father works -0.118           0.016 -0.251*          0.325* -0.173
(0.124)         (0.122)        (0.139)         (0.191) (0.207)
mother works -0.465** -0.097 -1.215*** -0.253 -0.337
(0.230)         (0.219)        (0.253)         (0.366) (0.364)
father works 0.059***        0.025          0.030* 0.045** 0.065***
(0.020)         (0.017)        (0.018)         (0.019) (0.022)
mother works 0.002           0.075          0.069*          0.064 -0.030
(0.045)         (0.046)        (0.041)         (0.044) (0.030)
father’s age -0.041 -0.070          0.091* -0.001 -0.001
(0.044) (0.051)        (0.051)         (0.057) (0.073)
father’s age2 0.000           0.001 -0.001** -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)         (0.000)        (0.000)         (0.001) (0.001)
mother’s age 0.015           0.043 -0.016 -0.111 0.093
(0.051)         (0.057)        (0.059)         (0.075) (0.085)
mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.001          0.000           0.001 -0.001
(0.001)         (0.001)        (0.001)         (0.001) (0.001)
consumption expenditure 0.382*          0.080 0.286 -0.089 0.995***
(0.223)         (0.547)        (0.688)         (0.678) (0.354)
community wage -0.345***       0.421*** -0.231 -0.453*** -0.413***
(0.002)         (0.001)        (0.001)         (0.002) (0.001)
household size 0.071*** -0.012 -0.025 -0.017 0.007
(0.022)         (0.026)        (0.028)         (0.027) (0.030)
rural 0.166           0.345* -0.048 -0.131 -0.033
(0.187)         (0.192)        (0.228)         (0.246) (0.228)
north 0.426***        0.276* -0.090           0.434 0.648*
(0.144)         (0.161)        (0.195)         (0.273) (0.342)
centre -0.118 -0.379*** -0.327** -0.058 -0.219
(0.111)         (0.111)        (0.128)         (0.145) (0.189)
residcons -0.322** -0.021*** -0.042***       0.324*** -0.237***
(0.001)         (0.001)        (0.004)         (0.012) (0.004)
constant 0.142           3.673 -0.289 6.975 -7.707*
(2.205)         (5.229)        (6.783)         (6.922) (3.986)
Log likelihood -8789 -5339 -2778 -4456 -6729
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance
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Table A3.12: Probit results of current enrolment of non-biological (unrelated)
children by expenditure quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
child’s age -0.227*** -0.292*** -0.351*** -0.320*** -0.400***
(0.031)         (0.039)          (0.045)         (0.041)           (0.050)
child’s sex 0.263           0.159            0.533**         0.286             1.071***
(0.210)         (0.228)          (0.225)         (0.227)           (0.225)
father works -0.084 -0.458            0.579*          0.134             0.804**
(0.365)         (0.297)          (0.315) (0.324)           (0.316)
mother works -0.327           0.917            0.045           0.054*            0.035
(0.575)         (0.759)          (0.039)         (0.030)           (0.026)
father’s education 0.074* -0.001 -0.068           0.066             0.018
(0.042)         (0.044)          (0.052)         (0.053)           (0.032)
mother’s education 0.004           0.097 -0.013           0.006             0.008
(0.352)         (0.070)          (0.049)         (0.062)           (0.072)
father’s age 0.002 -0.104            0.000 0.000 -0.000
(0.062)         (0.080)          (0.000)         (0.001)           (0.001)
father’s age2 -0.000           0.001            0.068           0.071             0.040
(0.001)         (0.001)          (0.055)         (0.071)           (0.073)
mother’s age 0.071           0.115 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.060)         (0.086)          (0.001)         (0.001) (0.001)
mother’s age2 -0.000 -0.001 -0.676           1.073 -0.691**
(0.001)         (0.001)          (1.422)         (1.176)           (0.291)
consumption expenditure 0.214           0.065            0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.475)         (1.226)          (0.002)         (0.003)           (0.002)
community wage -0.320*** -0.453*** -0.338*** -0.182*** -0.475***
(0.001)         (0.003)          (0.043)         (0.060)           (0.049)
household size 0.025           0.006 -0.246 -0.511             0.090
(0.033)         (0.042)          (0.418)         (0.425)           (0.320)
rural 0.044           0.281            0.526*          0.066             0.422
(0.378)         (0.457) (0.316)         (0.356)           (0.341)
north 0.249           0.468            0.562** -0.305             0.260
(0.269)         (0.345)          (0.270)         (0.276)           (0.262)
centre 0.386 -0.023 -0.000           0.000             0.000
(0.283)         (0.264)          (0.000)         (0.000)           (0.000)
residcons -0.237*** -0.172***         0.248*** -0.324*** -0.218***
(0.000)         (0.002)          (0.001)         (0.002)           (0.001)
constant -0.093           3.411           10.420 -7.847            11.618***
(4.299)        (11.466)         (14.001)        (11.673)           (3.337)
Log likelihood -8189 -9747 -2015 -2321 -4775
Notes: residcons is the residual from the reduced form of per capita consumption expenditure. The significance





















Impact of fertility on objective and
subjective poverty in Malawi
4.1 Introduction
Research looking at the relationship between poverty and fertility at the micro level on
the African continent remains scarce. Ironically, Africa has the highest rates of poverty
and fertility. A lack of data has often been given as the reason for the paradoxical lack
of studies on the continent. Empirically, there has not been any consensus as to the
nature of the relationship between fertility and poverty. The mixed empirical results
include; no relationship between fertility and poverty in Botswana (Chernichovsky 1984),
a positive relationship in Sierra Leone and Ethiopia (Ketkar 1979), a negative relationship
in Burkina Faso (Langani 1997) and in Southern Sudan (Cohen and House 1994). Further
to that, Noumbissi and Sanderson (1998) nd that in Cameroon where fertility rates are
very high, the relationship takes the inverse J shape, implying that both low and high-
income households have lower rates of fertility, whereas medium level income households
have higher fertility. The J shape is explained by the fact very low income households
tend to be landless farmers; as a result they dont depend on children as cheap labor,
whereas those with the highest income have lower fertility due to higher investment in
child quality. The middle income families are landholding farms which depend on cheap
labor, and therefore have a higher demand for child quantity.
The common thing about all the cited studies is that they treated fertility as an exoge-
nous variable. By doing that, these studies ignored the fact that fertility can inuence
poverty, and at same time be a¤ected by it. That is, causality can run in both directions.
Technically, they did not take into account the simultaneity that exists between the two
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which inuence both variables; that is unobserved heterogeneity1 was not accounted for.
Another shortfall of these studies is that they only focussed on poverty dened in the
objective monetary sense which is a narrower denition of household welfare. Subjective
measures of welfare better capture the multidimensional nature of poverty. They are likely
to include a households feelings of relative deprivation, exclusion from services and in-
stitutions, as well as feelings of marginalization related to household or individual status
(such as ethnicity, or marital status) (Devereux et al. 2006). It is therefore also interesting
to see how fertility impacts on poverty when poverty is conceived multidimensionally.
Disregarding simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity leads to biased and inconsistent
estimates. It is therefore important for the reliability of results of any econometric analy-
sis that they be accounted for. It is also worth noting that despite the poverty-fertility
relationship being a demographic issue as well as an economic one; most of the studies
on the continent have been done by demographers. These studies have mostly been de-
scriptive in nature. As discussed before the results have been divergent with some studies
nding no relationship, while other studies nd a negative or positive relationship. The
only study we are aware of which accounts for the two e¤ects was done in India by Gupta
and Dubey (2006). With respect to Malawi, there have been a few studies which have
looked at factors which inuence objective poverty (Mukherjee and Benson 2003; Bokosi
2007) but none of these has looked at the impact of fertility on objective poverty let alone
subjective poverty. The questions that this study therefore seeks to answer are twofold.
Firstly, taking into account the simultaneity and unobserved e¤ects, how does fertility im-
pact on objective poverty in Malawi? Secondly, taking into account the simultaneity and
unobserved e¤ects, how does fertility impact on subjective poverty in Malawi? Answering
these questions is signicant in the sense that it will go a long way in contributing to
the literature on poverty and fertility in Malawi as well as the African continent at large.
Additionally, by using a methodology that captures the problems that the previous stud-
ies have ignored, we will be making a contribution with respect to how the two variables
should be conceptualized and modeled. Further to that, by using subjective poverty, the
study will shed some light on the impact of fertility on a broader denition of household
welfare.
After accounting for endogeneity of fertility by using a natural experiment, two girls
rst as our instrumental variable, the study nds a positive relationship between fertility
and objective poverty. That is, having a large family increases the likelihood of being
objectively poor. This e¤ect is robust for all poverty lines used. It is also robust to
accounting for economies of scale and household composition as well as assuming that
poverty is continuous. We also nd that when fertility is treated as an exogenous variable
its impact is underestimated. When poverty is dened more broadly by using self rated
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assessments of welfare, the results are opposite to those of objective poverty. We nd that
fertility lowers the likelihood of feeling poor, that is having more than two children (a
large family) lowers the probability of feeling poor. The study also nds that fertility is
exogenous with respect to subjective poverty.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we present arguments for
why causality between fertility and poverty is bidirectional. Section 4.3 focuses on the
measurement of objective and subjective poverty, and fertility. Section 4.4 dwells on the
specication of the empirical model, data, and descriptives. Econometric results are the
focus of section 4.5. Our conclusions are presented in Section 4.6.
4.2 The poverty-fertility nexus
In this section, we give explanations which have been given in the literature which show
that causality between fertility and poverty is bidirectional. The link between poverty and
fertility may run from fertility to poverty. Poor households with big families have large
dependency ratios, as a result investments in the human capital of children, which im-
prove the future prospects of the children may be sacriced to more immediate household
needs such as food. This conict is especially likely when the opportunity cost of certain
investments in children (such as education) is high because of the associated loss of child
labor in agriculture or home work (Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988).
Family size may have a negative impact on child development and human capital forma-
tion, and hence their future economic status. For instance, studies in both developed and
developing countries nd that children in big families tend to be shorter, less intelligent,
and are even less likely to survive (e.g. Birdsall 1977; Bielicki 1986; Casterline et al.1987).
Birdsall (1980) found that though total household spending on education tends to rise
with family size, expenditures per child on education tend to be lower in large families for
all income and education levels of the parents. Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1980, in a study
of families with twins in India found that the additional unexpected child represented by
twins reduced enrollment levels of all children in the household. Using Malaysian data,
Rosenzweig and Schultz 1987 show that couples with a higher biological propensity to
have births, also have lower schooling attainment for their children. A childs ability to
learn is inuenced by the amount and quality of attention received from parents and other
adults in the rst few years, and that is generally less in large families. Hence, children
from large families are more likely not to be very educated and this makes them to be
more prone to poverty (Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988). U.S. studies show that women with
large families put in no more time on child care; educated women succeed in spending
more time with each child principally by having fewer children (see Birdsall 1977).
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Parents whose children die may try to replace them, and since high mortality is generally
high in poor households, parents may try to insure themselves against possible child loss
by having more children than they would otherwise want. Olsen (1987 cited in Birdsall
and Gri¢ n 1988) found that parents in Colombia directly replaced at least 0.2 of children
that had died, but further compensated by having on average about 0.14 extra children.
Similar results were found for Malaysia (Olsen 1983 cited in Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988).
Thus, hoarding by having extra children can be interpreted as an insurance strategy by
parents in the presence of high infant mortality. As the risk of infant mortality diminishes,
hoarding becomes unnecessary (Birdsall and Gri¢ n 1988). Related to this, is that poor
households may decide to have more children as a source of support in old age given the
absence of life insurance markets and social security in many developing countries.
According to the quantity-quality theory of Becker and Lewis (1973), increases in income
lead to an increase in demand for quality of children and a fall in the quantity of children.
Thus, as households become wealthier, they will tend to have fewer children. Additionally,
Willis (1973) argues that increases in womens wages (and therefore income) leads to fewer
children, as this increases the opportunity cost of having more children.
4.3 Measurement of objective and subjective poverty
and fertility
In this section, we discuss the measurement of both objective monetary poverty and sub-
jective poverty as well as fertility. Objective poverty can be measured either by using
household income or household consumption expenditure. Following Mukherjee and Ben-
son (2003), we use a consumption expenditure based measure of poverty rather than
income2. In the objective and monetary poverty analysis income or consumption is con-
sidered to be a measure of welfare. This approach reects how most empirical work on
poverty in Africa has been done. A households subjective assessment of its well being
is however much broader. Subjective well being (SWB) better captures the multidimen-
sional nature of poverty. Subjective measures are likely to extend well beyond the narrow
income or consumption needs, as they will include a households feelings of relative de-
privation, exclusion from services and institutions, as well as feelings of marginalization
related to household or individual status (such as ethnicity, or marital status) (Devereux
et al. 2006). Due to its broader scope, it is possible that some factors might a¤ect the
two poverty denitions di¤erently. It is therefore imperative that we investigate how fer-
tility impacts subjective poverty to complete the picture. There are three alternative
subjectivequestions which are used to measure subjective wellbeing. Firstly, there is












what is called the Income Evaluation Question (IEQ) introduced by Van Praag (1971).
The IEQ asks what level of income is regarded as very bad, bad,not good, not bad,
good, very good. The IEQ for example goes like Taking into account my (our) present
living circumstances, I would regard a net weekly/monthly/yearly (encircle period) family
income as: excellent, good,. . . ,.bad, very bad.Secondly, there is the Minimum Income
Question (MIQ). Here people are asked what they consider as a minimum level of income
to make ends meet. The MIQ is for example phrased like We would like you to tell us
the absolute minimum income of money for a household such as yours in other words,
a sum below which you couldnt make ends meet.The MIQ has been criticized for its
focus on income, in that the concept of income may be poorly dened for respondents
particularly but not only in developing countries (Ravallion and Lokshin 2002). Both the
IEQ and MIQ are based on income as a measure of welfare, and therefore they are not
broad. A measure of subjective poverty which is much broader and open-minded is the
Economic Ladder Question (ELQ). Here the respondents are asked a question framed as
follows: Please imagine a 6-step ladder where on the bottom, the rst step, stand the
poorest people, and on the highest step, the sixth, stand the rich. On which step are
you today?(Kalugina and Najman 2002). In the survey data we are using, this question
was answered by the household head. Owing to its broadness relative to the IEQ and the
MIQ, we employ the ELQ method to measuring subjective poverty3. In this study, we our
measure of fertility is based on the number of children in a household4.
4.4 Methodology
4.4.1 Motivation of the methodology
In order to take into account the fact that fertility and poverty (objective and subjective)
are potentially endogenous, we use instrumental variable (IV) estimation. We use a natural
experiment as our instrument5. For the IV to be valid it must be correlated with fertility
but should be uncorrelated with poverty. Our use of a natural experiment is inspired by
a number of studies in the labour supply literature. Bronars and Grogger (1994) use the
3The use of subjective wellbeing is advantageous in the sense that well being is self rated. These
measures are however not completely perfect. For example, an individuals answers could be inuenced
by di¤erent factors, for instance, attitudes and anticipations. Individuals may estimate themselves by the
means of comparison with socially accepted norms and rules, their group of reference etc (Kalugina and
Najman 2002; Kingdon and Knight 2003).
4A Fertility measure normally used by demographers is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which is dened
as the average number of children that would be born alive to a woman at the end of her reproductive
period given the current specic fertility rate.
5A natural experiment is a naturally occurring random event or situation, which can be exploited as an
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incidence of twins in the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Samples to
estimate the e¤ect of an unplanned second child on labor force participation for unwed
mothers. Angrist and Evans (1998) study the labor supply of married women with at least
two children, using both twins and the gender mix of the rst two children as instruments.
Since parents tend to prefer having a mix of genders among their children, gender mix
operates as an instrument because couples with two children of the same sex are more
likely to have a third child than couples with one boy and one girl. It has to be said that
using twins reduces usable data dramatically, and using sibling sex mix as an instrument
applies in the US and probably other western countries. In most developing countries,
parents tend to prefer sons to daughters. Gupta and Dubey (2006) in a study of the
impact of fertility on poverty in India (which is probably the rst to use IV estimation)
use having two girls rst as an IV on households with more than two children. A priori
parents are more likely to have another child if the rst two are girls.
Just like Gupta and Dubey (2006) we use two girls rst as our IV. Sons are preferred in
the developing world for a number of reasons. First, in many societies, old-age support
is exclusively the task of male o¤spring by way of social practice and tradition. Even
though female o¤spring may be just as able to o¤er support, there may be a stigma
associated with receiving such support from daughters. Second, in societies where female
employment is not in demand or undervalued, males may be potentially more productive
future assets(Gupta and Dubey 2006). Finally, sons may be preferred to daughters for
the continuation of the family name.
4.4.2 Model specication
Following the motivation given in the preceding section, we specify a recursive bivariate
probit model which nets out simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity e¤ects and there-
fore enables us to isolate the causal e¤ect of fertility on poverty (objective and subjective).
We have two dependent variables; poverty status and fertility which are binary. Our unit
of analysis is a household.
Objective poverty
As discussed earlier, in this study we measure objective poverty using consumption, and a
household is dened as poor if its total real annualized per capita consumption expenditure
(Yi) falls below the poverty line. Letting Y PL be a poverty line, then household i is poor
(Ti = 1) if Yi  Y PL and non poor (Ti = 0) if Yi > Y PL. Parameter estimates of a
probit change with the poverty line. This means that the e¤ects of di¤erent variables on
poverty are strictly speaking specic to that poverty line. To nd out whether or not the











and look for the presence of sign reversals in the impact of fertility on the alternative
poverty lines. When there are no sign reversals i.e. monotonicity holds, then the results
can be considered rst order dominant, implying that the direction of the impact of a
fertility variable on the probability of being poor remains the same regardless of poverty
line selected (Ravallion 1996).
We use three poverty lines; two as dened by the National Statistical O¢ ce of Malawi
(NSO), and the third as dened by the World Bank. The two NSO poverty lines are; one
for those considered ultra poor which is 10029 Malawi Kwacha per year, and another for
the poor which is 16165 Malawi Kwacha per year. The World Bank poverty line is the US
$1 per day (equivalent to an annualized gure of 11051 Malawi Kwacha after adjusting
for purchasing power parity). The NSO poverty lines are based on the cost of basic needs
approach. They are adjusted for interspatial and intertemporal price di¤erences. It is
worth pointing out at this stage, that there is an unsettled debate in the poverty literature
regarding whether poverty should be modeled as a continuous variable by using a levels
regression or as a dummy by using probit or logit models. The rst advantage of the levels
regression is that it uses all the information on the distribution of consumption expen-
diture, whilst the binary model loses important information by collapsing consumption
expenditure into two values. Secondly, the binary variable is derived from an observed
continuous variable, and this runs counter to the fundamental assumption on which the
probit or logit is based. Specically, the binary indictor models assume that there is an un-
observed latent response variable which generates an observed binary variable (Ravallion
1996). However, the levels regression has a major shortcoming in that it imposes constant
parameters over the entire distribution and thus assumes that the impact of various fac-
tors on welfare is constant across the expenditure distribution. That is, it assumes that
there is no di¤erence between the rich and the poor in terms of their characteristics. In
reality, the poor face di¤erent constraints such access to credit and services. As Grootaert
(1997) argues, the poors ability to cope with these constraints can be envisaged as a latent
variable which is a function of household characteristics which generates binary welfare
outcomes. In this study, we use both approaches to check the robustness of our results to
the poverty denition.
Fertility (Zi) is dened as equal to one if a household has more than two children and zero
if it has two6. Our study is essentially about large families versus small families. It should
also be pointed out that two girls rst would be more evident in the birth of the third child
and not the second child since most families prefer having at least two children (Gupta
and Dubey 2006). This implies that the two girls rst IV only works in the transition
from the second to the third child. We later (see subsection 4.5.8) change this denition of
6One can also quite plausibly assume that there is a latent variable which depends on personal and
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fertility, as a way of checking the sensitivity of our results to the denition of family size.
The poverty and fertility equations are jointly estimated in a recursive bivariate probit
which is formally specied below.
Consider the following levels regression;
Yi = 
0Xi + Zi + "i (4.1)
then poverty status is dened as;
Ti =
(
1 if Yi  Y PL (poor)
0 if Yi > Y
PL (non poor)
(4.2)
Consider the following levels regression for number of children (Ci);
Ci = 
0Xi + Mi + i (4.3)
then fertility is dened as;
Zi =
(
1 if Ci > 2
0 if Ci = 2
(4.4)
The recursive bivariate probit is therefore dened as;
Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2
 
Y PL   (0Xi + Zi); (0Xi + Mi)  2; 

(4.5)
Where, i2 (   ) is the bivariate normal cumulative density function, Xi is a vector of
exogenous variables which inuence both fertility and poverty, Mi is a zero-one dummy
IV dened as equal to one if the rst two children are girls and zero otherwise.  and  are
vectors of parameters to be estimated, and  and  are scalar parameters of the fertility
dummy and the IV respectively. "i and i error terms with the following properties;
 = Cov ("ii) (4.6)
E("ijXi; Zi;Mi) = E(ijXi;Mi) = 0 (4.7)











The parameters , , , ,  are estimated by maximum likelihood (see Maddala 1983;
Greene 2003; and Monfardini and Radice 2008 for more details).
The log likelihood to be maximized is7;
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d11 = TiZi; d10 = Ti(1  Zi); d01 = Zi(1  Ti); d00 = (1  Zi)(1  Ti)
P 11i = Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2(0Xi + ; 0Xi + ; )
P 10i = Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi + ; )
P 01i = Pr(Ti = 0; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2(0Xi + ; 0Xi   ; )
P 00i = Pr(Ti = 0; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi) = i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi   ; )
Testing the null that  = 0 using a Wald test amounts to testing for the exogeneity of
fertility. The specied recursive bivariate probit corrects for simultaneity (through the
IV) and at the same time controls for unobserved heterogeneity (by allowing correlation
between the errors which capture unobserved factors among other things). Our two equa-
tion system is identied by way of exclusion restriction i.e. the poverty equation does not
have Mi the IV as a regressor8.
The coe¢ cients in any limited dependent variable model can be misleading. Since the
model is a probability model, the absolute level of a coe¢ cient can convey a wrong picture
of the impact of a regressor on the dependent variable. To overcome this problem, we
compute marginal e¤ects on the conditional mean function given by;
E [TijXi; Zi;Mi] = Pr [Zi = 1]E [TijZi = 1; Xi; Zi;Mi]
+Pr [Zi = 0]E [TijZi = 0; Xi; Zi;Mi] (4.10)
= Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 1jXi; Zi;Mi) + Pr(Ti = 1; Zi = 0jXi; Zi;Mi)
= i2(
0Xi + ; 
0Xi + ; ) + i2( 0Xi   ; 0Xi + ; )
= P 11i + P
10
i
7For ease of exposition and in keeping with Maddala (1983), Greene (2003), and Monfardini and
Radice (2008), we express the log likelihood assuming that the poverty and fertility thresholds are at
zero. This simplication does not a¤ect our analysis.
8It should however be pointed out that theoretically it is possible to achieve identication by func-
tional form only i.e. without exclusion restrictions. This type of identication depends entirely on the
bivariate normality of the errors. The exclusion restrictions help in making results robust to distributional
misspecication (Monfardini and Radice 2008). Further, in our case the instrument allows us to check










102 CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF FERTILITY ON POVERTY
The marginal e¤ects are just the derivatives of this conditional mean function9. For
variables which appear in both the fertility and poverty equations, the total marginal
e¤ect of these variables is decomposed into the direct e¤ect (derivative of the second part
of equation 4.10) and the indirect e¤ect (derivative of the rst part of equation 4.10).
This indirect e¤ect works through fertility. For example, education may a¤ect poverty
directly, but may also a¤ect poverty indirectly through its impact on fertility. For binary
explanatory variables, we do not take derivatives of equation 4.10 rather the marginal
e¤ect is just the di¤erence in the conditional mean function with the dummy set equal to
one and zero (Greene 2003). The marginal e¤ect of fertility on poverty is calculated as
follows;
Pr(Ti = 1; jZi = 1jXi;Mi)  Pr(Ti = 1; jZi = 0jXi;Mi) (4.11)
The marginal e¤ects in the fertility equation are just the derivatives of the marginal
distribution quite like in a univariate probit.
Subjective poverty
As said earlier, this study uses the ELQ method to measure subjective poverty. Using
this method, one can model subjective poverty using an ordered probit model (see for
example Ravallion and Lokshin 2002), where the rungs of the ladder represent ordered
outcomes. Following Devereux et al. (2006) and Kalugina and Najman (2002), we dene
a subjective poverty dummy as follows; households are subjectively poor if they fall on
the bottom two rungs of the ladder and non-poor if they fall on rungs 3 to 6. So the
impact of fertility on subjective poverty is modelled using the recursive bivariate probit
presented in the preceding section for objective poverty.
In addition to the variables already discussed, for both objective and subjective poverty
we include variables to capture household demographics, education, employment, agricul-
ture, religion, and community level characteristics. We also control for regional e¤ects by
including regional dummies.
4.4.3 Data and descriptives
The data for this analysis come from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey
(IHS2)10. The survey collects demographic information which inter alia includes; age,
sex, together with the relationship of each household member to the household head.
This information allows us to identify children and their birth orders, which we then
9If  = 0 then the two parts of equation 4.10 reduce to a product of marginals (Greene 2003).











use to generate the two girls rst IV. The survey also collects information on subjective
assessment of well-being. Out of a total of 11280 households, we focus on 9827 rural
households (87%) of the total, as it is the rural areas where two girls rst may be more
evident. Because the survey does not track children across households; we impose the
following restriction on the rural sample. The sample is limited to mothers aged 20-40,
whose oldest child was less than 17 years of age at the time of the survey. Since we are
focusing on households with at least two children, we would not expect many women
younger than age 20 to have two children. Besides, it is to be expected that a child
over age 17 has moved to a di¤erent household11. We therefore have about 3400 rural
households constituting the restricted sample.
Table 4.1, presents objective poverty rates for the three poverty lines12. The results
indicate that for all rural households, 56.4% are poor with a corresponding restricted
sample head count rate of 52.5%. Additionally, 24.4% and 21.8% of all rural and restricted
rural households respectively are ultra poor. This means that about one in ve of the rural
population (restricted and unrestricted) live in dire poverty such that they cannot even
a¤ord to meet the minimum standard daily recommended food requirement. In terms of
the World Bank poverty line of US$1 a day, 30.6% and 27.7% of all Malawians residing
in rural areas and those in the restricted rural sample respectively live on less than a
dollar a day. Using the three poverty lines, we also nd that the poverty gap measures
are similar for the two samples. For instance, using the poor poverty line we nd that
all rural households (restricted rural households) have a poverty gap of 19.3% (17.7%)
suggesting that they on average subsist on 19.3% (17.7%) less than K16165. What is
therefore emerging from the results is that even though the poverty rates for all rural
households are consistently higher than those for the restricted sample, the di¤erence is
not very big. This would imply that the restricted sample that we are using for this study
is a reasonable representation of all rural households. In Table 4.2, we present results of
the relationship between poverty headcounts and fertility measured as number of children.
We nd that for all poverty lines the poverty headcount rate is increasing with the number
of children. For example, using the poor poverty line we nd that for the unrestricted
(restricted) 47.3% (46.2%) of households with less than three children are poor; this is
in contrast to a headcount rate of 71.6% (74.5%) for those households with more than
six children. This suggests that poverty and fertility might be positively related. This
11Similar restrictions are used by Angrist and Evans (1998), and Gupta and Dubey (2006). We later
relax these age restrictions in subsection 4.5.7, to see if our results are not a¤ected by the possiblity of
sample selection.









. Where ci is consumption of household i , z is the poverty line, and gi = z ci is a consumption
shortfall. q is the number of poor households,  is a measure of poverty aversion. For 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104 CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF FERTILITY ON POVERTY
pattern holds for both samples; we should also note that the head counts are not very
di¤erent for the two samples implying that our restricted sample represents quite well the
rural population.
We now turn to the descriptive analysis of subjective poverty. We nd that 84.8% of all
rural households consider themselves to be subjectively poor with a corresponding gure
of 83.5% for the restricted sample. These rates are very high as compared to the objective
rates given in Table 4.1. In Table 4.3, we check the relationship between subjective poverty
headcounts and the number of children. The results show an opposite relationship to
that found under the objective poverty analysis (Table 4.2). Where as before we found
that the more the number of children the higher the poverty rate; the results here show
that the more the number of children a household has the lower the subjective poverty.
This suggests that there might be a negative relationship between subjective poverty and
fertility.
Table 4.4 summarizes results of the relationship between objective poverty and subjective
poverty13. The results suggest that the objectively and subjectively poor are not the same
people. This is evidenced by the fact that the o¤-diagonals (unshaded cells) are nonzero.
This indicates that the matching of households between the two denitions of poverty is
weak. For example, using the poor poverty line, we nd that of 1359 households who
are subjectively non-poor only 987 households are non-poor in the objective sense14. The
Cramers V statistics test the null hypothesis of no association between the two measures.
A Cramers V statistic of close to 1 (0) indicates strong (weak) association. The values
are between 0 and 1, implying that there is a relationship albeit weak between the two
and this is conrmed by the likelihood test (probabilities of the chi-square are zero.).
In Table 4.5, we report results of the descriptive analysis of the explanatory variables used
in the study. The average number of children is 2.9. About three quarters of households
have more than two children. Households which have two girls rst make about 19% of
our sample. This would suggest weak evidence of non random sex targeting since you
expect the proportion of households with two girls rst to be 25%. Education levels are
low as is indicated by very low averages of numbers of people both male and female with
some education be it primary or secondary. The averages are less than one suggesting
very low numbers of people with education. In terms of education of parents, we note
that fathers have more education than mothers as we move up the education ladder. For
instance,13.6% of fathers have secondary as their highest education level as compared to
just about 5% for mothers. The labour force participation for fathers is higher than that
of mothers with 23% of fathers working for a wage compared to 4% for mothers.
13Since the results for the restricted and whole samples are similar, we only report results for all rural
households
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The average for number of enterprises is very low indicating that very few households
engage in non-agricultural income generating activities. About a quarter of our sampled
households grow tobacco which is a cash crop. The results indicate that close to two thirds
of households have no clinics in their communities; in addition 2% of the households live
in trading centres suggesting that most households are not close to markets. In Table
4.5, we also show descriptive statistics for all rural households15. This is done in order
to check the representativeness of the variables used in our regression analyses. The
results indicate that the restricted sample is generally not very di¤erent from the sample
of all rural households; suggesting that it is a realistic representation of rural households.
For example, the average number of children for the two or more children sample is
slightly higher than that of all households, 2.9 against 2.4 for all households. In terms
of employment, we also note that the sample of two or more children households has
somewhat higher labor force participation rates for both fathers and mothers. Looking
at all rural households their educational measures are to some extent lower. The same
pattern emerges for religion and community characteristics.
4.5 Econometric results
In this section, we present econometric results of the impact of fertility on objective and
subjective poverty. We start with the presentation and discussion of results for objective
poverty, and this is followed later by results for subjective poverty.
4.5.1 Impact of exogenous fertility on objective poverty
In this section results (Table 4.6) of naïve univariate probit regressions which assume
that fertility is exogenous for the three poverty lines are presented and discussed. These
results serve as our base for comparison with the scenario where we assume that fertility
is endogenous. For all the three poverty regressions, the chi-square statistics show all
variables included in the models are jointly signicant.
Similar to the ndings of Gupta and Dubey (2006), the univariate probit results suggest
a positive and statistically signicant e¤ect of fertility on poverty. This implies that
exogenous fertility increases the likelihood of being poor. The size of the e¤ect ranges
from 11% to 23%, and these values are economically substantial. This relationship is
monotonic, as it holds for all the three poverty lines, suggesting that our results are
robust to choice of a poverty line and that the rst order dominance assumption is not
violated. We also observe that the impact of exogenous fertility on poverty increases
as the poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra poor to poor. This might indicate










106 CHAPTER 4. IMPACT OF FERTILITY ON POVERTY
that children become more expensive as your income increases as households opt for good
quality children. As expected, the dependency ratio is signicantly and positively related
to poverty across the three poverty lines. An increase in the dependency ratio ceteris
paribus increases the probability of falling into poverty by 4%, 5.7% and 11% for ultra
poor, World Bank, and poor poverty lines respectively. These e¤ects are quite large
economically. Having secondary education for mothers and fathers signicantly a¤ects
poverty. The relationship as expected is negative. Holding other things constant, when
a father (mother) has secondary education it lowers the likelihood of being poor by 5%
(7%), 8.8% (6.6%), and 18.9% (18.4%) for ultra poor, World Bank, and poor poverty lines
respectively. All the other education variables have the expected negative sign but their
impact is statistically insignicant. It should however be pointed out that the magnitudes
of the education variables are economically quite signicant.
With respect to employment, we nd that for fathers being employed for a wage lowers
the likelihood of being poor with economically signicant e¤ects ranging from 4% to 6%.
However, for mothers being employed for a wage is not statistically signicant, probably
reecting the very low labour force participation rates for mothers (see Table 4.5). In
terms of the magnitude of the e¤ect, we note that they are quite large with values quite
similar to those for fathers. The higher the number of non agricultural enterprises a
household has, the lower the chance of being poor. For instance, using the poor poverty
line we note that ceteris paribus having more enterprises increases the probability of being
non poor by about 10%. The e¤ect is increasing on successive poverty lines suggesting
that the e¤ect is more pronounced as the level of consumption increases. Accessing loans
has the expected negative and signicant e¤ect on poverty.
Growing tobacco which is a cash crop has the expected negative relationship with poverty.
The impact is both statistically and economically signicant, with the magnitude ranging
from 1% to 9.6%. We notice however that for the lowest poverty line (ultra poor), growing
tobacco is not statistically signicant suggesting that tobacco growing has no statistically
signicant e¤ect on poverty at the lower end of the income distribution even though the
e¤ect seems to be economically large (about 1%). The statistical insignicance perhaps
reects the fact that due to its high cost nature very few ultra poor households can grow
tobacco. Unsurprisingly, land which is a productive resource, statistically signicantly
increases the chance of being non poor. The magnitude of the e¤ects suggests that it is
economically signicant. Although the importance of livestock as a means of livelihood is
falling in Malawi, the results suggest that holding other things constant, owning livestock
increases the probability of being non poor by 3%, 4% and 6% for the ultra poor, World
Bank, and poor poverty lines respectively. Having a clinic in a community lowers the
probability of being poor by 3%, 5%, and 7% in the ultra poor, World Bank, and poor
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statistical viewpoint. As might be expected, the presence of a clinic would imply easily
accessible medical attention which would among other things improve the productivity of
people in the area.
Our discussion above has been based on the assumption that fertility is exogenous, but as
discussed before fertility might be endogenous. In the next section, we address this issue
of endogeneity of fertility.
4.5.2 Controlling for endogenous fertility
As discussed before, to account for endogeneity we need an instrumental variable. In our
case we are using two girls rst as our IV. Before we go ahead to use the IV we rst check
two things. Firstly, we test using a hazard model whether indeed two girls rst exists in
rural Malawi16. Secondly, we then check the validity of two girls rst as an IV. We address
each one of these issues in the next subsections.
Having two girls rst and fertility in rural Malawi
Since the focus of this study is not on measuring two girls rst, we will not be too detailed
about the methodology (for details see Haughton and Haughton 1998). In order to test for
evidence of two girls rst, we need to rst dene what we mean by two girls rst. There are
basically two concepts of two girls rst. The rst is called lexicographic preferences; also
referred to as the threshold, xed minima, or target view of two girls rst, this approach
assumes that the ith household desires Si sons, regardless of the number of daughters
which it will need to have to achieve this goal. In practice, the target is likely to vary over
households, and it may vary within a household over time, either way it is an unobservable
quantity. The second concept of two girls rst is what is called sequential preference. This
obtains when for any given number of sons and daughters, parents prefer an additional
son to an additional daughter.
To measure lexicographic preferences you need families which have stopped child-bearing
i.e. complete families (Haughton and Haughton 1998). To measure sequential preference
you can use incomplete families. Since in the IHS2 data there is no distinction between
complete and incomplete families, we use the concept of sequential preference to measure
two girls rst. Sequential preference can be measured by using a hazard model. The
hazard model estimates the risk (hazard) of having another child at any point in time.
For an accelerated failure time (AFT) model, if the hazard is higher for families with a
son (or sons), the implication is that two girls rst is present. The dependent variable is
the length of the interval (in months) between one birth and the next, a by-product of
16This can be viewed as complementary to the evidence of son preference in education spending in rural
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recording the birth dates of the children born in the household. Specically, we focus on
two intervals namely the transition from the second to the third child, and the transition
from the third to the fourth child. In addition to the covariates included in the other
regressions, we use the number of existing boys. in a household
If two girls rst is present, we would expect the coe¢ cient for number of existing boys
to be positive, implying that the higher the number of boys, the longer the duration
between births. It is supposed that households that do not have as many sons as they
wish, will hurry to have another before it is too late. Underlying this idea is the notion
that households may have sequential two girls rst. Results in Table 4.7 are based on the
accelerated failure time Weibull hazard model. For the two transitions, the coe¢ cient for
number of boys is positive and signicant suggesting the presence of two girls rst in rural
Malawi17. Among other variables, we controlled for the employment of the father, and for
the interval 2 to 3 we nd that fathersemployment increases the duration of the birth
interval though this e¤ect is insignicant on the next birth interval. Having found that
two girls rst is present in rural Malawi the next thing to be done is to check if it is a
valid instrument.
Two girls rst as an instrumental variable
For a variable to be a good IV, it rstly must be uncorrelated with the error term, which
in our case means that it must not be correlated with poverty. Secondly, it must be
correlated with the endogenous variable. The consistency of our results may be a¤ected
by the possibility that the IV may be correlated with the error term, that is it may be
endogenous. There are two possible scenarios in which this can happen18. Firstly, there is
a possibility of using ultrasound services to know in advance the sex of a child which the
rich can access, which can then be used to do prenatal sex screening. This would make
our IV correlated with economic status (poverty). It however has to be said that while
this is possible in rich countries where medical services are very advanced, this cannot
be the case in rural Malawi where medical facilities are quite basic. Besides, abortion
including sex selective abortion is illegal in Malawi19. The second issue which can lead to
endogeneity is what Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000) call the hand-me-down e¤ect. They
argue that the cost of children depends on sex composition and show that there is strong
17To complement these results, we tested (using a t-test) whether or not there is a di¤erence in the
average number of children between households with two girls rst and those with two boys rst. We nd
that households with two girls rst have a signicantly higher number of children with a mean di¤erence
(standard error) of 0.3036 (0.054).
18There is a possibility that poor households may prefer sons to work in the elds, this would also mean
that the instrument would be correlated with poverty. We control for this by including a variable which
captures whether or not children work outside the home.
19There is a possibility of using more traditional sex-targeting mechanisms such as female infanticide
and extreme neglect of female children leading to their eventual death (Sen 1984). However, there is no
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evidence for a hand-me-down e¤ect. This is an economies of scale e¤ect where if you
have children of the same sex you spend less because there are some things like clothing
which can be used by the child coming after. Now if households with children of the same
sex spend signicantly less money than do households with children of di¤erent sexes,
this di¤erence in consumption may a¤ect the poverty situation of the household. In this
case therefore the IV is endogenous. In Table 4.8, we report results of two sample t-tests
of mean di¤erences to check for evidence of the hand-me-down e¤ect. If the hand-me-
down e¤ect is present, we would expect there to be a statistically signicant di¤erence in
expenditure on clothing and education by sex of the child. That is, if the hand-me-down
e¤ect is present, the expenditure on the two items should be signicantly lower for the
case where two girls or two boys are rst than the case where there is a mix of a boy and
a girl. However, we do not nd a statistically signicant di¤erence in expenditure on the
two items between households with two girls rst or two boys rst and those with a girl
and a boy. The implication of this nding is that two girls rst is not endogenous through
the hand-me-down e¤ect. We then need to check the second condition that two girls rst
and fertility are correlated.
We check for the relationship between fertility and our IV by estimating a reduced form
univariate probit model of fertility. The results are presented in Table 4.9. Column 1
leaves out religion, column 2 leaves out region but includes religion, and column 3 has all
covariates. Most of the variables have the expected signs. A fathers education is a strong
predictor of fertility though the education of mother does not have a signicant e¤ect on
fertility. This probably reects the fact in rural households a father has a nal say on
everything including for example contraceptives. The more educated a father is, the more
likely is the family going to adopt family planning. We nd that if children work at home
it leads to more fertility. Of particular interest is the relationship between the IV and
fertility. Having two girls rst signicantly increases the probability of having more than
two children. The relationship holds for all the three specications presented in Table 4.9.
This suggests that fertility and the IV are correlated20. It is worth noting that whether or
not we control for religion and region, the e¤ect of having two girls rst on the probability
of having more than two children is not a¤ected by religion or regional e¤ects.
So far we have found that two girls rst exists in rural Malawi, and that two girls rst is a
good IV in the sense that it is uncorrelated with poverty and it is correlated with fertility.
We now test whether fertility is endogenous. We present two complementary tests of the
endogeneity of fertility. Since the condence intervals do not contain a zero, the cross
equation error correlation (rho)21 results in Table 4.10 suggest that the null hypothesis
of exogenous fertility is rejected at the 5% signicance level for all poverty lines. This
20This can in a sense be viewed as direct evidence of son preference.
21A low error correlation coe¢ cient (rho) suggests that there no correlation between the error terms of
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conclusion is further conrmed by the Wald test results presented in Table 4.11. As said
before failing to account for endogeneity of fertility would lead to biased and inconsistent
results. We therefore present results of a recursive bivariate probit which jointly estimates
fertility and objective poverty.
4.5.3 Impact of endogenous fertility on objective poverty
In Tables 4.12-4.14, we report the marginal e¤ects of the recursive bivariate probit of
the impact of fertility on poverty for the three poverty thresholds. For all the three
poverty lines, the chi-square statistics suggest that the variables are jointly signicant.
The maximum likelihood results indicate that fertility and poverty are positively related.
The e¤ect is statistically signicant. This implies that fertility increases the probability
of being poor. The impacts are economically signicant with values ranging from 0.139
to 0.304. This relationship is monotonic, as it holds for the three poverty thresholds,
suggesting that just like in the base scenario where we assumed fertility to be exogenous,
our results are robust to choice of a poverty line. This means that the rst order dominance
assumption is not violated. Just like the naïve results of exogenous fertility, the impact
of endogenous fertility across the poverty lines increases as the poverty line increases i.e.
moving from ultra poor to poor. We note however that the total e¤ect of fertility on
poverty is larger than the one we got when we assumed that fertility is exogenous. This
implies that assuming that fertility is exogenous underestimates its impact on poverty.
For all poverty lines, the underestimation is about 1.3 times. It should be pointed out
that the statistically signicant e¤ect of endogenous fertility is not in conformity with
a nding by Gupta and Dubey (2006) for India. They nd that the impact of fertility
on poverty is statistically insignicant after controlling for endogeneity. The nding that
treating fertility as an endogenous variable increases its e¤ect on poverty merits further
speculative comment. If endogeneity was arising from reverse causation, then the IV would
purge the reverse causality problem making the relationship less positive i.e. the e¤ect of
endogenous fertility should be smaller than that of exogenous fertility. This means that
our result does not conform to this expectation. However, if the endogeneity problem
arises from omitted variables which inuence both fertility and poverty, then there might
be downward omitted variable bias, and thus by purging out the endogeneity problem we
get rid of this bias.
As expected, the dependency ratio is signicantly and positively related to poverty across
the three poverty lines. The total e¤ect is almost equal to that from the base regressions.
The recursive bivariate probit results show that having secondary education for mothers
and fathers are statistically signicant predictors of poverty. The relationship as expected
is negative. In terms of the size of the impact, we note that in the case of the ultra
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probability of being poor by 5.7% (6.6%), with the e¤ect of a mothers education being
slightly higher. As was the case with the univariate probit, most of the education variables
have the expected negative sign but they are not statistically signicant though they
appear economically large. With respect to employment, we nd that for a father all things
being equal, being employed for a wage lowers the likelihood of being poor. The e¤ect
is almost the same as that for the base regressions for all poverty thresholds. However,
as before wage employment for mothers has no statistically signicant e¤ect. The e¤ect
seems to be economically signicant though, with the magnitudes of the e¤ects similar
to those for fathers. Similar to the results from the simple probits, we nd that for the
lowest poverty line (ultra poor), growing tobacco has no statistically signicant e¤ect
though with a marginal e¤ect of about 1% it would suggest that the e¤ect is economically
sizeable. Land and livestock increase the probability of being non poor. Having a clinic in
a community lowers the probability of being poor by 7% in the poor poverty line model,
and this e¤ect is substantial from an economic as well as a statistical perspective.
Two things are coming out of our comparison between the base scenario regressions which
assumed that fertility is exogenous and the recursive bivariate probit results. Firstly, all
the variables which were signicant in the simple probit regressions are also signicant
after accounting for endogeneity. Secondly, the total e¤ects for the joint estimation of
fertility and poverty are generally larger than those for the univariate probit regressions.
So far our analysis has been based on real per capita annualized consumption expenditure.
This analysis does not take into account household composition and economies of scales. In
the next section, we investigate whether or not the impact of fertility on objective poverty
that we have found is robust to accounting for household composition and economies of
scale.
4.5.4 Household composition and economies of scale
The use of per capita consumption expenditure is common in poverty studies; however this
procedure has two problems. First, di¤erent individuals have di¤erent needs. For example,
a young child typically requires less food than an adult. Second, there are economies of
scale in consumption for such items as housing, kitchen utensils, and utilities such as
electricity. It costs less to house two people than to house two individuals separately.
Larger households can do bulk buying which can attract discounts. Some studies have
shown that the impact of household size on poverty disappears once these two problems
are addressed (e.g. Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995; White and Masset 2003). The solution to
these problems is to use adult equivalent scales22. An adult equivalent scale measures the
22The implication of using per capita consumption for poverty analysis is that households with children
are judged poorer on a per capita basis than they would be if their welfare level was measured on an adult
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number of adult males (typically) to which that household is deemed to be equivalent23.
In this study, we use the arbitrary method to measure equivalence scales; in the literature
there are di¤erent methods for measuring equivalence scale, none of them commands
universal assent (see Deaton and Zaidi 2002). The number of adult equivalents (AE) is
dened as follows:
AE = (A+ K) (4.12)
where A is the number of adults in the household, and K is the of number of children,
parameter  is the cost of a child relative to that of an adult, and lies between 0 and
1. The parameter  which also lies between 0 and 1, controls the extent of economies of
scale; since the elasticity of adult equivalents with respect to "e¤ective" size, A + K is
, (1   ) is a measure of economies of scale. When both  and  are unity (the most
extreme case with no discount for children or for size) the number of adult equivalents
is simply household size, and deation by household size is equivalent to deating to a
per capita basis. If  is zero, then economies of scale are so extreme that welfare is the
same for di¤erent households with the same total consumption expenditure regardless of
household size. The choice of the values of the parameters  and  is arbitrary, we use
the following values  = 0:65 and  = 0:9. For the cost of children parameter, our value is
based on the one used for Zambia by the World Bank (2005). Being neighbors, we would
expect the Zambian gures to be similar to Malawis. With respect to the economies of
scale parameter, our choice is motivated by the fact that in most developing countries
food is major component of consumption. Food is largely a private good and therefore
there are no economies of scale with food. This implies that a high value of  should be
used. The annualized real consumption expenditure for each household is divided by the
adult equivalent (AE) to have consumption per adult equivalent. With this adjustment
a household is considered poor if its annualized real consumption per adult equivalent is
below the three poverty lines discussed before.
The previous regressions were re-estimated in order to check the robustness of our nd-
ings to accounting for household composition and economies of scale. We present results
(Table 4.15) for both univariate probit which assumes exogenous fertility as well as the
recursive bivariate probit. We have replicated the previous per capita results for com-
parison. For the univariate probit regression, the results indicate that the variables are
jointly signicant. The simple probit results indicate that when we account for economies
of scale and household composition, fertility signicantly increases the likelihood of being
poor across the poverty lines. This e¤ect is monotonic as before implying our results
on poverty.
23In keeping with other studies (e.g Lanjouw and Ravallion 1995; White and Masset 2003), in this
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are robust to choice of poverty line, and that the rst order dominance assumption is
not violated. As was the case with the per capita poverty regressions, we nd that for
the adjusted regressions the impact of fertility across the poverty lines increases as the
poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra poor to poor. However, as expected adult
equivalent scale adjustment reduces the impact of fertility on poverty. The reductions are
economically substantial. For the ultra poor poverty line, the reduction is about 83.4%,
for the World Bank US$1 line the reduction is 77.6%, and nally for the poor poverty
line the reduction is 37.8%. This implies that the higher the consumption the lower the
reduction in the impact of fertility after adult equivalent adjustments.
For the bivariate probit regressions a similar pattern emerges24. After accounting for the
endogeneity of fertility as well as economies of scale and household composition, fertility
signicantly increases the likelihood of being poor across the poverty lines. Besides, the
impact is not as economically signicant as that for per capita models, as it ranges from
0.012 to 0.177, compared against a range of 0.139 to 0.304 for the unadjusted models. Our
results are robust to choice of poverty line and the impact of fertility across the poverty
lines increases as the poverty line increases i.e. moving from ultra poor to poor. Compared
with the results from the simple probit models which account for economies of scale and
household composition, we note that the impact of fertility on poverty is underestimated in
the simple probit models. However, compared with the per capita bivariate probit results,
the results show that the impact is reduced. For the ultra poor model the reduction is
91.4%, for the World Bank US$1 line the reduction is 77.8%, and nally for the poor
poverty line the reduction is 35%. These are economically signicant reductions. We also
notice that these reductions are not very di¤erent from those found for univariate probit
models. These ndings suggest that it is quite possible that the impact of fertility would
be economically insignicant with some values of the equivalent scale parameters25.
The conclusion from these results is that accounting for economies of scale and household
composition reduces the impact of fertility on poverty, and that these reductions are eco-
nomically large. However, the impact of fertility is still statistically signicant regardless
of whether or not fertility is exogenous or endogenous. This far we have looked at the
impact of fertility on poverty with poverty dened as a dummy. In the next section,
we investigate the robustness of our results to treating objective poverty as a continuous
variable.
24For the bivariate probit regression with adult equivalent adjustment we also nd that fertility is
endogenous, with the following Wald statistics (p values) for the three poverty lines; Ultrapoor 8.1933
(0.0042), World Bank 4.2567 (0.0391), Poor 4.392 (0.0361).
25Another way of accounting for economies of scale is to directly include household size and the square
of household size in the poverty equation, however this approach ignores the interactions that may exist
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4.5.5 Impact of fertility on continuous objective poverty
With poverty treated as continuous, we estimated a Two Stage least Squares (2SLS) re-
gression of the impact of fertility on poverty measured as the log of real annualized per
capita and adult equivalent adjusted consumption expenditures26. For the 2SLS regression
all right hand variables for the two regressions remain the same as in the bivariate pro-
bit27. In this framework, we also estimated a naïve regression which assumes that fertility
is exogenous. This is done by using Ordinary least Squares (OLS). All right hand variables
are the same as those for the univariate probit regressions. The results are presented in
Table 4.16. The results indicate that for the OLS regression, fertility is negatively related
to both per capita and adult equivalent adjusted consumption. This implies that having
more than two children lowers consumption and hence increases poverty. This is similar to
the nding earlier where poverty is dened as a dummy. The impact of fertility on poverty
is lower when we account for economies of scale and household composition. Again this
is similar to our earlier ndings. The regression based Hausman test for endogeneity (see
Woodridge 2002 for details) shows that fertility is endogenous. This implies that our OLS
results may be biased and inconsistent.
The 2SLS results, which account for this endogeneity show that as is the case with the
OLS results, fertility is signicantly negatively related to both per capita and adult equiv-
alent adjusted consumption. However, the impact of fertility on consumption is higher
when we account for endogeneity of fertility. For example, the OLS results of the per
capita regression underestimate the e¤ect of fertility by about 2.3 times. The nding
that accounting for endogeneity raises the impact of fertility on poverty is similar to the
one before where poverty is dened as a dummy. Additionally, the impact of endogenous
fertility is reduced when we account for economies of scale and household composition.
The reduction after accounting for endogeneity of fertility (2SLS) is about 20%. We also
note that this reduction though economically large is smaller than the reductions found
for poverty dened as a dummy.
To conclude, these results suggest that our earlier ndings are robust to a di¤erent con-
ceptualization of objective poverty. Specically, with objective poverty dened as a con-
tinuous variable; fertility increases the likelihood of being poor, that this e¤ect is underes-
timated when the joint determination of the two is not accounted for, and that accounting
for household composition and economies of scale diminishes the e¤ect. Our analysis so far
has looked at poverty in the objective and monetary sense which is a narrower denition
of poverty. In the next section, we present econometric results of the impact of fertility
26The F-statistic of the rst stage regression on the excluded instrument (girlIV) is 247.18 with a p-
value of 0.000. The partial R2 of the excluded instrument is 0.0376. Together these statistics suggests
our IV is not weak.
27The coe¢ cient for the instrument is .172 with a p-value of 0.000 suggesting that if the rst two
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on subjective poverty which is based on self reported well being.
4.5.6 Impact of fertility on subjective poverty
As before, we test for evidence of endogeneity between fertility and subjective poverty28.
We nd no evidence that fertility is endogenous with respect to subjective poverty. This
is in stark contrast to the objective poverty analysis where we nd that fertility is endoge-
nous. We therefore present results in Table 4.17 of a univariate probit regression since
fertility is exogenous.
Fertility is found to signicantly lower the likelihood that a household will be subjectively
poor. We nd that fertility lowers the probability of being poor by about 3%. This result
is however di¤erent from the objective poverty analysis where we nd consistently that
fertility increases the probability of being poor. This perhaps reects rural Malawis social
cultural context where those households with more children are treated with respect and
those with few or without children are looked at with some contempt. That is, having
more children elevates your status in society and these intangible benets feed into peoples
sense of wellbeing. Another possible explanation is that there is discounting taking place
in the sense that households with more children expect to have a higher future discounted
income and therefore feel less poor29. This nding can also be explained in terms of utility
in the sense that couples get additional utility when they have additional children. The
results also suggest that the higher the dependency ratio, the lower the subjective poverty,
again we found an opposite e¤ect for monetary poverty. In terms of the magnitudes, we
note that the probability of feeling poor is lowered by 2.5%. The fact that having more
dependents makes households feel less poor can also be explained by the cultural context
that the more people depend on you the higher will be your social status. This intangible
benet is reected in lower subjective poverty.
Interestingly, for all the other variables the results are similar in terms of the signs and
statistical signicance to those for monetary poverty. For example; education of the father,
number of enterprises, loans, growing tobacco, land, and ownership of livestock lower the
likelihood of being subjectively poor. We included a dummy variable marital status to
capture some of the characteristics of the household head. We have three classes; monog-
amous (mono), polygamous (poly) and the base category is those who are not married
i.e. widowed, divorced, or separated30. The results indicate that being married lowers
the probability of feeling poor. We further note that the decrease in the likelihood of
28We estimated a recursive bivariate probit of subjective poverty and fertility, the Chi-square value
(P-value) of the Wald test for exogeneity of fertility is 0.17 (0.6766).
29We would like to thank Erik Thorbecke for pointing out this possible explanation.
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feeling poor is higher for polygamous households than it is for monogamous households.
Specically, relative to being widowed, divorced, or separated, being polygamous lowers
the probability of being subjectively poor by 7.6% as against 5.9% for monogamous house-
holds. The same cultural explanation can be given here where being married raises your
status, and having more wives further increases the respect that people may give you.
The level of per capita annualized real consumption is also included to capture house-
hold income status. We nd that household economic status as measured by per capita
consumption expenditure lowers the probability of feeling poor by about 10%.
4.5.7 Sample selection bias
As discussed earlier, our results are based on a restricted sample of women aged between
20 and 40, and the oldest child is under 17. This is motivated by the fact we need to
have households which still have at least the rst two children at home. However, this
restriction may lead to a selected sample i.e. a non-random sample. Sample selection may
bias our results. Sample selection may arise from; a) the possibility that older children
may still be at home, b) the fact that women in developing countries tend to marry at
a very young age, and c) the possibility that some women may start bearing children
much later in life. To check the extent to which the restriction a¤ects our results, we
re-estimated the previous regressions with the mothers age relaxed to between 17 and 50,
and the oldest child to under 20. With this relaxation, the sample size increases to 4572
rural households.
The results are similar to those found before, thus giving us condence that our con-
clusions are invariant to the age restrictions. For example (compare with Table 4.15),
when objective poverty is dened as a dummy and we control for household composition
and economies of scale, the marginal e¤ects (standard errors) of fertility for the recursive
bivariate probit are 0.014 (0.003), 0.035 (0.006) and 0.148 (0.021) for ultra poor, World
Bank U$S1 and poor poverty lines respectively. The same picture emerges when objective
poverty is dened as a continuous variable (compare with Table 4.16), with 2SLS coe¢ -
cients (standard errors) of fertility being -0.426(0.126) and -0.325 (0.116) for per capita
and adult equivalent adjusted consumption respectively31. Similarly, the relaxation does
not change our conclusions regarding the impact of fertility on subjective poverty. The
marginal e¤ect and standard error of fertility on subjective poverty (compare with Table
4.17 ) are -0.022 and 0.002 respectively.
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4.5.8 Two child versus one child families
In keeping with the literature (e.g. Angrist and Evans 1998; Gupta and Dubey 2006),
our analysis has been based on the restriction of our sample to families with at least two
children. We have argued that two girls rst which we use as our IV, would be more
evident in the birth of the third child and not the second child, since most families prefer
having at least two children. With this restriction, the corresponding two girls rst
IV (two girls rst) only works in causing exogenous variation in the transition from the
second to the third child. However, with this restriction, the higher-order birth IV may
be correlated with poverty. It may potentially be correlated with poverty in the sense
that poorly nourished women may have di¢ culty conceiving three times. This possible
correlation may make the IV invalid, and thus making our results inconsistent. To check if
our results are a¤ected by this potential problem, we re-estimated the previous regressions
using a sample of families with at least one child. For these new regressions, fertility (Zi)
is re-dened as equal to one if a household has more than one child and zero if it has one32.
The corresponding IV (Mi), is re-dened as a dummy equal to one if the rst child is a
girl, and zero if the rst child is a boy33. With this relaxation, the sample size increases
to 6595 rural households.
The pattern of results is generally similar to those found before albeit with higher marginal
e¤ects34. For example (compare with Table 4.15), when objective poverty is dened as a
dummy and we control for household composition and economies of scale, the marginal
e¤ects (standard errors) of fertility for the recursive bivariate probit are 0.032 (0.002),
0.044 (0.003) and 0.203 (0.001) for ultra poor, World Bank U$S1 and poor poverty lines
respectively. A similar conclusion is arrived at when objective poverty is dened as a
continuous variable (compare with Table 4.16), with 2SLS coe¢ cients (standard errors)
of fertility being -0.612(0.014) and -0.511 (0.033) for per capita and adult equivalent
adjusted consumption respectively. Interestingly, with the relaxation we nd that the
marginal e¤ect of fertility on subjective poverty is lower. The marginal e¤ect and standard
error of fertility on subjective poverty (compare with Table 4.17 ) are -0.014 and 0.004
respectively. This suggests that while having a child makes a household feel less poor,
higher-order births have an even bigger e¤ect on subjective poverty. Since the general
ndings are not di¤erent from those found using a sample of families with at least two
children, this reassures us that our conclusions are robust to the denition of family size.
32See equation 4.4, for comparison.
33See equation 4.3, for comparison.
34The mothers age was restricted to between 15 and 40, and the oldest child to under 17. It should be
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4.6 Conclusions
In the chapter, we sought to nd the impact of fertility on poverty while recognizing the
fact that the two variables are jointly determined. The study uses data from the Second
Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2). By using a natural experiment, two girls
rst as our instrumental variable, we are able to use exogenous variation in number of
children to uncover the causal e¤ect of fertility on poverty of rural households in Malawi.
First, we have looked at poverty dened in the monetary sense. A menu of three poverty
lines has been used to check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of a poverty line.
Results from the naïve probit models show that fertility increases the likelihood of being
poor. Since fertility is found to be endogenous, we estimated a recursive bivariate probit
where two girls rst is used as an IV. For the bivariate probit models, it has been found
that fertility increases the likelihood of being poor as well. However, this e¤ect is larger
for endogenous fertility, implying that when fertility is treated as exogenous its e¤ect on
poverty is underestimated. For both the base scenario of exogenous fertility and that of
endogenous fertility, its impact has been found to be robust to choice of poverty line.
The positive impact of fertility on objective poverty has also been shown to hold when
household composition and economies are accounted for, though the e¤ect tends to be
reduced. It has also been demostrated that when objective poverty is conceptualized as
a continuous variable this does not change our nding that fertility increases poverty and
that its e¤ect is higher when fertility is endogenous.
Second, we have looked at poverty dened more broadly by using self rated assessments of
welfare. It has been shown that subjective poverty and objective poverty are related albeit
weakly. Interestingly, fertility has been found to be exogenous with respect to subjective
poverty, probably suggesting that the endogeneity of fertility is a monetary phenomenon.
In terms of its impact on subjective poverty, it has been found to have the opposite e¤ect
to that found under objective poverty. That is having more than two children lowers
the probability of feeling poor, probably reecting the fact that having more children
elevates your status in society and these intangible benets feed into peoples sense of
wellbeing. This contradiction in the impact of fertility on the narrower objective poverty
and the broader subjective poverty might be a possible explanation for why families in
rural Malawi have many children (in spite of this making them poor in the objective
monetary sense) as it makes them feel less poor.
Though the study is able to estimate a causal relationship between fertility and poverty,
it is worth pointing out that the study is static in nature and therefore cannot capture
dynamic aspects of the relationship between poverty and fertility. It should also be said
that modernity can invalidate our instrumental variable in the sense that richer households











(which is unobserved) can inuence both poverty as well as their gender preferences. Since
we can not control for modernity, our conclusions from the chapter should be taken with
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Table 4.1: Poverty lines and associated poverty rates
Poverty line name Poverty index Poverty line per year Poverty measure
Restricted All
Ultra poor Headcount 21.8% 24.4%
Poverty gap MK10029 5.1% 5.8%
Poverty severity 1.7% 2.0%
Poor Headcount 52.5% 56.4%
Poverty gap MK16165 17.7% 19.3%
Poverty severity 7.8% 8.7%
World Bank (US$1) Headcount 27.7% 30.6%
Poverty gap MK11051 6.9% 7.9%
Poverty severity 2.5% 2.9%
Notes:The ultra poor poverty line is a food poverty line. The poverty lines are expressed in Malawi Kwacha (MK).
Table 4.2: Poverty headcount and fertility
Poverty line name Number of Children Poverty Headcount
Restricted All
Ultrapoor Less than three 15.9% 17.5%
Between three and six 33.1% 33.9%
Greater than six 45.3% 42.8%
Poor Less than three 46.2% 47.3%
Between three and six 69.1% 69.8%
Greater than six 74.5% 71.6%
World Bank (US$1) Less than three 21% 22.8%
Between three and six 40.8% 41.2%
Greater than six 52.3% 48.8%










Table 4.3: Subjective poverty and number of children
Subjectively poor headcount
Number of children Restricted All
Less than three 83.5% 85.38%
Between three and six 84.6% 85.12%
Greater than six 76% 76.51%
Table 4.4: Objective poverty and subjective poverty
Subjective poverty
Absolute poverty line Non poor Poor Total
Ultrapoor Non-Poor 1,261 6,759      8,020
Poor 98 1,709 1,807
Total 1,359 8,468      9,827
Cramér's V =   0.1156  Chisquare= 157.9 Prob> Chisquare = 0.000
Poor Non-Poor 987 4,195 5,182
Poor 372 4,273 4,645
Total 1,359 8,468 9,827
Cramér's V =   0.1596   Chisquare= 260 Prob> Chisquare  = 0.000
World Bank Non-poor 1,224 6,283 7,507
Poor 135 2,185 2,320
Total 1,359 8,468 9,827
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Table 4.5: Sample statistics
Restricted All   households
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
Demographics
number of children 2.910627 .0365515 2.423051 .0286636
two children or more .7608118 .0082506 .6108187 .0066297
mother’s age 29.10582 .1096724 37.50181 .240289
dependency ratio 1.361335 .0169433 1.187387 .0141034
two girls first .188402 .0071974 .1373361 .00457
age at first birth 19.40541 3.838322 19.85218 3.949439
Education
females with primary .0983405 .0067846 .1014171 .0059358
males with primary .1592433 .0108257 .1680409 .0084645
females with JCE .0558154 .0046985 .0536465 .0037974
males with JCE .1136867 .0065776 .1101352 .0050674
males with MSCE .0438612 .0042456 .0372241 .0031862
father no education .751661 .0023005 .807705 .0034122
mother no education .891231 .0017032 .927293 .0062371
father primary .1127936 .0063001 .0954657 .0041973
mother primary .0589645 .0041884 .0425612 .0027699
father secondary .1355454 .0073334 .096829 .0050333
mother secondary .0498045 .0044107 .0300455 .0025036
Employment
father works .2328373 .010074 .1859403 .0076554
mother works .0414332 .0042292 .0309512 .003083
children work at home .504807 .010293 .5184155 .0073577
children work outside home .0446999 .0041152 .0746205 .0039465
number of enterprises .4597906 .016602 .4164337 .0131016
Agriculture
loan 1050.168 98.66299 1635.488 582.397
grows tobacco .2657778 .0119243 .2382278 .0097572
land 0.58458 2.652096 0.64926 1.424733
livestock 6.184791 .02887696 6.380213 .0250001
Religion
muslim .125529 .0077292 .1220689 .0066006
catholic .257815 .0109174 .2680185 .0093857
protestant .6340125 .0120363 .6403704 .0100509
Community
has clinic .2998732 .0222924 .2924817 .021051
lives in trading centre .0224902 .0064503 .024335 .0067625
Region
north .1271692 .0045091 .1283621 .0034756
centre .4070733 .0083056 .4092272 .0059133
Sample size 3402 6595
Notes: Restricted rural households are those which; have a mother aged between 20 and 40, the oldest child under










Table 4.6: Marginal effects of the impact of exogenous fertility on poverty
Variable Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Demographics
two children or more 0.109*** 0.134*** 0.225***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.027)
mother’s age 0.004*** 0.004** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
dependency ratio 0.040*** 0.057*** 0.109***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.016)
age at first birth -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.017***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Education
females with primary -0.028 -0.042 -0.123***
(0.026) (0.033) (0.046)
males with primary -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.019) (0.023) (0.038)
females with JCE -0.017 -0.023 0.043
(0.034) (0.039) (0.060)
males with JCE 0.041 0.033 0.055
(0.026) (0.033) (0.051)
males with MSCE -0.047 -0.049 -0.117
(0.045) (0.051) (0.075)
father primary -0.006 -0.008 -0.056
(0.025) (0.031) (0.047)
mother primary -0.010 0.017 0.084
(0.035) (0.048) (0.065)
father secondary -0.053** -0.088*** -0.189***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.053)
mother secondary -0.070*** -0.066* -0.184***
(0.025) (0.038) (0.062)
Employment
father works -0.038*** -0.038** -0.060**
(0.013) (0.016) (0.024)
mother works -0.034 -0.039 -0.012
(0.025) (0.031) (0.047)
children work at home 0.008 0.026 0.020
(0.014) (0.017) (0.025)
children work outside home 0.020 0.046 0.071
(0.028) (0.036) (0.051)
number of enterprises -0.020* -0.033** -0.095***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.019)
Agriculture
loan -0.031** -0.041* -0.049**
(0.002) (0.021) (0.024)
grows tobacco -0.012 -0.036** -0.096***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.023)
land -0.021*** -0.028*** -0.034**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.017)
livestock -0.032*** -0.040*** -0.062***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Religion
muslim 0.031 0.023 0.035
(0.026) (0.030) (0.042)
catholic 0.029 0.032 0.018
(0.019) (0.024) (0.033)
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Table 4.6: continued
Variable Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Community
has clinic -0.033*** -0.048*** -0.071***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.021)
lives in trading centre -0.028 -0.042 -0.093
(0.032) (0.038) (0.062)
Region
north 0.016 0.010 0.045
(0.017) (0.020) (0.031)
centre -0.105*** -0.144*** -0.190***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.022)
Loglikelihood -1274.66 -1470.5 -1904.2
Chisquare 511.47 624.9 892.5
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402
McFadden R2 0.167 0.175 0.19
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is
a poverty indicator based on annualized per capita real consumption expenditure. The coefficients are marginal
effects evaluated as partial changes at the mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the
partial changes are measured as a discrete change in the poverty indicator as the dummy covariate changes from 0 to











Table 4.7: Accelerated failure time Weibull model
Variable Mean Hazard ratio Transition 2 to 3 Hazard ratio Transition 3 to 4
number of boys 1.94 1.12 0.114***       1.11 0.113***
(0.018) (0.023)
father works .2328 2.71 0.100**        0.92 -0.073
(0.046) (0.062)
children work at home .5048 0.90 -0.103**       0.74 -0.299***
(0.048) (0.081)
children work outside home .0446 0.77 -0.259***      1.16 0.156*
(0.074) (0.081)
F-statistic 4.79 5.50
Prob > F-statistic 0.00 0.00
Sample size 2720 1651
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variables
are birth intervals moving from 2 to 3 children, and moving from 3 to 4 children. In addition to the new variable
number of boys, the models also include all the other covariates included in the previous models. The hazard ratio is
an exponentiated coefficient. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Table 4.8: Son preference and the hand-me-down effect















Notes: Mean differences are defined as the sample means of rural households which have two girls first (two boys
first) ( µ ) minus the sample of rural households which have a mix in the first two children i.e. boy and a girl (
mixµ ).The means are weighted. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Numbers in square brackets are p-
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Table 4.9: Marginal effects of reduced form univariate probit regressions of fertility
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Demographics
mother’s age 0.001* 0.001*             0.001*
(0.001)         (0.001)            (0.001)
dependency ratio 0.148***        0.149***           0.148***
(0.023)         (0.023)            (0.023)
two girls first 0.102***        0.103***           0.102***
(0.020)         (0.020)            (0.020)
age at first birth -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.019***
(0.004)         (0.004)            (0.004)
Education
females with primary -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
males with primary 0.027           0.025              0.025
(0.016)         (0.017)            (0.016)
females with JCE 0.020           0.023              0.019
(0.025)         (0.024)            (0.024)
males with JCE 0.074***        0.074*** 0.073***
(0.020)         (0.020)            (0.020)
males with MSCE 0.084***        0.085***           0.083***
(0.028)         (0.028)            (0.028)
father primary -0.029 -0.029 -0.024
(0.027)         (0.027)            (0.026)
mother primary -0.005 -0.007 -0.007
(0.025)         (0.025)            (0.026)
father secondary -0.152*** -0.151*** -0.146***
(0.052)         (0.052)            (0.051)
mother secondary -0.044 -0.052 -0.046
(0.043)         (0.044)            (0.043)
Employment
father works 0.007 0.006 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
mother works 0.017 0.018 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
children work at home 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.104***
(0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
children work outside home 0.026 0.028* 0.027*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
number of enterprises -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.006)         (0.006) (0.006)
Agriculture
loan 0.003           0.005 0.002
(0.006)         (0.004)            (0.002)
grows tobacco 0.011           0.016**            0.010
(0.007)         (0.008)            (0.007)
land -0.002 -0.001 -0.003
(0.003)         (0.002)            (0.003)
livestock -0.005* -0.004 -0.005












Variable (1)              (2) (3)
Religion
muslim 0.011              0.016
(0.011)            (0.011)
catholic 0.001 -0.001
(0.010)            (0.010)
protestant 0.016              0.015
(0.011)            (0.011)
Community
has clinic 0.007 0.008 0.007
(0.007) (0.007)            (0.007)
lives in trading centre -0.001 -0.001 -0.001






Loglikelihood -867.28 -870.62 -864.89
Chisquare 2006.61 2001.93 2013.39
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402
McFadden R2 0.536 0.535 0.538
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable
is a dummy for more than two children. The coefficients are marginal effects evaluated as partial changes at the
mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the partial changes are measured as a discrete
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Table 4.10: Cross equation error correlation
Name of poverty line Rho 95% Confidence Interval
Ultra poor -.2431234 -.3882092 -.0862774
Poor -.1865539 -.3436128 -.0193431
World Bank (US$1) -.177207 -.326869 -.0188744
Table 4.11: Wald test for exogeneity of fertility
Name of poverty line Chi square Prob. > Chi square
Ultra poor 9.05406 0.0026
Poor 4.76884 0.0290











Table 4.12: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (ultra poor)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
two children or more 0.139*** 0.139***
(0.014) (0.014)
two girls first 0.011** 0.011** 0.105***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.020)
mother’s age 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
dependency ratio 0.057*** -0.028*** 0.043*** 0.151***
(0.008)         (0.006) (0.007) (0.023)
age at first birth -0.011***       0.003*** -0.009*** -0.020***
0.002)         (0.001) (0.002)         (0.005)
Education
females with primary -0.027 -0.002 -0.028 -0.002
(0.023)         (0.004)       (0.024)        (0.017)
males with primary -0.010 -0.007* -0.013          0.028*
(0.015)         (0.004)       (0.016)        (0.016)
females with JCE -0.014 -0.006 -0.017          0.020
(0.031)         (0.006)       (0.033)        (0.024)
males with JCE 0.047** -0.012**       0.042*         0.074***
(0.024)         (0.005)       (0.025)        (0.021)
males with MSCE -0.032 -0.022*** -0.043          0.085***
father primary -0.009 0.005 -0.006 -0.030
(0.020)         (0.006)       (0.022)        (0.028)
mother primary -0.007 0.001 -0.007 -0.007
(0.029)         (0.006)       (0.031)        (0.025)
father secondary -0.063***        0.014 -0.057** -0.146***
(0.020)         (0.009)       (0.023)        (0.054)
mother secondary -0.065*** -0.001 -0.066*** -0.048
(0.022)         (0.006)       (0.024)        (0.043)
Employment
father works -0.035*** -0.005** -0.037***       0.007
(0.012)         (0.002)       (0.013)        (0.008)
mother works -0.031 -0.006** -0.034          0.019*
(0.022)         (0.003)       (0.023)        (0.011)
children work at home 0.018 -0.021***      0.007          0.108***
(0.014)         (0.006)       (0.014)        (0.025)
children work outside home 0.027 -0.006         0.024          0.030*
(0.026)         (0.004) (0.027)        (0.016)
number of enterprises -0.019* -0.002 -0.020* -0.001
(0.011)         (0.001)       (0.011)        (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.053*** 0.001
(0.001)         (0.002)       (0.002)        (0.001)
grows tobacco -0.010 -0.003 -0.012          0.010
(0.014)         (0.002)       (0.015)        (0.007)
land -0.011*** -0.003 -0.012** -0.001
(0.001)         (0.003)       (0.002)        (0.001)
livestock -0.030*** -0.002** -0.031*** -0.005
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Table 4.12: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.031 -0.002         0.031          0.017
(0.028)         (0.003)       (0.029)        (0.012)
catholic 0.025           0.002         0.027          0.000
(0.019)         (0.003)       (0.020)        (0.011)
protestant 0.035** -0.000         0.035**        0.016
(0.015)         (0.003)       (0.016)        (0.012)
Community
has clinic -0.029** -0.004* -0.031**        0.006
(0.014)         (0.002)       (0.014)        (0.007)
lives in trading centre -0.027 -0.002 -0.029 -0.000
(0.032)         (0.004) (0.033)        (0.019)
Region
north 0.012           0.001         0.013 -0.001
(0.022)         (0.004)       (0.023)        (0.013)
centre -0.093*** -0.013*** -0.100*** 0.023**
(0.015)         (0.004)       (0.015)        (0.009)
Chisquare 725.23
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty











Table 4.13: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (World Bank)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
two children or more 0.167*** 0.167***
(0.020)                       (0.020)
two girls first 0.010*        0.010* 0.106***
(0.005) (0.005)        (0.020)
mother’s age 0.003** -0.002 0.003**        0.001
(0.001)         (0.002) (0.001)        (0.001)
dependency ratio 0.080*** -0.033***      0.059***       0.150***
(0.010)         (0.007)       (0.010)        (0.023)
age at first birth -0.013***       0.004*** -0.010*** -0.020***
(0.002)         (0.001)        (0.002) (0.005)
Education
females with primary -0.040 -0.002 -0.042 -0.003
(0.034)         (0.005)       (0.035)        (0.017)
males with primary -0.008 -0.008* -0.013          0.027
(0.017)         (0.004)       (0.018)        (0.016)
females with JCE -0.018 -0.007 -0.023          0.020
(0.036) (0.007)       (0.038)        (.024)
males with JCE 0.043 -0.016***      0.033          0.075***
(0.031)         (0.006)       (0.032)        (0.021)
males with MSCE -0.030 -0.024*** -0.046 0.086***
(0.049)         (0.009)       (0.051)        (0.029)
father primary -0.012           0.006 -0.008 -0.028
(0.025)         (0.007)       (0.027)        (0.028)
mother primary 0.017           0.003         0.019 -0.007
(0.046)         (0.007)       (0.048)        (0.024)
father secondary -0.099***        0.015 -0.091*** -0.147***
(0.024) (0.010)       (0.028)        (0.054)
mother secondary -0.064*          0.003 -0.062* -0.046
(0.035)         (0.009)       (0.038)        (0.043)
Employment
father works -0.035** -0.004* -0.038**        0.007
(0.016)         (0.002)       (0.016)        (0.008)
mother works -0.036 -0.006** -0.040          0.018
(0.027)         (0.003)       (0.028)        (0.011)
children work at home 0.039** -0.024***      0.024          0.108***
(0.017)         (0.006)       (0.017)        (0.025)
children work outside home 0.053 -0.006         0.050          0.029*
(0.034) (0.005)       (0.035)        (0.016)
number of enterprises -0.031** -0.002 -0.033** -0.001
(0.013)         (0.002)       (0.013)        (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.026*** -0.022** -0.046**        0.002
(0.002)         (0.005)       (0.001)        (0.002)
grows tobacco -0.032* -0.005** -0.035*         0.010
(0.017)         (0.002)       (0.018)        (0.007)
land -0.002* -0.002 -0.004 -0.002
livestock -0.038*** -0.001* -0.039*** -0.005*
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Table 4.13: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.025 -0.003         0.023          0.017
(0.033)         (0.004) (0.034)        (0.012)
catholic 0.029 0.002 0.030 -0.000
(0.023)         (0.003) (0.024)        (0.011)
protestant 0.022 -0.002         0.021          0.015
(0.021)         (0.003) (0.022) (0.012)
Community
has clinic -0.043** -0.005* -0.046**        0.007
(0.018)         (0.002)       (0.019)        (0.007)
lives in trading centre -0.040 -0.003 -0.042 -0.001
(0.037)         (0.005)       (0.038)        (0.020
Region
north 0.007           0.001         0.008 -0.001
(0.027)         (0.004)       (0.029)        (0.013)
centre -0.130*** -0.015*** -0.141***       0.024**
(0.019)         (0.005)       (0.019)        (0.009)
Chisquare 828.37
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty











Table 4.14: Impact of endogenous fertility on poverty (poor)
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Demographics
two children or more 0.304*** 0.304***
(0.040) (0.040)
two girls first 0.015** 0.015** 0.106***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.020)
mother’s age 0.006*** -0.003 0.006***          0.001
(0.002)         (0.002)          (0.002)           (0.001)
dependency ratio 0.169*** -0.081***         0.109***          0.148***
(0.020)         (0.016) (0.017)           (0.023)
age at first birth -0.024*** 0.010*** -0.016*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Education
females with primary -0.119*** -0.005 -0.124*** -0.002
(0.042)         (0.010)          (0.044)           (0.017)
males with primary -0.001 -0.017 -0.014             0.028
(0.038)         (0.011) (0.041)           (0.017)
females with JCE 0.048 -0.011            0.041             0.022
(0.055)         (0.014)          (0.059)           (0.024)
males with JCE 0.084* -0.041***         0.054             0.075***
(0.047)         (0.014)          (0.050)           (0.021)
males with MSCE -0.074 -0.055*** -0.118             0.086***
(0.070)         (0.019)          (0.074) (0.029)
father primary -0.064           0.013 -0.055 -0.029
(0.043)         (0.016)          (0.046)           (0.028)
mother primary 0.079           0.009            0.088 -0.008
(0.061)         (0.016)          (0.064)           (0.025)
father secondary -0.228***        0.049* -0.195*** -0.148***
(0.043)         (0.025)          (0.050)           (0.054)
mother secondary -0.185***        0.009 -0.181*** -0.047
(0.057)         (0.018)          (0.063)           (0.042)
Employment
father works -0.055** -0.007 -0.061**           0.007
(0.024)         (0.004)          (0.025)           (0.007)
mother works -0.008 -0.010 -0.016             0.016
(0.046)         (0.007)          (0.047)           (0.011)
children work at home 0.062** -0.060***         0.016             0.107***
(0.028)         (0.015)          (0.027)           (0.025)
children work outside home 0.088* -0.015            0.077             0.029*
(0.049)         (0.011)          (0.050)           (0.016)
number of enterprises -0.091*** -0.004 -0.095*** -0.001
(0.020)         (0.004)          (0.020)           (0.006)
Agriculture
loan -0.028*** -0.001 -0.029*** 0.003
(0.002)         (0.004)          (0.005)           (0.007)
grows tobacco -0.087*** -0.010** -0.096***          0.011
(0.028)         (0.005)          (0.029)           (0.007)
land -0.002*          0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002)          (0.004)           (0.002)
livestock -0.060*** -0.004 -0.061*** -0.005*
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Table 4.14: Continued
Poverty Equation Fertility Equation
Variable Direct effect Indirect effect Total effect Total effect
Religion
muslim 0.039 -0.008            0.033             0.016
(0.044)         (0.007)          (0.044)           (0.012)
catholic 0.015           0.001            0.016 -0.001
(0.033)         (0.006)          (0.035)           (0.011)
protestant 0.006 -0.008 -0.001 0.014
(0.031)         (0.007)          (0.033)           (0.012)
Community
has clinic -0.064** -0.007 -0.070**           0.007
(0.027)         (0.004)          (0.028)           (0.007)
lives in trading centre -0.089 -0.005 -0.094             0.001
(0.085)         (0.010)          (0.088)           (0.019)
Region
north 0.040           0.002            0.042 -0.000
(0.045)         (0.008)          (0.046)           (0.013)
centre -0.171*** -0.022*** -0.190***          0.024**
(0.029)         (0.007)          (0.029)            (0.009)
Chisquare 1076.35
Prob > Chisquare 0.00
Sample size 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The coefficients are
marginal effects. For variables which appear in both the poverty and fertility equations, the marginal effects are
decomposed into two effects. The direct effect produced by its presence in the poverty equation, and an indirect
effect which works through the fertility equation. The sum of the two makes the total effect. The total effect may not
exactly equal the sum of the two effects due to rounding. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The poverty











Table 4.15: Accounting for household composition and economies of scale (marginal effects)
Ultrapoor Worldbank Poor
Variable per capita AES per capita AES per capita AES
UNIVARIATE PROBIT
two children or more 0.109*** 0.018*** 0.134*** 0.030*** 0.225*** 0.147***
(0.013) (0.004) (0.016) (0.005) (0.027) (0.015)
All covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chisquare 511.47 208.69 624.9 263.63 892.5 542.73
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 0.00
McFadden R2 0.167 0.18 0.175 0.176 0.19 0.153
BIVARIATE PROBIT
two children or more 0.139*** 0.026*** 0.167***    0.037*** 0.304*** 0.177***
(0.014) (0.002) (0.020) (0.006) (0.040) (0.020)
Instrument Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
All covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Chisquare 725.23 4792.6 828.37 665.49 1076.35 779.68
Prob > Chisquare 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. The per capita poverty equations are based on annualized per capita real consumption
expenditure, and AES poverty equations are based on annualized real consumption expenditure per adult equivalent
scale and economies of scale.  For the poverty equations in the bivariate probit we report the total marginal effects
only. For brevity total marginal effects of the fertility equation for the bivariate probit are not reported. The per
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Table 4.16: OLS and 2SLS results of continuous fertility and poverty
OLS 2SLS
Variable per capita AES per capita AES
two children or more -0.298*** -0.172*** -0.568*** -0.456***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.124) (0.122)
Instrument - - Yes Yes
All covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman test - - 0.281** 0.295**
(0.125) (0.123)
Mean of dep variable 9.627 9.99 9.627 9.99
(.578) (.547) (.578) (.547)
F-stat 59.75 43.45 53.86 40.18
Prob> F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sample size 3402 3402 3402 3402
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Numbers in parentheses
are standard errors. The dependent variables for the per capita models are log of the annualized per capita real
consumption expenditure. The dependent variables for the AES regressions are the log of the annualized real
consumption expenditure per adult equivalent and economies of scale. The Hausman test is a regression based test











Table 4.17: Impact of fertility on subjective poverty
Variable
Demographics









females with primary -0.046***
(0.014)
males with primary -0.008
(0.013)
females with JCE -0.055***
(0.019)
males with JCE -0.012
(0.014)















children work at home -0.048***
(0.011)
children work outside home 0.042***
(0.015)












































Prob > Chisquare 0.000
Sample size 3402
McFadden R2 0.159
Notes: The significance asterisks are defined as follows: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. The dependent variable is
a subjective poverty indicator based on the Economic Ladder Question (ELQ. The coefficients are marginal effects
evaluated as partial changes at the mean value of the continuous covariates. For dummy covariates, the partial
changes are measured as a discrete change in the poverty indicator as the dummy covariate changes from 0 to 1.












Recognizing the important role that education plays in economic growth and the ght
against poverty, the thesis has looked at three interrelated themes concerning household
schooling investments in children and the impact of fertility on poverty in Malawi. We have
used data from the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) to conduct the
empirical analyses. We have looked at factors which a¤ect spending on primary education
in both rural and urban Malawi as well as what explains the gap in spending in education
between the two areas of residence. Mindful of the crucial role that parents play in the
human capital formation of non-biological children in Africa, we have investigated the
issue of schooling bias that parents may exhibit against non-biological children. We have
also recognized that parents do not just make decisions on education investments of own
and non-biological children, they also make choices on the size of the family to have. The
thesis has made contributions on these rather intertwined issues.
Looking back, some of the take home messages from the thesis include the nding that
parental characteristics have a bigger impact on spending in rural areas, and that a
mothers characteristics have a larger impact on spending compared to a fathers. We
have argued that this nding has two important implications. First, if one thinks of the
employment status and education of the mother as a reection of the bargaining power
of the mother in the household, this would imply that childrens education benets from
an improvement in the bargaining position of the mother. Secondly, this result has in-
tergenerational implications for human capital formation in that more female education
entails more educated mothers, and hence more education for children. Besides, better
education and employment for mothers has also been shown to be one of the signicant
factors in redressing the rural-urban spending gap. Improvements in household economic
status have been shown to play an important role of increasing spending on education and
reducing the rural-urban spending gap. We have also shown that as the economic status
of a household gets better, intrahousehold schooling bias against non-biological children
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positive e¤ect on the education investments that parents make on their own children, but
also lead to a reduction in schooling bias against non-biological children. There is however
a catch in e¤orts to improve the welfare of a household and its human capital formation,
in the sense that the number of children that a household has negatively impacts on a
households economic condition, but improvements in the economic status of a household
lead to improvements in human capital accumulation. Thus, human capital formation at
the household level would benet from small family sizes in so far as small family sizes
are good for a households economic condition.
Critically, the nding that households feel less poor if they have more children suggests
an apparent conict in e¤orts to increase human capital formation, which as it has been
argued is necessary for economic growth to take place. It further throws some light on why
many households in Malawi have many children in spite of the negative economic conse-
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